Author Archive

WA Legal Roundup – WA State Supreme Court: Cause of Action for Loss of Chance of Better Outcome

October 13, 2011

Mohr v. Grantham

In Herskovits, the supreme court decided that there was a cause of action for a loss of chance of survival. But what if someone doesn’t die, but instead lost the chance of a better outcome? That question is now answered. Mohr had a stroke, a bad one. Had Mohr had better treatment, the outcome would have been different:

The testimony included expert opinions that the treatment Mrs. Mohr received violated standards of care and that, had Mrs. Mohr received nonnegligent treatment at various points between August 31 and September 1, 2004, she would have had a 50 to 60 percent chance of a better outcome. The better outcome would have been no disability or, at least, significantly less disability.

Now, note, the court didn’t need to reach that issue. Here, the chance was 50-60%, which makes it more probable than not that the failure to properly treat led to increased or total injury. They didn’t need to touch Herskovits as the standard for a normal tort claim was right there.

The example I use is this: The expert says, well, there was a 60% chance if the surgery was done by someone competent, she would have had the same result. But a 40% chance she would have had a better outcome. The surgery as done gave her a 0% chance of a better outcome. Under the old standard, this did not meet more probable than not, and thus a directed verdict would have been appropriate. Now, there’s a cause of action.

WA Legal Roundup – WA State Supreme Court: Per curium defining substantial bodily harm; withdrawal of plea ok given misunderstanding of offender score

October 6, 2011

Two new opinions out of the court. One was a per curiam decision. What does that mean? The law in the thing is so basic, that the court doesn’t really feel the need to have a “majority” author, because the court is speaking with one united voice. Here, in State v. McKague, the court used the opportunity to correct the court of appeals definition of substantially bodily harm:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a split decision. Judge Armstrong dissented on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm.” He specifically disagreed with the lead opinion’s citation to a dictionarydefinition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” State v. McKague, 159 Wn. App. 489, 520-21, 246 P.3d 558 (2011) (Armstrong, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Armstrong opined that under this definition, any cognizable injury would necessarily be “substantial.” He would have held that the term “substantial” requires the harm to be considerable and that the State’s evidence was insufficient to meet that standard.

We agree with Judge Armstrong that the majority applied an erroneous definition of “substantial,” but we nonetheless affirm McKague’s conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show that Chang’s injuries were “substantial” under a proper definition.

The court takes no side on whether it was appropriate to define substantial in a jury instruction, only that the definition by the court of appeals was wrong. So what is the proper definition?

We hold instead that the term “substantial,” as used in RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), signifies a degree of harm that is considerable and necessarily requires a showing greater than an injury merely having some existence. While we do not limit the meaning of “substantial” to any particular dictionary definition, we approve of the definition cited by the dissent below: “considerable in amount, value, or worth.” Webster’s, supra, at 2280.

The next case on the block is State v. Robinson. Robinson was given a plea deal after being explained the implications. He thought his juvenile offenses had washed out. Not true. So basically he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary waiver, and the trial court allowed him to withdraw the plea. The Supremes agreed, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to do so.

 

WA Legal Roundup – WA State Supreme Court: No appeal of hearing for school district. Must read for teachers!

October 5, 2011

Federal Way Sch. Dist. v. Vinson

When a teacher loses a dispute in this state at the level of administrative hearing, they have the ability to appeal to the court. A lot of this is rooted in the fact that the license carries with it the ability to work. Any law student who has taken constitutional law can tell you that (due process, people). In Washington, its also governed by statute.

The statute doesn’t provide a right of appeal to the school districts if the hearing officer finds for the teacher, a fact which has been just affirmed by our supreme court:

We hold that the statutory writ, an extraordinary remedy, is not available to the school district. In contrast, the constitutional writ is always available to a party seeking relief from arbitrary, capricious, or illegal acts. The hearing officer acted within the limits of his statutory authority, and his final decision was not arbitrary or capricious. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the attorney fees awarded by the superior court.

The court of appeals reasoning below basically held that a teacher could be fired for doing anything not work related during the school day, even if at lunch:

The Court of Appeals first deviated from our stated rule in Clarke in Sauter v. Mount Vernon School District No. 320, 58 Wn. App. 121, 791 P.2d 549 (1990). Relying on Pryse and Potter,[17] the Sauter court eliminated the remediability prong of the second Clarke test. Sauter, 58 Wn. App. at 130-31. The Sauter test — sufficient cause for a teacher’s discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher’s deficiency is (1) irremediable and materially and substantially affects the teacher’s performance or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose — eradicated the significant protections previously afforded teachers by the sufficient cause standard.[18] Under the Sauter test, any misconduct will be grounds for discharge because, by definition, misconduct is behavior that “lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose.” Id. at 130.

The ramifications of the modified-Clarke rule are glaringly apparent in Vinson. The Clarke rule as modified by Vinson holds that any time a teacher, in the course of his job, engages in conduct lacking any “professional purpose,” that teacher may be discharged. Vinson, 154 Wn. App. at 230. This creates a per se rule of discharge under which any school-day lapse, no matter how minor and no matter the context, will always constitute sufficient cause for the teacher’s discharge. Essentially, the Vinson court, relying on Sauter, removes the required nexus between alleged teacher misconduct or deficiency and teaching performance. We reject this alteration of our Clarke rule. The nexus requirement finds root in the constitution. See, e.g., Hoagland, 95 Wn.2d at 429 (“[I]t would violate due process to discharge a teacher without showing actual impairment to performance.”).

Sufficient cause may be found as a matter of law, without applying the Clarke test or Hoagland factors, in only the most egregious cases. We hold that where a teacher engages in sexually exploitive conduct or physical abuse of a student, sufficient cause is established as a matter of law; the Clarke test and Hoagland factors (if applicable, see Clarke, 106 Wn.2d at 114) must be applied in all nonflagrant instances of misconduct.

So basically, because the conduct of the teacher on his lunch (shouting match with a former student, who was harassing him because of gender identity) had nothing to do with his ability to teach, he gets to keep his job.

WA Legal Roundup – Div I: Commission Order Lessening Cops Punishment Not Supported By Substantial Evidence; Requests Under the PRA are NOT Continuing (duh); Oath-ify Your De Novo; UW Has Delegated Authority to Suspend Raises; But There’s Not…err…typo…NOW Racism; Review Those Manslaughter Instructions; Can’t Just Toss Out an Other-Person With ONLY Evidence That Another Said They Did It To Cops; Goodwill is an Asset

September 19, 2011

Holy &*(%!!!! Is Division I trying to kill yours truly? I need to get a hold of some truthers up in this biatch! Seriously! Eight opinions?! Ever heard of a little thing called staggering? Or scotch! Scotch would resolve this problem, I bet. If you’re hungover, you won’t pump out this much work in one day.

Werner v. Seattle Police Dep’t

Its rare that you see something kicked back on lack of evidence grounds. Here, Werner (an officer with SPD) was disciplined for lying to investigators about striking a suspect. SPD, of course, wants its officers to be truthful. This is especially true given the recent string of incidents of officer violence.

Anyhow, Werner was being investigated for excessive force and denied striking a suspect. During the interview process for a job in Snohomish, he admitted to striking the suspect.

Gil 86′d the officer, but the commission reduced it to a 30-day suspension based on what it deemed uneven application of the discipline rules around truthfulness.

29.  Even-Handedness of the Rule.  The Commission 
       majority is concerned about the even-handedness in which the 
       Department is applying its rules.  There is evidence that employees
       in past cases involving dishonesty either received no suspension 
       of duties or only temporary suspension of duties.  Examples of 
       more lenient punishment include an officer who fired shots at a 
       stolen car and then misrepresented the facts was not suspended 
       for the incident; an officer who did not notify authorities of the 
       discharge of his service weapon, and only reported the incident 
       when he learned that local police were investigating was not 
       suspended but instead received a disciplinary transfer with no loss 
       of pay; an off-duty officer was involved in an encounter when her 
       handgun was accidentally discharged, she initially denied it before 
       reporting it to her chain of command and was given only 15 days 
       suspension; and an officer, who denied using any force but was 
       contradicted by three witnesses, received a one-day suspension 
       for excessive force in a case where dishonesty was an issue. To 
       date, no other employee has been terminated based on 
       dishonesty.  The Commission majority concludes the evidence 
       does not support that the Department even-handedly applied its 
       rules.

       The superior court reversed finding of fact 29 for lack of evidentiary 

support. The superior court ruled as follows:  

              The Department correctly argues that the finding is not supported 
       by substantial evidence.  To the contrary, none of the cases cited by the 
       Commission include a sustained finding of dishonesty (as opposed to 
       other misconduct).  Moreover, none of the cited cases involve a sustained 
       finding of intentional dishonesty in an investigation regarding use of force.  
       Nor did the Commission find that the misbehavior in the cited cases was 
       either as serious as or more serious than Werner's dishonesty.  In short, 
       there is neither any evidence that other officers who either engaged in the 
       same behavior or who were disciplined for dishonesty were treated 

                                           8 

No. 65632-5-I/9

       differently.

Yes, I’m going to be lazy and not format that. Its a pain in the butt and I have better things to do. Anyhow, the supremes went through the cases of “unevenhandedness” and found that they weren’t comparable to Werner, noting that even Diaz had testified that not all discrepancies are acts of dishonesty (the law does allow for brain farts).

The superior court decision stands and the court refused to reinstate the commission ruling.

Sargent v. Seattle Police Department

There is no standing request under the PRA. Once the disclosure is made, they don’t have to keep looking through new documents. Can you imagine?!

Brackman v. City of Lake Forest Park

A certificate of service filed with a request for trial de novo that is

signed by a legal assistant, but is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury, is

not "proof that a copy has been served" under Mandatory Arbitration Rule (MAR)

7.1(a).  We affirm the trial court's decision to strike the request for trial de novo and the 

order denying reconsideration.

Nye v. Univ. of Wash.

Peter Nye, representing a putative class of University of 

Washington faculty members, appeals a summary judgment order dismissing his 

breach of contract claim against the  university.  Nye contends the university 

breached its contractual obligation under the faculty salary policy to pay two 

percent merit raises to eligible faculty members during the 2009-2011 biennium.  

Because the university acted within its delegated authority in suspending the 

merit raises, we affirm.

State v. Read

Read argued that he didn’t focus his racial epithets at one person as required by the law. The court begged to differ: “We hold that the virulent racial epithets Read used coupled with his aggressive and intimidating conduct establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Read intentionally and maliciously threatened the victim because of her race, color, ancestry, or national origin, and sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Read made a true threat.

Donezo!

State v. Peters

The jury 

found Peters not guilty of felony murder but guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.  

Contrary to State v. Gamble, 154 Wn.2d 457, 114 P.3d 646 (2005) and 11 Washington 

Practice:  Washington Pattern Jury Instructions:  Criminal 10.03 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC),

the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that in order to convict Peters of 

manslaughter in the first degree, the State need only prove that he knew of and 

disregarded "a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur," rather than "a substantial 

risk that death may occur." Because the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless  

No. 64568-4-I/2

beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

State v. Strizheus

This one is interesting. Strizheus pointed to his son, Vladimir. Because of what I’m about to type, I think I should refer to him as “Vlad the Stabby”:

In his trial brief, Strizheus claimed Valentina blamed Strizheus for committing the 

crime because she was more afraid of Vladimir than she was of Strizheus.  Strizheus

asserted that Vladimir "is a suspect in this case" and there was evidence that 

established Vladimir committed the charged crime.  Strizheus argued that the evidence 

of Vladimir's October 2007 statements to the police, the February 2007 malicious 

mischief conviction, the 2008 incident resulting in the assault charge, and evidence that 

police had been called to the residence on several occasions in the months before the 

stabbing, met the requirements to admit evidence that Vladimir committed the crime.  

The defense further sought to introduce evidence that Vladimir was angry at Strizheus

because Strizheus allegedly had sex with Vladimir's girlfriend, and evidence that 

Valentina broke up a physical fight between Strizheus and Vladimir a couple of days 

before the stabbing.  

       The trial court addressed the admissibility of the proffered other suspect

                                               6 

No. 64077-1-I/7

evidence several times during the trial.  Most of the discussion focused on the 

admissibility of the statements Vladimir made in October 2007 as recounted in the 

police reports.  The State and the defense disputed whether these statements 

amounted to a confession to the crime.  Relying on the report of one officer, the 

defense argued that Vladimir said that he "'stabbed his mother and father.'"  The State

countered that the statements the defense relied on were not actually Vladimir's words 

but only the officer's interpretation of what Vladimir said to the other officer.  According 

to the State, the police officer whose report Vladimir cited would testify that Vladimir's 

actual statements were "'[i]t's my fault, arrest me.  I should be in jail.'"

 

Now, I don’t know about you, but those statements seem pretty clear cut evidence of a different person committing the crime. I’m no Sherlock Holmes here, but a guy coming up to me and saying “I stabbed her” is pretty good evidence that its not anyone that didn’t say that.

The court of appeals frames this, talking not about the other evidence, which Strizheus didn’t talk about in the brief, but which he rested on just the statement:

But on appeal, Strizheus challenges only the trial court's 

exclusion of the statement Vladimir allegedly made to police in October 2007.  

Strizheus argues that the prior statement is direct evidence that Vladimir committed the 

crime.  Strizheus claims a statement that Vladimir stabbed his mother and father,

standing alone, satisfies the nexus required to admit evidence showing that Vladimir 

committed the crime.        

I dunno, they say its not enough on its own. I don’t agree with this. This is when we get down to technicalities instead of truth. Hopefully there’s an appeal to the supreme court.

Dixon v. Crawford, McGilliard, Peterson & Yelish

Goodwill is an asset for law firms.


In other news, have you checked out the new blog? The Nursing Home Neglect Report covers issues of elder abuse and neglect and elder care. You can find it at http://www.nursinghomeneglectreport.com.

WA Legal Roundup – WA Supreme Court: No specific findings competency for waiver needed for pro-se; County jails need to provide good-time credit; failure to define aggravators not a manifest constitutional error; Statutory language trumps on lien

September 15, 2011

Pers. Restraint of Rhome

In this original personal restraint petition, Demar Rhome argues 

that the state and federal constitutions require independent findings of fact that a 

defendant is competent to waive counsel and represent himself at trial.  He also 

argues that the colloquy conducted by the trial court here was inadequate to secure a 

valid waiver of counsel.  We disagree and dismiss his personal restraint petition.

Pers. Restraint of Talley

We hold that the statutory issue is properly before us.  We also hold 

that former RCW 9.92.151 requires a county jail to provide opportunities for 

a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit.  We do not reach Talley's 

constitutional issue.  Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicts with 

former RCW 9.92.151, Talley should receive earned early-release credit at 

the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.

State v. Gordon

John Gordon and Charles Bukovsky were each charged 

with second-degree murder in the beating death of Brian Lewis.  The State also 

sought two aggravating sentencing factors: deliberate cruelty and particular 

vulnerability of the victim.  The jury was instructed to determine whether the  

State v. Gordon (John Caldwell); State v. Bukovsky (Charles Andrew), 84240-0

aggravators were present, but the instructions did not define "deliberate cruelty" or 

"particular vulnerability."    The defendants did not object to the instructions on that 

basis.  The jury found the defendants guilty and also found the aggravators applied.  

The trial court imposed exceptional sentences.  We must decide whether the failure 

to provide detailed instructions defining the meaning of "deliberate cruelty" or 

"particular vulnerability" is a manifest error of constitutional magnitude that may be 

addressed for the first time on appeal.  We hold that it is not and therefore reverse 

the Court of Appeals.

Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc.

RCW 60.04.091(2) requires mechanics' liens to be 

"acknowledged pursuant to chapter 64.08 RCW"  --  that is, an authorized person 

must certify in writing that the signor executed the lien freely and voluntarily.  RCW 

64.08.050.  RCW 60.04.091(2) also includes a sample claim of lien that the statute

states "shall be sufficient" but that does not include language satisfying the

acknowledgment requirement.  Contractors Athletic Fields Inc. (AFI) and Hos Bros. 

Construction Inc. each filed claims of lien that used the sample form and did not 

contain certificates of acknowledgment.  In each case, the lower court concluded the 

lien was invalid.  We disagree and hold that a claim of lien in the sample form is 

valid despite the absence of a proper acknowledgment.

 

 

In other news, have you checked out the new blog? The Nursing Home Neglect Report covers issues of elder abuse and neglect and elder care. You can find it at http://www.nursinghomeneglectreport.com




WA Court of Appeals – Div III: A bunch of blahdeblah criminal stuff; Pretext stops still illegal; need to give evidence of prior conviction for felony DUI; Real Estate Transactions are BOOOORING

September 15, 2011

I’m going to be lazy and post these quotes unformatted. Forgive the sin :)

State v. Guerrero

Cesar Bribiesca Guerrero requested, but was denied, sentencing 

under the drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA), RCW 9.94A.660.  He appeals, 

arguing procedural error, that the trial court failed to meaningfully consider his request,

and that the court abused its discretion by imposing a $3,000 methamphetamine lab clean-

up fine. We find no error or abuse of discretion and affirm.

State v. Arreola

First, I just need to say how lucky Mr. Arreola is that his family kept that extra r in his last name. That said, this case involves using a tailpipe to pull someone over to investigate drunk driving despite seeing nothing that would make the officer thing that this was a drunk driver.

Pretextual traffic stops are prohibited by the Washington 

Constitution.  Const. art. I, § 7; State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 

(1999).  In this case, a patrol officer followed Gilbert Chacon Arreola's blue Chevy 

Cavalier for over a half mile because it fit the description of a car reportedly driven by a 

suspected drunk driver.  While watching for signs of impaired driving, the officer noticed

the car was equipped with a modified muffler in violation of state vehicle equipment 

requirements.  Without having seen any evidence of impaired driving, the officer pulled
over Mr. Chacon1 with the primary motive of investigating whether he was driving under 

the influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of RCW 46.61.502.  At a hearing on Mr.  

No. 29164-2-III
State v. Chacon Arreola

Chacon's motion to suppress the State's evidence, the officer testified that the muffler 

was an additional reason for the stop and, hypothetically, would have caused him to stop 

and cite Mr. Chacon even absent suspicion of drunk driving.  

       The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court's finding of the officer's 

secondary, hypothetically sufficient reason for the stop supports its conclusion that the 

stop was nonpretextual and constitutional.  We hold that it does not.  The court's findings 

that the officer was following Mr. Chacon to investigate a possible DUI and stopped him 

principally for that reason compel the conclusion that the stop violated the Washington 

Constitution.  We reverse Mr. Chacon's conviction and remand with directions to dismiss 

the charges with prejudice.

State v. Santos

Felony driving under the influence (DUI) requires a showing that 

the defendant has been convicted of previous DUIs within a given time frame.  And, in 

Washington, the State must show that the person named in earlier judgments or court 

documents and the defendant presently sitting in the courtroom is the same person.  The 

State did not make that showing here, so we reverse this felony DUI conviction and 

remand for entry of a conviction and a sentence for gross misdemeanor DUI.

Washington Prof. Real Estate, LLC, v. Young

Reversal of SJ. Facts are at issue whether the buyers of the young’s home learned of the listing through WPRE’s marketing efforts. YAWN!

 

In other news, have you seen our new website on Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect? I’m pretty proud of this baby. Its called The Nursing Home Neglect Report. You can find it at http://www.nursinghomeneglectreport.com.

 


WA Legal Roundup – Div I: Need to Tell the Jurors How They Arrive at Collective ‘No’

September 7, 2011

State v. Campbell

All you need to know is here:

Kenneth Campbell was charged with two counts of assault in the second degree and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Regarding the assault charges, the State sought firearm sentence enhancements on both counts. When instructing the jury as to its deliberative responsibilities with respect to the special verdicts on the sentence enhancement allegations, the trial court correctly instructed the jurors as to the process by which each juror could arrive at an individual conclusion that the correct answer to the inquiry on a special verdict form was “yes,” the process by which each juror could arrive at an individual conclusion that the correct answer to the inquiry was “no,” and the process by which the jury could properly render a collective “yes” answer. To render a proper collective answer of “yes,” jury unanimity was required. However, the trial court did not instruct the jurors as to how the jury could properly return a collective answer of “no” — that is, by either unanimously agreeing that the correct answer was “no” or by failing to reach unanimous agreement on the question. In this respect, the trial court erred.

This error was exacerbated when the trial court subsequently declined to answer the jury’s direct question as to whether unanimity was required in order for the jury to collectively conclude that the State had failed to meet its burden of 
proof on the allegations referenced in the special verdicts. In determining not to answer the jury’s question, other than to refer the jury to the instructions previously given, the trial court articulated a misapprehension of the legal effect 
of an absence of unanimity on a special verdict, likening it to a mistrial as opposed to an acquittal. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in determining not to further instruct the jury.

Under the circumstances of this case, the instructional error cannot be considered harmless. Thus, we order the vacation of the special verdicts and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

WA Legal Roundup – Div. II: DSHS Entitled to Chevron-esque Deference on Food Allotments; Land Use Lawyers are Still Nerds; PRA Doesn’t Mandate E-Disclosure, Still Mandates Explaining Exemptions; Trailer Parks Still Suck

September 7, 2011

Green v. DSHS

Green challenged DSHS calculations of income deductions to her food benefits under the WACs. The superior court granted class status. The court of appeals reversed, stating the WAC was ambiguous and the ALJ was entitled to deference on interpretation of agency regulation (86′ing the class and upholding the ALJ decision):

Former WAC 388-450-0175 (2006), the primary regulation at issue in this appeal, stated, ”The department gives special deductions to people who receive income from work while receiving General Assistance-Unemployable (GA-U).” For these individuals, the regulation directed the Department to deduct the following from the GA-U client’s gross income: (1) $85.00, (2) one-half of the individual’s remaining monthly gross earned income, and (3) 20 percent of the individual’s gross earned income for work expenses. Former WAC 388-450-0175 (2006). The regulation required the Department to deduct these amounts before determining the individual’s eligibility and monthly benefits. Former WAC 388-450-0175 (2006).

Former WAC 388-450-0175 (2006) was ambiguous because its scope was unclear. It could have meant, as the Department contends, that when a GA-U client received income from work, the Department had to apply the deductions in former WAC 388-450-0175 (2006) to a client’s gross income when determining only the client’s GA-U eligibility and monthly benefits. See Appellant’s Br. at 8-9 (“At all times prior and subsequent to the amendment, the Department has consistently interpreted WAC 388-450-0175 to apply exclusively to the General Assistance Program.”) Alternatively, the regulation could have applied more broadly, as Green contends. Thus, it could have required the Department to apply its deductions to a GA-U client’s gross income when determining the client’s eligibility and monthly benefits for GA-U and other public assistance programs that the Department administered, like Basic Food.

I can v. Wwgmhb

Land use opinion. Read it if you want, nerds!

NewImage

Mitchell v. Dep’t of Corrections

Mitchell requested records under the PRA, but requested they be disclosed electronically. The Department denied the request on the basis that it needed to redact, but couldn’t do so if done electronically (seriously though, get with the times, electronic redaction is SO much easier). However, the department didn’t explain its withholding and claimed exemptions, a violation of the PRA. The court did say that nothing in the PRA mandates electronic disclosure. Again, this should be written in for when departments already have the document scanned in, it would save mucho dinero!

Seashore Villa Ass’n v. Hagglund Family Ltd. P’ship

This is an opinion about trailer parks and carports. Basically these people are losing their carports. If you’re living in a trailer and have a car nice enough for a carport, shift your priorities a little to comport with Maslow’s hierarchy. Shelter should be before fancy transportation.

NewImage

 

WA Legal Roundup – Div I: Eyeman’s Traffic Cam Initiative Off the Ballot

September 7, 2011

American Traffic Solutions v. City of Bellingham

The RCWs gave Bellingham authority to put up traffic cameras. The reason I think the initiative process should be modified or repealed Eyeman sought to hinder that authority. While I generally am not a fan of the cameras, the law on local initiatives is pretty clear when authority comes from state statute:

“An initiative is beyond the scope of the initiative power if the initiative involves powers granted by the legislature to the governing body of a city, rather than the city itself.” Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d at 261. Where the legislature enacts a general law that grants such authority to the legislative body of a city, the exercise of that authority by the legislative body is not “subject to repeal, amendment or modification by the people through the initiative or referendum procedure.” State ex rel. Guthrie v. City of Richland, 80 Wn.2d 382, 384, 494 P.2d 990 (1972); see also Priorities First v. City of Spokane, 93 Wn. App. 406, 410, 968 P.2d 431 (1998) (people cannot deprive the city legislative authority of power to do what a state statute specifically permits it to do). In determining whether the legislature granted authority to the local legislative body, we look primarily to the language of the relevant statute. See Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d at 262-63.

WA Legal Roundup – Div. I: A pucker is not a ham (need anal penetration, not just the buttocks)

September 7, 2011

State v. A.M.

A.M. was 11 when he allegedly “placed his wiener in RD’s butt.” AM was 11, RD was about 7. RD told the officers it touched the outside but didn’t go inside.

The term “sexual intercourse,” for purposes of RCW chapter 9A.44 (sex offenses), “has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight.”  RCW 9A.44.010(1)(a).

That’s the crucial definition here, the difference between Rape of a Child in the First Degree and a lesser charge. The court refused to remand for attempt because the juvenile court didn’t make findings pre-appeal. Same goes with the lesser charge of child molestations.

Two things here, I think the court is narrowly interpreting sexual contact, which meets the definition of intercourse. RD told officers it touched the anus, but didn’t penetrate, which meets the definitions in the RCW.

Second, really? This kid is 11. Obviously he’s had something happen where he because hypersexualized. How about some counseling or something to help him out rather than labeling him as a sex offender. This one goes towards prosecutorial discretion in my book.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 442 other followers