Author Archive

Court of Appeals: Div. II – Defendant Did Have a Clue As To His Guilty Plea, Despite Claim of Incompetency

September 25, 2010

State v. DeClue

Thomas DeClue pled guilty to second degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. DeClue later moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he claimed he was on medication and thus was unable to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. I guess you could say he didn’t have DeClue as to what he was doing! Sorry, I couldn’t resist.

Get a clue

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and several people testified as to DeClue’s competency at the time he plead guilty. A nurse from the jail testified that DeClue had taken several medications at different times including Vicodin, BuSpar, Skelaxin, and Seroquel. I guess incarceration wasn’t too painful.

DeClue testified that the medications made him feel like a zombie and he wasn’t able to process information. Others, including inmates at the jail, also testified that DeClue was drowsy and couldn’t concentrate. However, DeClue’s attorney when he entered the plea testified that DeClue was sharp, astute, paid attention, and had no problems communicating. The judge also reviewed a videotape of the plea. The judge held that entry of the plea did not violate DeClue’s constitutional rights. DeClue appealed.

DeClue contended that since he claimed he was not competent to enter the plea, the statute required that a competency hearing was required not an evidentiary hearing. “If a defendant supports his motion to withdraw a guilty plea with substantial evidence of incompetency, the trial court must either grant the motion or hold a formal competency hearing under RCW 10.77. 060.” The important part of this rule is that the claim must be supported by “substantial evidence of incompetency.” If substantial evidence is lacking, then the motion is denied and no competency hearing is required.

DeClue’s claim that the judge made an error by having an evidentiary hearing rather than a competency hearing failed. The evidentiary hearing was held for the purpose of exploring DeClue’s claim that he was not competent. That exploration ended in a finding that there was no substantial evidence of incompetency and thus no competency hearing was necessary.

DeClue also challenged the trial court’s finding that he was competent. However, given the nurse’s testimony that DeClue didn’t appear intoxicated, DeClue’s attorney’s testimony, and the judge’s own recollection (with assistance from video) of the plea, the Court of Appeals could not find that the judge abused her discretion. Affirmed! Get a clue.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Teacher’s Use of School Computer for Lobbying Is Grounds for Dismissal

August 22, 2010

Knudsen v. Washington State Executive Ethics Board

Knudsen is apparently a take charge kind of person. She even represented herself in the appeal of this case. But sometimes this type of approach can get you into trouble. Knudsen was a teacher at Spokane Community College (SCC). She sent an email from an SCC computer urging recipients to pursue approval of two pending bills that would provide tenure-like protections to part time college teachers. Knudsen was a part time college teacher. Was.

The email violated school policy, state statutes, and administrative code for using state resources for lobbying. Although Knudson did not agree that her email was lobbying, she was unable to present evidence that the email was within the scope of her duties as an English teacher. The Washington State Executive Ethics Board entered a finding that Knudsen had violated school policy, state statutes, and the administrative code. Knudson did try to argue that the email was sent on behalf of her union, but then contradicted herself when she testified that the union had made no efforts to lobby on behalf of this legislation. Knudsen appealed to the Superior Court and then to the Court of Appeals.

The Washington Administrative Code allows for de minimis personal use of state resources, EXCEPT if the use is “for the purpose of participating in or assisting in an effort to lobby the state legislature, or a state agency head.” WAC 292-110-010.

Knudsen argued that the school’s email policy violated her free speech rights. However, her argument was procedurally incorrect, as the Board did not consider the email policy when it made its determination; it only considered the statute and the WAC. Thus the Court of Appeals could not consider the constitutionality of the school’s email policy. The Court agreed, but analyzed her argument anyway:

 

The constitution allows the regulation of protected speech in certain circumstances. For example, speech in public forums is subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. In contrast, speech in nonpublic forums may be restricted if the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral

 

Since the email system was a nonpublic forum and application of the statute and WAC was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, there was no constitutional violation

So in an attempt to protect her teaching position, Knudsen lost hers.  Class dismissed!  Or should I say “Claim dismissed!”

0511-0709-0401-3307_English_Teacher_clipart_image

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Gang Affiliation and Witness Intimidation Not Prejudicial for This Walmart Shopper

August 15, 2010

State v. Saenz

Mr. Saenz was a member of a gang called the Bell Garden Locos in Sunnyside, Washington. Saenz got into a verbal altercation at Walmart with two 15 year old members of a rival gang, the Lower Valley Locos. Walmart makes me crazy too. I become a member of the Low Price Locos and our motto is “I don’t care how cheap it is, get me the hell out of here!”  And their logo is a smiley face…I don’t think so.

Walmart guy

The parties left the store and Saenz had a friend, Guillen, pick him up to pursue the two rivals. They found the rivals driving through the parking lot. Saenz started shooting and the two rivals exited their vehicle and ran. Saenz shot one of them in the back. The other fell while trying to escape and put his head through the glass door at Ace Hardware.

Saenz and Guillen escaped, but were later turned in by a relative. Guillen agreed to testify against Saenz for a plea deal. Saenz was charged with two counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. At trial, the State sought admission of Saenz’s gang affiliation. “The court found that three detectives had specific knowledge of language, formation, affiliation, and overall gang structure. The trial court allowed the detectives to testify regarding gangs and gang activity to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.”

The State also sought to introduce evidence of witness intimidation. Saenz had been sending messages to Guillen while they were both in jail. Saenz wanted Guillen to take responsibility for the crimes because he wouldn’t get as much time. Guillen was warned that if he didn’t take the rap, then he and his family would be harmed. Guillen was assaulted in the jail by a group of inmates who were “sending a message.” The court allowed the evidence regarding witness intimidation to show guilty knowledge of the crimes and participation.

Saenz was convicted on all charges and the State sought to have Saenz sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole because he was a persistent offender. The judge disagreed that Saenz was a persistent offender because Saenz had plead guilty to second degree assault and custodial assault when he was 15 years old. When Saenz plead guilty to these charges he signed a stipulation declining juvenile jurisdiction and specifically waived the requirement of a declination hearing. Saenz was represented by counsel when he plead guilty. However, the judge who took the plea failed to make any findings regarding the declination of juvenile court jurisdiction or Saenz’s waiver. So the trial court in the present case concluded that these convictions did not qualify for purposes of persistent offender status because there was no express waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Saenz had one other serious offender conviction, but the statute requires two convictions for persistent offender status.

Saenz appealed the admission of gang affiliation evidence and witness intimidation. The State appealed the court’s failure to sentence as a persistent offender.

Since the trial court had weighed the probative value of the evidence of gang affiliation against its prejudicial impact and held that the evidence was being introduced to establish motive, intent, opportunity, and res gestae for the crimes charged, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the ruling. Similarly, the witness intimidation evidence was also properly weighed by the trial court and admitted.

Saenz also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. However, given the testimony of the victim AND Saenz’s own homie that he was the shooter, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient.

In addition, the Court of Appeals found that when Saenz entered his plea as a 15 year old, he knowingly and intelligently waived juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus he was a persistent offender under the statute and the trial court was reversed. Saenz will be getting LIFE! Maybe he can start a new gang called the Life Time Locos!

Life

Court of Appeals: Div. III – False Report of Possession Charge Not Defamation

August 12, 2010

Van Hoven v. Pre-Employee.Com, Inc.

Mr. Van Hoven (VH) filled out an application for employment at Central Washington Hospital (CWH). As part of the application process, he was required to submit to a background check which included a criminal history. VH stated on his application that he had not been convicted of any crimes.

Pre-Employee.com conducted the background check and reported that VH had been convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. While it was true that VH had been charged with both of these crimes, he was only convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia (the possession of marijuana had been dismissed). Pre-Employee later corrected the report to reflect that the marijuana charge had been dismissed.

Pot Pipe

A human resources specialist from CWH met with VH and asked him about the convictions. VH admitted that he was guilty of both charges but stated that as part of a plea bargain, the one charge had been dismissed. Because VH had provided false information on his application, his offer of employment was rescinded. VH then filed suit against Pre-Employee for defamation. DEFAMATION?! What’s the thinking process here? “I’m a possessor of drug paraphernalia NOT a possessor of drugs! How dare you! What will my neighbors think!”

The case was dismissed on summary judgment and VH appealed…after he went to Jack In the Box for 99¢ tacos. Dude!

RCW 19.182.080(6) provides:

no consumer may bring an action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against a consumer reporting agency . . . based on information disclosed under this section or RCW 19.182.070, except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure the consumer.

VH argued that the statute didn’t apply, but did not argue that Pre-Employee acted with malice or willful intent to injure. The Court of Appeals found that the statute did apply. In addition, to prove defamation the plaintiff must establish (1) falsity; (2) an unprivileged communication; (3) fault; and (4) damages. Since the hospital would not have hired VH because of the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, the wrong information about the conviction for possession of marijuana was moot. And besides…HE LIED ON HIS APPLICATION!! No damages=No case.

VH

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Holds City Must Haul Their Juveniles 158 Miles for Holding

August 11, 2010

City of East Wenatchee v. Douglas County

East Wenatchee must be a hotbed of juvenile crime. Douglas County had previously allowed East Wenatchee to hold juveniles in their holding facility at Chelan County (Douglas County had a contract with Chelan County). However, the juveniles could only be held at Chelan County until their preliminary hearing. After that, the juveniles were required to be held at a juvenile facility in Medical Lake, which is about 158 miles from East Wenatchee.

But these are hard economic times and counties are slashing costs everywhere. Douglas County was paying $110 per day for each of the East Wenatchee juveniles held at Chelan County. In addition, 70% of the Douglas County juveniles held at Chelan County were East Wenatchee cases. So Douglas County pulled the plug on their agreement with East Wenatchee. After December 5, 2005, East Wenatchee was required to haul the juveniles 158 miles to Medical Lake for holding. They should have made the juveniles ride bikes there…in shackles…in the hot sun…or cold snow; maybe it would deter them from committing crimes!

Snowing Bike 

Transportation to Medical Lake

East Wenatchee broke down and struck their own contract with Chelan County to hold the juveniles until transported to Medical Lake. What a weird name for a lake. Want to go swimming in Medical Lake? I don’t think so.

East Wenatchee filed suit against Douglas County seeking an order requiring Douglas County to pay for holding juveniles at Chelan and for transporting them to Medical Lake. On cross motions for summary judgment the trial court ruled in favor of Douglas County holding that their juvenile holding facility was Medical Lake and East Wenatchee was responsible for transporting their juveniles there.

RCW 13.16.030 requires that counties provide juvenile detention facilities. Douglas County has a juvenile detention facility. The statute does not require that the county place it in a convenient location. East Wenatchee made several arguments citing Attorney General opinions on detaining arrestees, however all of these opinions dealt with cities booking arrestees into jails of the county for which the cites are located. Here, East Wenatchee wanted to book the juveniles into Chelan County; East Wenatchee is in Douglas County. Even though the Chelan County facility is conveniently located 3 miles from East Wenatchee, there is no authority for allowing them to hold their juveniles there. Judgment affirmed.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Six Months Not “Shortly After”…This Time

August 4, 2010

State v. Combs

This one is nice and short. Combs was released from prison on a drug possession charge. Six months later he was charged with attempting to elude a police officer. RCW 9.9A.535(3)(t) allows a court to impose an exceptional sentence if the “defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.” This is referred to as “rapid recidivism.” Say that five times fast!

This case came down to what does “shortly after” mean? Is it a week? A month? Six months? The Court of Appeals held that considering the facts of this case, six months was not “shortly after.” But they weren’t going as far as to draw a line in the sand at six months for every case. The reasoning being that if the defendant had no opportunity to re-offend for six months or immediate access to the means to re-offend (i.e., it takes a while to find contraband), then it could be considered “shortly after.” In addition, some crimes “require a lengthy period of time to plan or come to fruition.” It takes time to knock over a liquor store! Combs exceptional sentence was reversed.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Assault Was Part of Rape and Thus Cannot Convict for Both Crimes

July 29, 2010

State v. Williams

This is a lovely story about a swell guy (note sarcasm). Floyd Williams was convicted on two counts of rape and one count of second degree assault with sexual motivation, which involved two victims. The cases had been consolidated and tried together. The trial court admitted testimony from the victim of Floyd’s prior rape conviction. Floyd was sentenced to life imprisonment as a persistent offender based on these convictions and the prior rape conviction.

Floyd appealed the admittance of the prior victim’s testimony. In addition, Floyd claimed that the assault charge should have merged with the rape charge.

Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes to show that the defendant acted in conformity with that character-had a propensity to commit this crime. But evidence of prior crimes may be admitted for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Since the facts of the earlier rape were very similar to the facts of both the recent rapes, the trial court held that it showed a common scheme and the prejudice of the testimony was minimal. The Court of Appeals agreed.

Next Floyd argued that he could not be convicted of both assault and rape as the assault was part of the rape and the assault had no independent purpose. Since the assault on the victim before and during the rape is what raised it to the level of First Degree Rape, Floyd couldn’t be convicted of both charges. There was merger of the two crimes and thus the conviction for assault was vacated. Boy, I bet ole Floyd was glad to get that assault off his record. I mean what would his employer think?

Three strikes and you’re out Floyd. Out for life! Floyd also made some Pro-se arguments including that the forensic lab who conducted the tests on the victims had a history of making mistakes. But at trial he argued that the sex was consensual. Nice try Floyd.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – If Witness Did Not Report His Own Sexual Abuse, He Can’t Be Used as a Witness for Other Sex Abuse Victims

July 18, 2010

Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc.

Currently there are several cases in the Spokane County Superior Court involving the Morning Star Boys Ranch (the Ranch). The trial court has separated 19 cases into individual trials. The cases are brought by former residents of the Ranch that allege that they were sexually abused by Father Joe Weitensteiner and/or other members of the staff of the facility. In addition to having Fr. Weitensteiner found individually liable, the plaintiffs seek to hold the Ranch liable for damages on various theories including civil conspiracy and vicarious liability.

Father

The first of the 19 trials resulted in a defense verdict. In the second case, this case involving plaintiff George Minehart, the trial court ruled that it would exclude all testimony from witnesses claiming that they were also sexually molested, but never reported the incident to staff at the Ranch (holding that the testimony’s prejudice outweighed its probative value). But if the witness had reported the incident to staff, then the trial court allowed the testimony to support the claims of conspiracy and vicarious liability. Both parties sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals; plaintiff appealing the exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony and the Ranch appealing the admission of other witnesses’ testimony and the suppression of Fr. Weitensteiner’s passed polygraph test. The trial was stayed pending this appeal.

For you lay people, this is what they call an interlocutory review. Basically the trial court has issued an order and the appealing party feels that the alleged error is reasonably certain and its impact on the trial manifest. The appeal is filed while the trial is still pending, but the appealing party feels that the error will affect the outcome of the trial and thus it can’t wait to appeal the case after a final judgment.

In this case, both parties claimed that the discretionary review by the Court of Appeals was necessary under the rules because (1) The superior court had committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; and (2) The superior court had committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially altered the status quo or substantially limited the freedom of a party to act.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were no obvious or probable errors. This decision goes into each ruling that the trial court made and why each one did not meet the standards for discretionary review. I’m not going to go into each of those here, but if you are interested you can click on the link to the case and read on!

While the plaintiffs in these cases won’t be able to use witnesses that didn’t report their own abuse, they still have the witnesses who did report the abuse.  It will be interesting to see how the rest of these cases play out.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Fifth Amendment Violation Was Harmless Error in Conviction of Child Rape

July 4, 2010

State v. Epefanio

Mr. Epefanio was a teacher’s aide and basketball coach at Salk Middle School in Spokane, Washington. Apparently Mr. E had a thing for the young girls at the school. He asked Brianna Summers to help him with the basketball team and they started a sexual relationship when Brianna was 15 years old. Mr. E was 25!

Eventually Brianna got pregnant, moved in with Mr. E, and then the honeymoon was over. Brianna was now 18 years old (probably too old for Mr. E). After the couple separated, Brianna determined that what Mr. E did was wrong. She was older and wiser! She sued the school district and reported Mr. E to the police. Mr. E was charged with Sexual Misconduct in the First Degree and Rape of a Child in the Third Degree.

At the criminal trial, Brianna testified about her sexual history with Mr. E. A friend of Brianna’s testified that she hung out with the couple and witnessed them having sex. Brianna’s boyfriend Jared (she had a boyfriend through all of this?!) testified that he had found out about the relationship, told Brianna’s parents, and then confronted Mr. E in front of Brianna’s parents.

Mr. E moved to dismiss the case after the State rested. The court dismissed the misconduct charge, but not the rape charge. On defense, Mr. E took the stand in his own behalf and denied having sex with Brianna when she was 15. He would never do such a thing! He waited until she was 16 and then knocked her up. When the State attempted to cross-examine Mr. E about Jared’s confrontation, the defense objected as it was outside the scope of direct examination. The court agreed. However, the State called Mr. E as a rebuttal witness and examined him on the same subject (the confrontation) and the court allowed it.

The jury convicted Mr. E and returned a special verdict that the offense was "part of an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of the same victim under the age of 16 years manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time." The stand range for this crime is 12 to 14 months, but with the special verdict, the court imposed an exceptional sentence of 20 months. Mr. E also moved for relief from judgment based on the argument that the State violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination when he was called as a rebuttal witness. The court denied the motion. Mr. E appealed the conviction and the exceptional sentence.

The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient and persuasive evidence to convict Mr. E. They also held that it was a violation of Mr. E’s Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination to call him as a rebuttal witness regarding testimony outside the scope of direct examination. HOWEVER, "If the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of the defendant’s guilt, the error is harmless." State v. Koslowski. So even if you remove the tainted evidence (Mr. E’s testimony about his confrontation with Jared), there was still ample evidence to convict him. HARMLESS ERROR!! The Court of Appeals also confirmed the exceptional sentence.

I’m sure the prison population will help Mr. E straighten out his penchant for young girls.

Inmates

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Dismissal of Charges of Child Molestation Upheld Due to Violation of Attorney-Client Privilege

June 19, 2010

State v. Perrow

This is another instance where the State’s handling of a case let an alleged child molester off the hook. In my previous article, the State let a convicted child molester receive about half the prison sentence he should have received under the law. (See Even Though Sentencing Incorrect, Child Rapist Will Be Released Earlier Than Statute Requires; June 15, 2010). In Perrow, the State bumbled the case at the beginning rather in than in the end, as they did in Hudgens.

In October 2007, Detective Sloan began investigating Perrow for alleged sexual abuse of his daughter, A.P. Sloan assisted A.P. in obtaining a protection order against her father on November 13th. On November 14th Sloan contacted Perrow and informed him of A.P.’s allegations. Sloan then prepared an affidavit for a search warrant.

Perrow received a copy of the protection order on November 17th and contacted attorney Vannier on November 19th. Vannier agreed to represent Perrow in regards to both the protection order and any potential criminal charges. Vannier asked Perrow to gather information about A.P.’s allegations and provide him with a written narrative of the matters.

On Novemeber 29th, Sloan executed a search warrant of Perrow’s home. Sloan seized the written materials that Perrow had prepared for his attorney. Perrow contacted his attorney while the police were searching his home and told him that they had seized the written materials he had prepared for Vannier. Vannier told Perrow to inform Sloan that the materials were protected under the attorney-client privilege. Sloan took the materials anyway. Sloan read and analyzed the materials and compared them to notes he had taken from his conversation with Perrow. He noted inconsistencies between the written materials and what Perrow had told him. Sloan prepared a written analysis of the materials seized and forwarded it, along with the seized documents, to the prosecutor.

On December 17th, the State charged Perrow with two counts of child molestation. Perrow moved to dismiss for based on unjustifiable interference of the right to counsel, violation of the attorney-client privilege, and prejudicial governmental misconduct. The court granted the motion finding that at the time the documents were seized, Vannier represented Perrow and therefore the items seized were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the seizure violated Perrow’s constitutional right to counsel and his right to privileged communication with his attorney. Based on the prosecutor’s knowledge of the contents of the documents seized, the court concluded that suppression was not an adequate remedy and dismissed the charges.

The attorney-client privilege applies to communications and advice between an attorney and client and extends to documents that contain a privileged communication. It applies to any information generated by a request for legal advice. "The attorney-client privilege exists in order to allow the client to communicate freely with an attorney without fear of compulsory discovery." The privilege encourages a client to make a full disclosure to his or her attorney, enabling the attorney to render effective legal assistance. An eight-part test in determining if the privilege exists is (1) the client must have sought legal advice; (2) from an attorney; (3) the communication was made to obtain legal advice; (4) in confidence; (5) by the client; (6) the client must wish to protect his identity; (7) from disclosure; and (8) the protection must not have been waived.

The findings of the trial court established each part of the eight part test and thus the attorney-client privilege did exist and the documents were covered under the privilege. The Court of Appeals held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument doesn’t matter, because existing case law holds that a violation of the attorney-client privilege is enough to suppress evidence or grant dismissal even before a Sixth Amendment right attaches.

So we are left with the issue of whether dismissal was the appropriate remedy. Case law holds that the prejudice from a violation of the attorney-client privilege cannot be isolated and thus dismissal is the only appropriate remedy. The dismissal was affirmed.

Both Detective Sloan and the prosecutors in this matter really dropped the ball. Detective Sloan could have simply contacted the prosecutor’s office and asked them if the documents were privileged; well in advance of anybody viewing them and spoiling the case. In addition, the prosecutors, once they learned the privileged information was contained in Sloan’s reports, could have sealed the evidence and returned it to Perrow’s attorney. This action may also have saved the case. Instead, both Detective Sloan and the prosecutors ignored the privilege (even when they were informed it existed when seized) and lost the opportunity to convict an alleged child molester. Shame on you. Get it right next time!

Get Out of Jail Free

A dissent was filed in this case by Judge Korsmo, who felt that a lesser remedy was appropriate and that the violation of the attorney-client privilege was only negligent and not egregious. He based this on the fact that the documents were seized under a valid search warrant. The cases in which the majority relied upon, were cases where the information was seized illegally and after the right to counsel had attached.

This may be taken to the Supreme Court.


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