Archive for the ‘Administrative Law’ Category

WA Supreme Court: Court of Appeals has to Defer to ALJ on WAC Interpretation re: Need for Surgery Center

September 25, 2010

Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health

Swedish wanted to add a surgery center in East King County. The department of health agreed. Under the administrative code, to find a certificate of need for the surgery center, the department has to look at three factors: (a) the existing capacity of operating rooms in the planning area, (b) the anticipated number of surgeries in the area three years into the future, and (c) whether existing operating room capacity is sufficient to accommodate the projected number of future surgeries.

Well Swedish applied for a certificate of need. Overlake, being big-dog in the area opposed it, as did Evergreen Health. The health law judge said that the exempt facilities can’t be counted for existing capacity, but can be used for the determination of future need. This seem off to you too? How about we include the capacity of every surgery facility read plainly under the WACs?

Overlake and Evergreen requested an adjudicative proceeding before a health law judge to determine whether the Department erred by issuing the CN to Swedish. They contended that the Department failed to properly apply WAC 246-310-270(9) and that, as a result of the alleged error, the need for an additional ASF in East King County was overstated.  In  upholding the Department’s decision, the health law judge acknowledged that, in calculating existing capacity and future need, the applicable language in sections (a) and (b) of WAC 246-310-270(9) “appears to be all inclusive” of ASFs and exempt facilities. CP at 29. The health law judge went on to say, however,  that the language of the WAC “cannot be read in isolation” and that its “plain meaning may be ascertained by an examination of the statute in which the provision is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found.”  Id. (citing City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wn.2d 289, 295, 126 P.3d 802 (2006)). Following that approach, the health law judge  determined that exempt facilities should be excluded from the calculation of existing capacity under WAC 246-310-270(9)(a), but included in the calculation of future need under subsection (b) of that regulation. In holding that Swedish established need for an additional five operating  room ASF in Bellevue, the health law judge took particular note of the legislature’s emphasis on assuring “that all citizens have accessible health services” and indicated that “[i]f the more inclusive approach were followed, the calculation of available operating rooms would include [exempt facilities] that would not be available to many of the individuals within the health planning area.” CP at 29 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ got it wrong in interpreting the WACs. Unfortunately, that’s not the standard:

The standard of review in CN cases is that the agency decision is presumed correct and that the challengers have the burden of overcoming that presumption. Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health, 164 Wn.2d 95, 102, 187 P.3d 243 (2008). Insofar as questions of law are concerned, we may substitute our interpretation of the law for that of the agency. We do, however, accord  substantial  deference to the agency’s interpretation of law in matters involving the agency’s special knowledge and expertise. An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision is the result of willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances.

Overlake contends that not counting exempted facilities led to an overestimate of need. However, the supreme court said, while not clear, that the ALJ’s interpretation could be a valid one. They have to provide some deference on interpretation of the WACs to those within the agency. Here, the ALJ gave some good reasons as to why he was calculating like that, under a need for availability of centers for the general public. It may not be the best reason, but its definitely one within the agency’s special knowledge. Swedish gets its CN.

That was the Chevron case, right? It’s been a while since i graduated. But I definitely remember something about Chevron.

 

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Teacher’s Use of School Computer for Lobbying Is Grounds for Dismissal

August 22, 2010

Knudsen v. Washington State Executive Ethics Board

Knudsen is apparently a take charge kind of person. She even represented herself in the appeal of this case. But sometimes this type of approach can get you into trouble. Knudsen was a teacher at Spokane Community College (SCC). She sent an email from an SCC computer urging recipients to pursue approval of two pending bills that would provide tenure-like protections to part time college teachers. Knudsen was a part time college teacher. Was.

The email violated school policy, state statutes, and administrative code for using state resources for lobbying. Although Knudson did not agree that her email was lobbying, she was unable to present evidence that the email was within the scope of her duties as an English teacher. The Washington State Executive Ethics Board entered a finding that Knudsen had violated school policy, state statutes, and the administrative code. Knudson did try to argue that the email was sent on behalf of her union, but then contradicted herself when she testified that the union had made no efforts to lobby on behalf of this legislation. Knudsen appealed to the Superior Court and then to the Court of Appeals.

The Washington Administrative Code allows for de minimis personal use of state resources, EXCEPT if the use is “for the purpose of participating in or assisting in an effort to lobby the state legislature, or a state agency head.” WAC 292-110-010.

Knudsen argued that the school’s email policy violated her free speech rights. However, her argument was procedurally incorrect, as the Board did not consider the email policy when it made its determination; it only considered the statute and the WAC. Thus the Court of Appeals could not consider the constitutionality of the school’s email policy. The Court agreed, but analyzed her argument anyway:

 

The constitution allows the regulation of protected speech in certain circumstances. For example, speech in public forums is subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. In contrast, speech in nonpublic forums may be restricted if the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral

 

Since the email system was a nonpublic forum and application of the statute and WAC was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, there was no constitutional violation

So in an attempt to protect her teaching position, Knudsen lost hers.  Class dismissed!  Or should I say “Claim dismissed!”

0511-0709-0401-3307_English_Teacher_clipart_image

Opinion letters to Agencies are not challengeable “final agency actions” under the WAPA

July 25, 2010

Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. State Human Rights Commission

The Department of Corrections (DOC) solicited an opinion from the Human Rights Commission (HRC) on whether gender-based hiring criteria could be used for personnel at a specific correctional facility.  In other words, the DOC wanted to know whether it would be cool with everyone if it didn’t hire men to do the pat-downs and shower checks at the women’s prisons.

This opinion says more about the underlying facts of a current controversy than it does about the law.  The holding and analysis are straightforward.  Under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, a justiciable controversy does not arise before “final agency action.”  Prior cases had established that interpretive letters like the one here, do not constitute final agency action.  Open and shut, as one might say.

Nonetheless, the opinion letter opens up interesting future questions.  The HRC opined that gender may be a bona fide occupational qualification, under certain circumstances, like preventing prison guards from getting free looks at lady parts, and not subject to the Washington Law Against Discrimination.  When the DOC finally gets around to issuing its policies and guidelines, then the Teamsters can sue again.

Jimmy Hoffa is rolling over under the end zone at Giants Stadium.

WA Court of Appeals at Div II: “Good Cause” = “Good Reason” and neither was present here.

July 19, 2010

Puget Sound Medical Supply v. DSHS

Puget sound medical supply was dinged for medicaid overpayments. They were ordered to pay it back. They wanted to appeal it, but were a day late. If they could show their failure was with good reason, they get back into it. Good reason doesn’t appear much, but the court of appeals ruled that it was essentially good cause. PSM blamed the failure on the short time (but that’s in the rules, so that’s not good cause), office staff being out for the holidays, lead counsel leaving the firm, etc. etc. The problem is, courts have held that breakdown in office procedure doesn’t count as good cause, and that is all that happened here. No dice PSM.

 

WA Supreme Court: Time for Appeal Clocks from Denial of Motion for Reconsideration

May 18, 2010

Skinner v. Civil Serv. Comm’n

Skinner was terminated. He then sought review of the termination. The termination was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. The then sought reconsideration, which was also denied. He then appealed to the superior court, which granted summary judgment based on the fact that Skinner didn’t appeal within 30 days of the original order, instead appealing within 30 days of the reconsideration denial. The supreme court held the time for calculation of the 30 days is from the denial of reconsideration. This is keeping in line with the commission’s own rules, which allow for such reconsideration. Further, the statute says within 30 days of entry of such order, which could be the first order or the second order. Thus, his appeal can be on the second order under the statute. The court is entirely correct when it states to hold otherwise would be to undercut judicial efficiency. It would force an appeal to go on at the same time as a motion for reconsideration, which could render the appeal moot. Don’t expect this rule to change anytime soon, as it was a 9-0 opinion.

Court of Appeals: Div. 1: Seattle Public Safety Commission Has Authority to Discipline Police Officer as it sees Fit

May 5, 2010

City of Seattle v. City of Seattle Public Safety Commission

Seattle police officer Richard Roberson was suspended for 30 days by the police department for 3 separate incidents of misconduct. He appealed and the Public Safety Commission determined that discipline was only justified for one of the offenses. The commission reduced the suspension to 7 days.

The Court of Appeals, in examining the appropriate standard of review for the commission on appeal, determined that the review standard was consistent with the state statute establishing the city police civil service system.

WA Supreme Court: No Prima Facia Discipline Requirement for Prisoners Seeking Review

February 18, 2010

PRP of Grantham

Grantham was disciplined for sneaking in no no substances. At issue was whether he could get a PRP review based on the fact that he had had no other review in courts (only a hearing). In other words, did Grantham have to make a prima facie case? The Court explains the nuance in the issue better than I ever could:

In his initial ruling, Washington State Supreme Court Commissioner Steven M. Goff noted that the Court of Appeals relied on the actual and substantial prejudice standard, that the standard “does not apply where the petitioner has had no previous opportunity for judicial review,” and directed the department to file supplemental briefing “in light of the proper standard of review.” Ruling at 2-3. The department filed a vigorous brief arguing its disagreement with the commissioner on the proper standard and contending that, notwithstanding our opinion in In re Personal Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 299, 88 P.3d 390 (2004), prisoners facing discipline are still required to meet the Lord1 prima facie standard when challenging disciplinary decisions. We accepted review.  In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, noted at 166 Wn.2d 1006, 211 P.3d 1029 (2009).

Held: If you have had no review of your claim, then a PRP need not make a prima facie case. Here, Graham was , and directly sought a PRP. However, it was also held that there was no prejudice to Graham in the disciplinary action:

A prisoner is only entitled to minimum due process protections, which include notice, an opportunity to provide evidence and call witnesses “when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety and correctional goals,” and to receive a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipline.

While we agree with Grantham that prisoners challenging prison discipline need not make a prima facie case of constitutional error and actual and substantial prejudice or nonconstitutional error and total miscarriage of justice, that simply means that we more easily reach the substantive question.  However, when applying the well established substantive law, the prison’s disciplinary decision was not so arbitrary and capricious as to deny a fundamentally fair proceeding.  Grantham was informed of the charges against him and given an opportunity to defend himself. He has not shown that he was denied a fundamentally fair proceeding or that he was prejudiced by the process he received.

On a side note, this opinion offers a great review of the evolution of the Personal Restraint Petition, and its development from the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

January 12, 2010

 

Martin v. Criminal Justice Training Commission

Martin was a Steven’s County Sheriff’s Officer who was investigated for an allegation of untruthfulness in regards to the facts surrounding his charging a defendant with Driving Without a License.  The investigation was conducted by Captain George who discharged his official duties when interviewing Martin.  The facts imply that Martin lied to George about what happened and Martin subsequently resigned from his position while the investigation was pending.  If Martin had not resigned, he would have been terminated.  The Sheriff’s Office notified the Criminal Justice Training Commission that Martin had been terminated.

Martin held a peace officer certificate from the Criminal Justice Training Commission.  The Commission sought to revoke Martin’s certificate based on his discharge for disqualifying conduct (making a false or misleading statement to a public servant).  Martin requested a hearing and the Commission concluded at the hearing that Martin had been discharged for disqualifying misconduct pursuant to RCW 43.101.010(7)(b).  Martin appealed to the Superior Court, where the case was reversed and remanded for a new hearing.  The Commission appealed that ruling. 

To reverse an administrative order, a reviewing court must find that the order:  (1) is based on an error of law; (2) is based on findings not supported by substantial evidence; (3) is arbitrary or capricious; (4) violates the constitution; (5) is beyond the statutory authority; or (6) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision making process or has failed to follow a prescribed procedure.  (Now that brought back memories of the Bar review!)  Martin claimed that there was an error of law in that the Commission’s hearing panel did not include two members of a tribe (Martin was a tribal officer).  However, Martin did not object to the make up of the hearing panel at the time of the hearing.  He also claimed that he did receive a fair hearing because he was not granted a continuance. 

Martin’s first issue was that the Commission’s panel was prejudicial to him because there were no tribe members.  Martin was also a tribal officer.  However, the statute in affect at the time Martin appealed the Commission’s order, RCW 43.101.380, did NOT require the presence of tribal members on the panel. 

Martin also claimed that the Commission’s refusal to grant him a continuance of the hearing violated his due process rights.  Martin moved for a continuance because one of his witnesses was not available.  However, this same witness testified telephonically.  Division III held that the Commission did not abuse its discretion nor did it act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when denying the continuance. 

Peace officer no more.

WA: Legal Roundup Division II

December 10, 2009

Jolley v. Regence Blueshield

Dr. Jolley sued Regence Blueshield for violating the Consumer Protections Act and for terminating his practitioner agreement, arguing that Regence failed to provide him with a fair review.  The trial court granted summary judgment on both issues in favor of Regence.  Dr. Jolley appeals.

Dr. Jolley and Regence entered into a practitioner agreement whereby the agreement was later amended to satisfy the WACs in regards to the process of dispute resolution.  The agreement discussed termination in three sections including an at will termination clause, a termination upon suspension of the doctor’s ability to practice medicine, and a section stating that a provider may be terminated if they fail to meet the Company’s Credentialing criteria. 

In 2003 the Washington State Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance Commission (MQAC) issued charges against Dr. Jolley for having sexual relations with his patients’ mothers.  His license was suspended but he was granted a stay for the suspension and was placed on probation for 10 years. Regence notified him that his contract automatically terminated when his license was suspended and explained his right to appeal. During the appeal process his contract was later reinstated by an arbitrator, however, Regence again terminated his contract under the at will clause. Jolley appealed. Regence later stated that they had terminated him for conditions on his license.  An arbitrator found for Regence and stated specifically that Regence met their fair review standard and provided Jolley with an opportunity to state his case.

The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of fair review, which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Jolley argued that he did not receive proper notification because he was told his termination was under the at will clause but later found out that it was due to conditions on his license.  The Court disagreed with Jolley holding that Regence had reasons for its at will termination, which did not convert it to a for cause termination.  Second, Jolley argued that he did not have the opportunity to be heard, however, the court disagreed finding that Jolley went through both Regence’s internal appeals process and an arbitration provided to him, which gave amble opportunity to be heard. 

The Court of Appeals held that he lacked standing to bring a CPA claim, but even if his claim were considered it would fail because there is not evidence to support an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Washington Legal Roundup – Land Use News

November 16, 2009

 

The Growth Management Hearings Boards (Boards) are most likely consolidating into one board in an effort to improve efficiency and save money.  The boards recently commissioned a study that recommended as such, and have provided the report to the governor. (caution: large PDF) I recently attended the November 12th meeting of the Puget Sound Regional Council’s Growth Management Advisory Board, and it would seem that this consolidation is moving forward.

The proposed changes include cutting the number of board members from nine to seven, but to retain “regional panels.”  As the Boards acknowledge, their workload is going to grow, not shrink over the coming years, so the impact of consolidation may slow the resolution of several growth management appeals and other matters over which the Boards have jurisdiction.

Also, one of the interesting recommendations (again, nothing is set in stone yet) is to bring the consolidated board within the Environmental Hearings Office (EHO), which currently houses the Pollution Control Hearings Board, the Shorelines Hearings Board, the Forest Practices Appeals Board, Hydraulic Appeals Board, and the Environmental and Land Use Hearings Board.  Perhaps if this recommendation goes through, we could expect more consolidation within the EHO at a later date.  However, I expect that this recommendation is meeting with resistance from, in part, intra-agency resistance between Department of Ecology, Department of Natural Resources, and Department of Commerce.

More to come as this issue develops.


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