Archive for the ‘Attorney's Fees and Costs’ Category

WA Supreme Court: Settling All Claims Includes Attorneys Fees

August 2, 2010

McGuire v. Bates

If you settle all claims, this really means all claims.  This means you can’t come back later and seek attorneys fees under a new claim. Under the plain language of the contract all claims were gone. This included the claim for attorney’s fees made in the complaint. The fact be settled is not making the prevailing party.

Pragmatically, this means what most of us are you know. When negotiating a settlement, include arguments as to what your attorneys fees are currently, are likely to be in the near future, and are likely to be by the time of trial. If you’re entitled to fees, and are likely to win on the claim, you don’t settle until you get those fees. The

 

 

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Doctor’s Claims Against Hospital and Staff Very Costly

June 3, 2010

Perry v. Rado

Dr. Perry is a gynecologist who practices medicine through his professional services corporation in Kennewick, Washington. In the fall of 2006, he was a member of the medical staff at Kadlec Medical Center (KMC) until his staff membership and clinical privileges were terminated. I bet it’s difficult to practice obstetrics and gynecology when the hospital won’t let you through the front door. So Dr. Perry sued the hospital and several staff members including Drs. Rado, Bowers, Rawlins, and Occhino who all participated in Dr. Perry’s peer review that resulted in his termination. Drs. Rawlins and Occhino also are members of an OB/GYN practice that competes with Dr. Perry’s office. I guess that’s one way to eliminate the competition.

Apparently, Dr. Perry had a problem with one of his surgeries and he was suspended. Perry entered into an agreement with KMC that he would not conduct certain types of surgeries without a “monitor” to assist him. He violated that agreement and after a hearing (which resulted in a finding in his favor) and an administrative appeal, his privileges were permanently suspended. Dr. Perry then filed a suit in federal court where all but his state claims were dismissed. So Dr. Perry filed suit in superior court alleging seven claims. Most of the claims were dismissed under CR 12(b)(6) except for one and Dr. Perry voluntarily dismissed that one. The trial court awarded KMC over $380,000 in fees and costs. OUCH!! Dr. Perry appealed the dismissals under CR 12(b)(6).

RCW 7.71.030(1) states: “This section shall provide the exclusive remedy for any action taken by a professional peer review body of health care providers …, that is found to be based on matters not related to the competence or professional conduct of a health care provider.” Further, Section (2) states “[a]ctions shall be limited to appropriate injunctive relief, and damages shall be allowed only for lost earnings directly attributable to the action taken by the professional review body.” The claims that Dr. Perry was pursing were not related to the competence or professional conduct of a health care provider so his only remedy was injunctive relief. Dr. Perry was not seeking injunctive relief; he was seeking damages other than for wage loss. The trial court had permitted Dr. Perry to amend his complaint to seek reinstatement of his medical privileges. This would have been injunctive relief. But Dr. Perry did not amend his complaint. Whoops! Affirmed.

Crazy Doctor

And to pour more salt in the wounds, RCW 7.71.030 requires an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to the “prevailing party.” Guess who the “prevailing party” was? Not Dr. Perry. DOUBLE OUCH!! He must have paid close to a total of $1 million in attorney fees and costs when this was all done. After this experience, he may want to take up proctology.

Court of Appeals – Div. II: GAL Petitioners not on the hook for costs and attorney fees GAL-initiated action

May 20, 2010

Matthews v. Sherwood Assisted Living, Inc.

Ah, human greed and cruelty, why are you so prevalent?  Matthews arose out of the actions of two relatives of an incapacitated elder living in an assisted living facility.  After a State Ombudsman’s investigation and report revealed (the court uses the kinder word “suggested”) that the relatives were siphoning money off of grampa, an employee of the facility petitioned the court to appoint a guardian ad-litem (GAL).

Now, I don’t really want to speculate beyond the facts presented in the opinion, but the situation had reached that point, it must have been quite bad.  Nonetheless, the relatives doubled-down on the greed by trying to move Mr. Matthews to California, out of his erstwhile home of six years, and the GAL petitioned for a temporary restraining order. (TRO)  Because a TRO petition is to be accompanied by a bond, the trial court ordered the facility to one up in the amount of $10,000.  When the facility refused, the court denied the TRO (allowing the relatives to move grampa to California), dismissed the GAL petition, and awarded attorney fees to the relatives.  Ouch.

Thankfully, Division II don’t play that, and reversed the trial court:

We hold that a GAL appointed under RCW 11.96A.160 or former RCW 11.88.010 has an agency relationship with the court much like a permanent guardian or limited guardian appointed under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) (ch. 11.96A RCW) has with the court. . . . A GAL is not an agent of a guardianship petitioner.  A GAL makes recommendations and takes actions free of a petitioning parties’ vested interests.  See former RCW 11.88.090(3)(a).  Thus, the petitioner for a guardianship cannot be held liable for the GAL’s actions taken during the guardianship petitioning process and vice versa.

This decision makes sense on a number of levels, but the main point is that unless an interested third party is petitioning for a GAL unreasonably or in bad faith, isn’t this exactly the outcome we as a society want to see?  I would think so, and I’m glad the court read the statutes that way.

Court of Appeals: Div. I: Purposeful Availment Still the Standard for Personal Jurisdiction

May 5, 2010

Freestone Capital Partners, LP v. MKA Real Estate Opportunity Fund, I, LLC

This case arose out of a declaratory judgment action brought by a group of lenders in Washington to enforce remedies arising out of the $30 million dollar delinquency of a group of California borrowers.

The issues in this appeal involved: 1. Whether a Washington court had personal jurisdiction over the California borrowers, 2. What state’s law governed the dispute, and 3. Whether the parties were entitled to attorneys fees and costs.

The Court of Appeals determined that because MKA had purposefully availed itself of the privileges of transacting business in the State of Washington, Washington courts had personal jurisdiction over MKA.

The Court of Appeals held that there was not a sufficient record to determine whether there was an actual conflict between Washington and California law and remanded the case to the trial court to make this determination

The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in awarding some attorney fees to Freestone, but left to the trial court the determination of what additional fees might be appropriate on remand.

Court of Appeals: Div I: Evicting a Tenant Can Be Tough, Make Sure You Jump Through All the Hoops

April 29, 2010

Housing Authority of Everett v. Kirby

Carroll Kirby failed to pay rent one month. The Housing Authority tried to evict him. They failed to state in the summons and complaint that he could answer by facsimile or mailing. He moved the court to have the case dismissed on that ground. He also asked for attorney fees. The court commissioner determined that the summons and complaint were invalid, but declined to award attorney fees because the court believed it lacked authority to do so once the case was dismissed. The Court of Appeals held affirmed, except that it held that Mr. Kirby was entitled to statutory attorney fees in the amount of $200.

WA Supreme Court: Prisoner Who Won is Prevailing Party (they’re not all gems)

April 21, 2010

Parmelee v. O’Neel

If you’re a prisoner and you succeed in getting an infraction tossed and invalidating a statute which is the subject of your appeal, you’re the prevailing party.

Court of Appeals: Div. I – Service of Process on Foreign Corporation Should be Done by Personal Service

February 23, 2010

Ralph’s Concrete Pumping v. Concord Concrete Pumps

Ralph’s Concrete Pumping (Ralph’s) is a Washington corporation.  Concord Concrete Pumps (Concrete) is a British Columbia, Canada corporation.

Ralph’s sued Concrete for breach of contract.  Ralph’s served Concord in Canada by mail.  Concord acknowledged receipt of the summons and complaint by signing a delivery receipt.  Concord did not appear or answer the summons and complaint.  Ralph’s got a default judgment against Concrete for $175,000. 

Concord then made a special appearance, moving to vacate the default judgment.  The motion to vacate was denied and Concord appealed.

The Court of Appeals determined that since the long arm statute, RCW 4.28.150, provided for personal service, and because Ralph’s failed to file an affidavit that established that service could not be made within the State of Washington, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Concrete.  The Court of Appeals held that the default judgment was void.

The Court of Appeals declined to award attorney fees because the statute did not provide them unless service of process was accomplished by personal service.

Court of Appeals: Div. I – Openly Gay High School Teacher Gets Fired for Cussing Out Student

January 26, 2010

Federal Way School District v. Vinson

David Vinson was an openly gay high school teacher at Federal Way High School.  At a Taco Time restaurant, he ran into a student that had apparently harassed him in the past.  They called each other some naughty names and then both lied to a school investigator about it.  At a disciplinary hearing to determine whether he could be fired, the hearing officer determined that his conduct did not rise to the level of a fire-able offense.

The Federal Way School District asked the superior court for review.  The superior court denied the request for review and awarded attorneys fees to Mr. Vinson.  The School District then asked the Court of Appeals to review the denial of review.  The Court of Appeals agreed to do so and found that the conduct was so offensive as to justify termination.

A strongly worded dissent by Judge Dwyer stated that because the school district did not have a right to appeal the hearing examiner’s findings because the statute doesn’t allow it and because the case was moot, the court should not have heard the case.  Mr. Vinson no longer objected to the termination and waived his attorneys fees.  He is suing the school district civilly.

I don’t have a crystal ball or an “in” at the Supreme Court, but my money is on the Supreme Court taking a  look at this case should the parties seek review.  I can’t say who, for sure, but I suspect there are a few justices that would agree with Judge Dwyer.

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).


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