Archive for the ‘Dependancy Gaurdianship Proceedings’ Category

WA Legal Roundup: WA Supreme Court: Mom loses 4 years olds left at home for work; ANOTHER Blakely case; Can’t Adversely Possess City’s Alley

March 1, 2012

So its actually quite an interesting day.

The first case wasn’t all that surprising. The challenge to the dependency action was based on not providing services blah blah blah. The usual rigamarole in dependency actions. So naturally, in Dependency of M.S.R. the Court found no issue with the services (not always the case) and no issue with failure of providing counsel, since none was requested. Let’s just say its not a good idea to take off for work and leave your twin four year olds to their own devices. In this case, they ended up causing a fire.

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Next case is a Blakely case. Every public defender should know this and the Recuenco series of decisions. Anyhow, the long and the short of it is Recuenco III isn’t retroactive and the Court may look at verdict forms to determine if the sentence is valid on its face. Can you imagine the train hurtling down the tracks if firearms enhancements from time immemorial were invalidated? Further, the court should be able to quickly look and see if the sentence is valid on its face, which would give it the ability to revise and clear the burden of the COA. The true gem of this opinion comes from Chambers’ clerk’s inserted footnote. Those who know Chambers’ clerks know from whence this note sprang:

On June 24, 2004, five black-clad figures seized control of the Criminal Justice Express, crashed through warning barriers, flattened the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, opened the throttle, and sent the train hurtling from the main line down the old rail spur where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the sentencing systems of numerous states lay tied helplessly to the tracks. Whereupon, the 2003 Term of Court being concluded, the justices twirled their collective mustachios, sent their robes off to the cleaners, and went on vacation. Two months on, as this Essay goes to press, the rest of us stand staring slack-jawed, some delighted and some aghast, at the disarray and paralysis in the locomotive’s wake and the impending carnage at the end of the line.

I refer, of course, to Blakely v. Washington.

Now, to preserve the (semi) anonymity of the Clerks, I won’t give the name. But I will tell you that this quote originated in a law review article: Frank O. Bowman, III, Essay, Train Wreck  Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved  A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 217, 218 (2004). Oh yeah, the opinion is PRP of Scott.

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Its important to note that, while there have been a LOT of post-Blakely cases. I don’t think the sky has fallen down. The courts seem to have dealt with it rather effectively. Probably a little less turmoil than the whole felon-murder thing and the seminal case I can’t remember right now.

Finally, you can’t really take a city’s alleyway. Its there for public use, so you’re not really adverse possessing until the state actually says that part of it isn’t yours. This only applies to statutory dedications as opposed to common law dedications, which CAN be adversely possessed (comes down to the difference between a grant of fee simple in a statutory dedication of land, and an easement in common law). Sadly, I do not have anything funny to say about an Alley. So instead, I’ll post something involving Kirstie Alley. Oh yeah, so you want to know the case on this one too? You needy bastards! Fine! Kiely v. Graves.

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Court of Appeals: Div. III – “Permanent” Does Not Mean “Forever”

June 13, 2010

In re the Interest of J.R.

This is a sad case where perhaps the law failed. When J.R. was five years old, his mother relinquished her parental rights to him. A guardianship was ordered and the guardianship put J.R. in the care of his grandmother and another relative. After 10 years the guardians requested that the juvenile court terminate the guardianship. At this point J.R. was 15 years old and his mother had apparently cleaned up her act. J.R. wanted to live with his mother.

RCW 13.34.215(1) allows dependent children to petition for reinstatement of parental rights if four conditions are present:

1. The child was previously found to be a dependent child under this chapter;

2. The child’s parent’s rights were terminated in a proceeding under this chapter;

3. The child has not achieved his or her permanency plan within three years of a final order of termination; and

4. The child must be at least twelve years old at the time the petition is filed.

There was no doubt that J.R. met the first, second, and fourth conditions, but the State argued that he did not meet the third condition because there was a permanency plan in place when the guardianship was ordered. Under the same statutory chapter, “permanency plan of care” includes guardianships. J.R. argued that since the guardianship was terminated after 10 years, it couldn’t have been permanent. The State countered that “permanent” does not mean forever, it simply means “intended to last.”

The Court of Appeals agreed with the State citing legislative intent, the unambiguous language of the statute, and the ever powerful Webster’s Dictionary. J.R. also claimed that the statute violated his right to substantive due process and equal protection, but the Court didn’t agree. The decision was affirmed. However, the opinion did state even though the juvenile court found that there was no statutory support for J.R.’s petition, “the court indicated that the State would continue to explore permanency plan options for him.” Hopefully the right result was obtained.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Affirms Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

April 30, 2010

In re the Welfare of A.G. and L.S.

This was a very sad case. Ms. G is the mother of A.G. (now age 8) and L.S. (now age 5). The State removed the children from Ms. G’s care in 2005 and they were declared dependents in August 2005. In October 2006, Ms. G had another child (M.S.). M.S. never left the care of Ms. G and never lived with A.G. or L.S. In March 2007 the State petitioned to terminate Ms. G’s parental rights as to A.G. and L.S. The petition stated that the reasons for termination were drug and alcohol abuse, neglect of the children, domestic violence, and serious mental health problems. The facts set forth an ugly history. Ms. G made an effort to clean up her act, but the facts reflected that she just wouldn’t go 100% of the way. This was evidenced by her refusal to cooperate with mental health evaluations and urine tests for drugs. In addition, the assessments of the children’s attachment to their mother were not positive.

In the end, the court terminated Ms. G’s parental rights and disallowed any visitation between M.S. and the other two children. Ms. G appealed.

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and found that the evidence did support the trial court’s findings and affirmed those findings. However, the Court of Appeals did reverse the trial court’s order regarding the visitation between M.S. and the other two children. The court did not have jurisdiction over M.S. because he was not a party to the action. A little silver lining.

What I found strange about this case was the fact that in the midst of terminating the parental rights of the mother as to two of her children, the third child was completely ignored. If she wasn’t a fit parent as to two of the children, then why was she allowed to keep the third?

Washington Supreme Court: State has to offer services before terminating

January 22, 2010

Dependency of C.S.

C.S.’s mother had drug problems. She fixed them. The state still terminated the parental relationship on the basis that, while she had recovered, she was unable to care for his ADHD needs. Unfortunately, the state did not offer services to help her with that, a pre-termination requirement under RCW 13.34.190.

WA Supreme Court says Stepparents Can’t Sue for Negligent DSHS Investigation

December 18, 2009

Ducote v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.

Ducote’s step-daughter alleged he peeked at her through the window, made her sit in his lap, touched her buttocks, walked in on her in the bathroom, and hit her little brother. She was placed in emergency care. During the 6-month investigation, the step-daughter was out of the house, and Ducote was booted from the house and barred from seeing any of his stepchildren. The allegations were returned as unfounded.

Ducote sued for Negligent Investigation. However, it is not an action that existed at common law. The statute itself doesn’t define who can sue, but case law under the Bennet test has decided the duty is owed to parents, custodians, guardians, and children. Though Zellmer did apply the same protections of parental immunity for step parents, the Court distinguished based on the fact that Zellmer involved a cause of action at common law, and this case did not.

Seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. The dissent things so as well.

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

July 1, 2009

In re the Dependency of KB
Ohhh- a dependency case not about taking away or keeping a child!! Appellant Ms. Rioux appeals the trial court’s decision for her request for attorneys fees and sanctions against DSHS, concluding that RCW 13.50.100(10) does not apply in guardianship proceedings, and concluding that civil rules of discovery are the exclusive means for seeking a remedy when DSHS does not provide records. Ms. Rioux informally requested records from DSHS pertaining to herself and her daughter. DSHS never complied. Ms. Rioux must have forgotten to pick up a copy of the civil rules book because the Court held (after deciding to review de novo) that due to not complying with the statutory provisions the Court is affirming the trial court’s ruling denying her request to sanction DSHS and snag her attorney’s fees as well as requiring her to comply with the civil rules of discovery when requesting records from DSHS as opposed to submitting a simple request. (Darn- we are required to submit formal requests for productions when we want to obtain records from the other side who would have thought?)
The Court also ruled, and DSHS eventually conceded, that legislative intent of RCW 13.50.100(10), although fails to state dependency guardianship proceedings as a category applies to them nonetheless because of the procedural similarities between the category of cases listed and a dependency guardianship proceeding. The court ruled that the portion of the statute stating “subject to the rules of discovery in civil cases” interpreted to mean that when a party wants to request records relating to themselves and their children from DSHS they may do so by serving DSHS with interrogatories, requests for production, subpoenas duces tecum, deposition notices, and other discovery allowed under the civil rules.


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