Archive for the ‘Division II’ Category

Court of Appeals: Div. II – Defendant Did Have a Clue As To His Guilty Plea, Despite Claim of Incompetency

September 25, 2010

State v. DeClue

Thomas DeClue pled guilty to second degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. DeClue later moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he claimed he was on medication and thus was unable to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. I guess you could say he didn’t have DeClue as to what he was doing! Sorry, I couldn’t resist.

Get a clue

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and several people testified as to DeClue’s competency at the time he plead guilty. A nurse from the jail testified that DeClue had taken several medications at different times including Vicodin, BuSpar, Skelaxin, and Seroquel. I guess incarceration wasn’t too painful.

DeClue testified that the medications made him feel like a zombie and he wasn’t able to process information. Others, including inmates at the jail, also testified that DeClue was drowsy and couldn’t concentrate. However, DeClue’s attorney when he entered the plea testified that DeClue was sharp, astute, paid attention, and had no problems communicating. The judge also reviewed a videotape of the plea. The judge held that entry of the plea did not violate DeClue’s constitutional rights. DeClue appealed.

DeClue contended that since he claimed he was not competent to enter the plea, the statute required that a competency hearing was required not an evidentiary hearing. “If a defendant supports his motion to withdraw a guilty plea with substantial evidence of incompetency, the trial court must either grant the motion or hold a formal competency hearing under RCW 10.77. 060.” The important part of this rule is that the claim must be supported by “substantial evidence of incompetency.” If substantial evidence is lacking, then the motion is denied and no competency hearing is required.

DeClue’s claim that the judge made an error by having an evidentiary hearing rather than a competency hearing failed. The evidentiary hearing was held for the purpose of exploring DeClue’s claim that he was not competent. That exploration ended in a finding that there was no substantial evidence of incompetency and thus no competency hearing was necessary.

DeClue also challenged the trial court’s finding that he was competent. However, given the nurse’s testimony that DeClue didn’t appear intoxicated, DeClue’s attorney’s testimony, and the judge’s own recollection (with assistance from video) of the plea, the Court of Appeals could not find that the judge abused her discretion. Affirmed! Get a clue.

Opinion letters to Agencies are not challengeable “final agency actions” under the WAPA

July 25, 2010

Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. State Human Rights Commission

The Department of Corrections (DOC) solicited an opinion from the Human Rights Commission (HRC) on whether gender-based hiring criteria could be used for personnel at a specific correctional facility.  In other words, the DOC wanted to know whether it would be cool with everyone if it didn’t hire men to do the pat-downs and shower checks at the women’s prisons.

This opinion says more about the underlying facts of a current controversy than it does about the law.  The holding and analysis are straightforward.  Under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, a justiciable controversy does not arise before “final agency action.”  Prior cases had established that interpretive letters like the one here, do not constitute final agency action.  Open and shut, as one might say.

Nonetheless, the opinion letter opens up interesting future questions.  The HRC opined that gender may be a bona fide occupational qualification, under certain circumstances, like preventing prison guards from getting free looks at lady parts, and not subject to the Washington Law Against Discrimination.  When the DOC finally gets around to issuing its policies and guidelines, then the Teamsters can sue again.

Jimmy Hoffa is rolling over under the end zone at Giants Stadium.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Bailbondsperson testimony exclusion improper under ER 615

July 19, 2010

State v. Skuza

Note: This opinion is not the standard Google Scholar link, but to Washington Courts. As such, it will expire after ninety days.

In presenting a defense to bail jumping, Skuza was allowed to have a bailbondsman testify. He had a conversation with the bailbondsperson, where she related what her testimony would be to Skuza. The transcript on this portion is worth the read. However, the conversation didn’t on its face violate ER 615 and the exclusion is reversible error to that count only:

Here, however, the trial court erred because there was no evidence that Spencer violated ER 615. The trial judge stated that he had seen Skuza and Spencer together in a smoking area near the court and heard a portion of a conversation between them.  But the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding the circumstances of the interaction.  Spencer, Skuza, and the trial judge were not questioned about the interaction or their observations of it.  The trial judge made a statement, which was not subject to cross-examination, about what he had witnessed and the results of legal research the trial court extern had conducted.  Counsel discussed the effect of the trial judge’s observation on whether Spencer could be called as a defense witness in the proceeding but did not discuss the fact that the trial judge had inadvertently become a witness in the proceeding.  Skuza had no opportunity to question the trial judge about his observations, call Spencer to testify about the specifics of their contact, or research the law to provide a defense or authority against the sanction of excluding Spencer’s testimony.

Moreover, the trial judge’s description of the conversation did not identify specific exchanges that took place between Spencer and Skuza sufficient to warrant a finding that an ER 615 violation occurred.  The trial judge only described statements that Spencer made to Skuza about her testimony and made no reference to specific statements that Skuza made to Spencer about her intended testimony or his prior testimony.  It is possible that the conversation did not violate ER 615′s intent, which is  ”to discourage or expose inconsistencies, fabrication, or collusion.”  Tegland, § 615.2, at 623.  Skuza had already completed his testimony in the case by the time of the alleged violation, so Spencer telling Skuza about her intended testimony did not give Skuza an opportunity to alter his testimony to match hers.

Without a thorough factual development of the circumstances of the conversation, the record is insufficient to establish that an ER 615 violation occurred.  On this record, the trial court erred when it applied the harshest possible sanction of excluding evidence central to the defendant’s bail jumping defense.

 

 

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Have to be under house arrest to get credit for it

July 19, 2010

State v. Dockens

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(One Dokken is never enough…or maybe it is)

There’s just something really satisfying about homophones. But enough about metal. Dockens contended that it was a violation of the equal protection clause to not give him credit for house arrest on his sentence. Seeing as he was never under house arrest, but on bail with a curfew, he doesn’t get credit for house arrest. Second, he is not a member of a protected class.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II:

July 19, 2010

Yeakey v. Hearst Communications, Inc.

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The 2006 Crane Accident in Bellevue, where a man was killed in his apartment, spawned a slew of news stories regarding crane safety. One of the stories involved the operator of the crane, Warren Taylor Yeakey, and alleged he had a history of drug abuse. He sued Hearst (operators of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, a former print newspaper now exclusively online) for defamation when his drug test came back negative. Does he contend the PI spead anything untruthful (a requirement for defamation)? Not quite:

He argued that the juxtaposition of the article’s statements with a photograph of the damage, a photograph of the deceased, and a graphic with bullet points contending “GAPS IN SAFETY CONTROLS” falsely implied that Yeakey’s drug use, operator error, or failure to sufficiently perform safety inspections were factors in the collapse. CP at 11. He concedes that all the statements in the articles are true and that his claims are not based on a contention that facts were omitted from the articles.

Unfortunately, Washington only recognizes standard defamation, which means the statements have to be false:

But we have held that a plaintiff may not base a defamation claim on the negative implication of true statements. Lee v. Columbian, Inc., 64 Wn. App. 534, 538, 826 P.2d 217 (1991). Defamatory meaning may not be imputed to true statements. Lee, 64 Wn. App. at 538.

As a side note: I have, through looking for pictures examining truth, learned of Tarski’s undefinability theorum. You should give it a read. Philosophy major’s already know of Russell’s utter destruction of Frege.

You may be wondering why I didn’t include links to Tarski or Russell. Simply, a computer glitch that won’t let me.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski’s_undefinability_theorem

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell’s_paradox

Happy philosophizing!

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Scribbled Crappy CR 2(a) Dissolution Agreement Enforced Because Both Parties Want It to Be

July 19, 2010

Grimsley-Lavergne v. Lavergne

This is the first time I’ve heard of a record referred to as “abysmal”. But there’s no other way to describe this. It’s essentially a dissolution CR2(a) stipulation written on a bar room napkin:

On September 21, 2004, Mark, Teresa, and their attorneys attended a mediation with former King County Superior Court Commissioner Harry Slusher. The 11-hour mediation resulted in a partially typed but mostly scribbled document identified as a “CR 2A stipulation and agreement” signed by each party, the attorneys, and Slusher. The CR 2A agreement addressed many marriage dissolution issues including: (1) a parenting plan; (2) child support; (3) spousal maintenance; (4) extensive agreements on the distribution of personal property, real property, business property, and personal and business liabilities; and (5) ownership and management of the septic and plumbing business.

The CR 2A agreement is confusing; portions are interlineated, sections are crossed out, and some crossed-out sections have adjacent notes stating, “Back in.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 489-90, 493. The CR 2A agreement does clearly state, however, that “W will prepare final paperwork, incl. [the property settlement agreement]. W will do final presentation.”

Anyhow, they end up having sex that night and staying together three years. Then she wants to enforce the agreement and he doesn’t. Then he does. The court, understandably, is ticked that they didn’t follow form in a dissolution:

Moreover, the record reflects that, although they did so at different times, Mark and Teresa each asked the trial court to enforce the CR 2A agreement. Accordingly, neither party has standing to argue that he or she is aggrieved by the trial court’s enforcement of the CR 2A agreement and the entry of the final dissolution decree.

As we noted earlier, the trial court should have required the parties to comply with former RCW 26.09.070. The legislature expressly designed this statute to address the enforceability of parties’ predissolution agreements. See generally former RCW 26.09.070. Moreover, former RCW 26.09.070 mandates that a predissolution separation contract be in writing and any terms of a parties’ predissolution separation contract (except for parenting plans and child support) be incorporated into a decree of dissolution unless (1) the parties mutually intended to revoke the agreement or (2) the trial court finds the agreement was “unfair at the time of its execution.” Former RCW 26.09.070(1), (4), (5), (8). Neither the trial court nor the parties addressed the statute.

Affirmed.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Need to do a Motion to Suppress to Preserve Vehicle Search Issue

July 19, 2010

State v. Cross

As you recall, earlier we had a vehicle search issue come up. Here, there was no motion to suppress the gun. I’m still unclear on the timing here, but it sounds like this is the opposite of the previous, in that the area searched was exactly within the control. Center console which the driver dove for and a glove box in the control of the passenger that was heard shutting while the officer had the driver out of the car. So regardless of the fact that they didn’t preserve the issue, it likely would have been the same result. We, of course, have virtually the same dissent as the last on the issue of waiver.

Conviction stands as do the enhancements (firearm of course).

For those of you wondering…I’m not going for the low-hanging fruit. That’s why there’s no David Cross picture up there. No, we here at The Amateur Law Professor keep things classy. That’s why I now give you The Cross Gun!

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WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Keep Things Separate and Distinct in Jury Instructions to Keep Convictions of More Than One Count.

July 19, 2010

State v. Carter

Carer is a pederass who raped his own daughter between the ages of 6 and 7 given my counts. Lovely guy, non? Unfortunately, the jury instructions didn’t spell out which acts they were finding and subjected Carter to the possibility that the counts were based on the same acts.as opposed to several separate and distinct acts, which are required to avoid double jeopardy issues. As such, only one of the counts can survive.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Argument that Rick Astley is Not a White Guy Fails

July 19, 2010

State v. McGrew III

You may remember a way back there was a hullaballoo about an offender getting mad at getting a firearm enhancement when the jury found a deadly weapon. The court reversed because a deadly weapon could be something other than a firearm. Well here is the opposite problem. Well, not really a problem. A firearm is always a deadly weapon.

Let’s see if we can break this down. I am white. Rick Astley is white. Consider a firearms enhancement like Rick Astley. Say a trial court said…hey, you’re Justin, and therefore a white guy, and we will give you a white guy enhancement:

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(IS a white guy)

But say it was even worse than being a white guy to be Rick Astley. And the court found that I was Rick Astley because it already found I was a white guy.

 

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(NOT Justin)

However, you can say that if you find that a person is Rick Astley to begin with, that he is in fact a white guy. That’s not only science, but it is me Rick-rollin’ you!!!!

So needless to say, the fact that a firearms enhancement was found does in fact mean Rick Astley is a white guy (or that there was a deadly weapon involved). So needless to say, arguing a firearm is not necessarily a deadly weapon fails.

He also claimed that the firearm enhancement punished the same criminal conduct as the firearm charged. Unfortunately, this has come up before. A sentencing enhancement isn’t a sentence, and thus falls outside double jeopardy.

 

 

 

WA Court of Appeals at Div: II: Would the Real Party In Interest Please Stand Up?

July 19, 2010

Kim v. Moffett

Kim and his sons sought help of an Olympia architect to facilitate some California deals. Kim transferred the land to his sons. Kim then entered into the contract with Moffett for the services. He was the only contracting party, saying that it was between Kim and Moffett only. The sons weren’t involved. Moffett moved to California, and wanted out of the agreement. Kim transferred the land to the partnership, sued, and then added the partnership as a Plaintiff. Kim didn’t appeal dismissal of his and JME’s claims, but his sons did. Held, the sons are not real parties in interest and can’t enforce his personal services contract for an undisclosed principal:

As a contracting party, Kim could bring a claim alleging breach of his contract with Moffett for architectural services. While it remains to be seen whether Kim can prove a breach, the trial court erred in denying Kim that opportunity.

. . .

The nonassignability of personal services contracts as noted in the above cases is significant because such designation corresponds to the limits placed on the above stated general rule. This is so because the nature of the performance that a contract requires determines whether an undisclosed principal is entitled to receive that performance. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.03 cmt. d (2006). Accordingly, Dana and Columbia state the applicable rule regarding “simple contracts,” such as cash for goods. But because the present case involves a personal services contract, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that an undisclosed principal may not enforce performance. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.03 cmt. d (2006).

Seriously, how am I supposed to make this funny (aside from my brilliant, and not at all sophomoric, reference to Eminem)?


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