Archive for the ‘Employment’ Category

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: NIED Claim Survives Ecclesiastical Abstention

July 19, 2010

Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church

Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, you usually let church employment matters be handled by the church. Anything less usually gets you into first amendment no-no zones. Same with this, a church employee who continually questioned her church’s guided religious tours as not being in comport with the church’s status as a non-profit.

Needless to say, her employment went south. Most of her claims fell under the abstention, with only her negligent supervision and retention claims surviving:

Analyzing this case under Bollard, we first note that the church has not offered a religious justification for Toone’s alleged tortious acts. Instead, it has denied that any misconduct occurred and argues that both the ministerial exception and ecclesiastical abstention bar consideration of Erdman’s claims. Second, in its employee handbook, the Church specifically recognizes its prohibition against sexual harassment. Third, the Church’s Book of Order states that the Session possesses responsibility “to provide for the administration of the program of the church, including. . . fair employment practices.” CP at 831. Thus, the Church’s employment policies and church doctrine prohibit sexual harassment. Fourth, Erdman’s negligent supervision and retention claims and the Church’s potential defenses involve a limited, secular inquiry similar to the plaintiff’s claims and potential defenses under Bollard.

The First Amendment does not bar Erdman’s negligent supervision and retention claims against the Church. Thus, we remand for further proceedings.

 

WA Supreme Court: Time for Appeal Clocks from Denial of Motion for Reconsideration

May 18, 2010

Skinner v. Civil Serv. Comm’n

Skinner was terminated. He then sought review of the termination. The termination was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. The then sought reconsideration, which was also denied. He then appealed to the superior court, which granted summary judgment based on the fact that Skinner didn’t appeal within 30 days of the original order, instead appealing within 30 days of the reconsideration denial. The supreme court held the time for calculation of the 30 days is from the denial of reconsideration. This is keeping in line with the commission’s own rules, which allow for such reconsideration. Further, the statute says within 30 days of entry of such order, which could be the first order or the second order. Thus, his appeal can be on the second order under the statute. The court is entirely correct when it states to hold otherwise would be to undercut judicial efficiency. It would force an appeal to go on at the same time as a motion for reconsideration, which could render the appeal moot. Don’t expect this rule to change anytime soon, as it was a 9-0 opinion.

WA Supreme Court: Mandamus improper for budget decisions

April 21, 2010

SEIU Healthcare v. Gregoire

SEIU sought pay increases for Home Health providers awarded in a prior arbitration. Gregoire didn’t include it in her budget. The latest budge adopted in the 2009-11 biennial budget. Its already been presented to the legislature and passed into law. Thus, its too late to go back and have the governor amend her proposed budget.

Additionally, the act of budgeting is something that you can’t issue a writ of mandamus to do, as it is a discretionary function of the governor, and not ministerial.

WA Court of Appeals – Div. II: Spoliation and Secretly Recording ARE Misconduct for Unemployment Denial

March 17, 2010

Smith v. State Of Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep’t

Smith secretly recorded conversations with his coworkers in violation of state law. In addition, he had a county laptop with unauthorized software and was instructed to return it without deleting anything. He returned it after removing the incriminating software of course. Those amount to misconduct worthy of denying Smith’s unemployment benefits. Of particular note is the Court of Appeal’s refusing to look at witness credibility over the view of the Commissioner. The Commissioner was actually reviewing the ALJ. Its unclear from the opinion if the Commissioner made credibility findings over the ALJ; all the court says is it will not put its findings of credibility over the agency. This seems a bit off.

Unfortunately, the policy was clear that recording was not allowed, and not complying with a policy is misconduct.

Court of Appeals: Div. I – Harborview Hospital Did Not Misclassify a Nurse to Avoid Paying Her

February 1, 2010

Lane v. Harborview Medical Cntr.

Janet Lane worked as a “per diem” nurse for Harborview for about 10 years.  Nurses in Washington are classified into categories by statute.  Ms. Lane claimed that her classification as a “per diem” nurse was improper and was done to relieve Harborview of its obligation to pay her certain benefits.  She argued that she should have been considered a “part-time classified nurse.”

The Court of Appeals disagreed.  They held that because her objective work circumstances, namely her control over her own schedule, were not the same as those of a “part-time classified nurse.”  The court stated that “Lane’s employment classification was one of her choosing, and her choosing along.”  She was, therefore, not misclassified under RCW 49.44.170(1)(a).

Court of Appeals: Div. I – Openly Gay High School Teacher Gets Fired for Cussing Out Student

January 26, 2010

Federal Way School District v. Vinson

David Vinson was an openly gay high school teacher at Federal Way High School.  At a Taco Time restaurant, he ran into a student that had apparently harassed him in the past.  They called each other some naughty names and then both lied to a school investigator about it.  At a disciplinary hearing to determine whether he could be fired, the hearing officer determined that his conduct did not rise to the level of a fire-able offense.

The Federal Way School District asked the superior court for review.  The superior court denied the request for review and awarded attorneys fees to Mr. Vinson.  The School District then asked the Court of Appeals to review the denial of review.  The Court of Appeals agreed to do so and found that the conduct was so offensive as to justify termination.

A strongly worded dissent by Judge Dwyer stated that because the school district did not have a right to appeal the hearing examiner’s findings because the statute doesn’t allow it and because the case was moot, the court should not have heard the case.  Mr. Vinson no longer objected to the termination and waived his attorneys fees.  He is suing the school district civilly.

I don’t have a crystal ball or an “in” at the Supreme Court, but my money is on the Supreme Court taking a  look at this case should the parties seek review.  I can’t say who, for sure, but I suspect there are a few justices that would agree with Judge Dwyer.

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

September 18, 2009

Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., LLC.

Though Washington’s Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MUMA, chapter 69.51A RCW) may excuse a marijuana user from criminal prosecution, it will not give rise to a suit for wrongful termination.  In Roe, the applicant received a conditional offer of employment, but failed a pre-employment drug screen.  The employer revoked her offer and Roe sued for wrongful termination in violation.  The court rejected her arguments that 1) MUMA created a private right of action providing her with a civil remedy  and 2) MUMA expressed a public policy against which the normal rule of at-will employment did not apply.

From a strictly doctrinal perspective, the analysis in Roe holds up just fine, but pragmatically the opinion leaves a lot to be desired.  I suppose it’s the larger social issue of whether employers have the right to discharge individuals for otherwise private conduct outside of the workplace that has little to do with the performance of the job itself that has me bothered, but I wonder whether opinions like these will one day be viewed as those myriad Lochner era primacy of contract cases are now viewed.

WA Legal Roundup – Washington State Supreme Court

August 27, 2009

Briggs v. Nova Servs.

If there’s one thing that chaps my hide, its opening up an opinion and seeing the words “Lead Opinion”. Why? Because it means that there is a majority only as to the holding, but there is no majority as to the reasoning. Three justices supported the reasoning of the lead opinion and the holding, two justices each wrote their own concurrence, and 4 justices voted for and agreed with the reasoning on the dissent. So now I have to go through and parse the logic of the lead opinion and the two concurrences to see what matches up. You’d better appreciate what I do for you. You never take me out anymore. When was the last time we went on a real date? That’s it, I’m going to stay with my mother for a few days.

Here’s the run down. Board appoints an Executive Director. Employees hate Executive Director. Board affirms their support of Executive Director. Six employees quit, two are fired. Employees attempt to say their activities were concerted to improve work conditions, an activity protected under Ch. 49.32 RCW, termination in violation of public policy.

Held: Not protected.

The lead opinion and the dissent argue in terms of both the firing for concerted activity AND the tort of wrongful discharge. One is statutory, the other is common law. The concurrence by Justice Charles Johnson agrees with the reasoning that this is a concerted activity case. The concurrence by Justice Barbara Madsen conflates the two as well, but argues that the policy violated was never identified. So where does this leave us? With a result and no reasoning, essentially.

Really…we’re on thin ice here. You’d better at least bring me flowers.


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