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WA Supreme Court: Presumption of Competency for Child Witnesses; Burden on Person Opposing to Prove Otherwise

September 25, 2010

State v. S.J.W.

S.J.W. raped a developmentally disabled boy, 14 years old. At trial, S.J.W.’s attorneys challenged the competency of the victim as a witness. The trial court held that the burden was on S.J.W. to show that the witness was not competent. The court of appeals held that the burden was on the party offering the witness to show the witness was competent, not the other way around, but that the error was harmless.

Let me just pause right there to state why the court of appeals holding would be unruly. Every witness in a criminal trial offered by the State would have to go through a litany of questions as to their competency when the same wouldn’t really be in question. It makes sense that the burden is on the person challenging competency to prove incompetency. Anything else would be just plain silly.

The supreme court agreed with me of course. Its because I’m wise and incredibly handsome:

We may better frame this issue as whether a trial court should presume a child is competent or incompetent to testify. If a trial court should presume a child witness is competent, then the party challenging the child’s competency has a burden to rebut that presumption by establishing that the child is not competent to testify. Conversely, if a trial court should presume a child witness is incompetent, then the party offering the child witness has a burden to rebut that presumption by establishing that the child is competent to testify. As noted, the trial court here started with the presumption that 14-year-old children are competent to testify. The Court of Appeals would have trial courts presume that all children are incompetent to testify.

. . .

Because RCW 5.60.050 no longer makes any reference to age, the default rule for all witnesses should apply, i.e., that every person is presumed competent to testify. See RCW 5.60.020 (“Every person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding”); ER 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or by court rule.”); see also State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803, 650 P.2d 201 (1982) (“Where there has been no such [adjudication of insanity], the burden is on the party opposing the witness to prove incompetence.”). Requiring a trial court to presume a witness is incompetent based solely on his age would be inconsistent with the current statutory scheme that gives no weight to the witness’s age. A six-year-old child (as in Allen) may be more competent to testify than an adult in a given case; no court should presume a child is incompetent to testify based upon age alone. Rather, we hold that courts should presume all witnesses are competent to testify regardless of their age.

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(The Prof: Incredibly Handsome and Wise)

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Posted in Criminal Law, Evidence, Justice Charles Johnson - Draft Majority, Unanimous, WA Supreme Court | 1 Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Gang Affiliation and Witness Intimidation Not Prejudicial for This Walmart Shopper

August 15, 2010

State v. Saenz

Mr. Saenz was a member of a gang called the Bell Garden Locos in Sunnyside, Washington. Saenz got into a verbal altercation at Walmart with two 15 year old members of a rival gang, the Lower Valley Locos. Walmart makes me crazy too. I become a member of the Low Price Locos and our motto is “I don’t care how cheap it is, get me the hell out of here!”  And their logo is a smiley face…I don’t think so.

Walmart guy

The parties left the store and Saenz had a friend, Guillen, pick him up to pursue the two rivals. They found the rivals driving through the parking lot. Saenz started shooting and the two rivals exited their vehicle and ran. Saenz shot one of them in the back. The other fell while trying to escape and put his head through the glass door at Ace Hardware.

Saenz and Guillen escaped, but were later turned in by a relative. Guillen agreed to testify against Saenz for a plea deal. Saenz was charged with two counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. At trial, the State sought admission of Saenz’s gang affiliation. “The court found that three detectives had specific knowledge of language, formation, affiliation, and overall gang structure. The trial court allowed the detectives to testify regarding gangs and gang activity to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.”

The State also sought to introduce evidence of witness intimidation. Saenz had been sending messages to Guillen while they were both in jail. Saenz wanted Guillen to take responsibility for the crimes because he wouldn’t get as much time. Guillen was warned that if he didn’t take the rap, then he and his family would be harmed. Guillen was assaulted in the jail by a group of inmates who were “sending a message.” The court allowed the evidence regarding witness intimidation to show guilty knowledge of the crimes and participation.

Saenz was convicted on all charges and the State sought to have Saenz sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole because he was a persistent offender. The judge disagreed that Saenz was a persistent offender because Saenz had plead guilty to second degree assault and custodial assault when he was 15 years old. When Saenz plead guilty to these charges he signed a stipulation declining juvenile jurisdiction and specifically waived the requirement of a declination hearing. Saenz was represented by counsel when he plead guilty. However, the judge who took the plea failed to make any findings regarding the declination of juvenile court jurisdiction or Saenz’s waiver. So the trial court in the present case concluded that these convictions did not qualify for purposes of persistent offender status because there was no express waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Saenz had one other serious offender conviction, but the statute requires two convictions for persistent offender status.

Saenz appealed the admission of gang affiliation evidence and witness intimidation. The State appealed the court’s failure to sentence as a persistent offender.

Since the trial court had weighed the probative value of the evidence of gang affiliation against its prejudicial impact and held that the evidence was being introduced to establish motive, intent, opportunity, and res gestae for the crimes charged, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the ruling. Similarly, the witness intimidation evidence was also properly weighed by the trial court and admitted.

Saenz also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. However, given the testimony of the victim AND Saenz’s own homie that he was the shooter, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient.

In addition, the Court of Appeals found that when Saenz entered his plea as a 15 year old, he knowingly and intelligently waived juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus he was a persistent offender under the statute and the trial court was reversed. Saenz will be getting LIFE! Maybe he can start a new gang called the Life Time Locos!

Life

Posted in Criminal Law, Division III, Evidence, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Conconr in Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Draft Majority, Juvenile Jurisdiction Declination, Rules of Evidence, Sentencing, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

WA Supreme Court: Old Trespass Warrant Doesn’t Permit Vehicle Search for Evidence of the Offense

August 2, 2010

State v. Afana

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(Dispensing Iron Since 2001.)

Afana was parked in a car, watching the movie with his lady friend on one of those portable DVD players. One officer came up that’s what they were doing, and told them that they should move along. He then ran their names, discovered that the lady friend had a warrant, and pulled the car over to arrest her. The warrant: misdemeanor trespass.

The officer then proceeded to search the car. In a fit of irony, in a black bag titled My Chemical Romance (a band), the officer discovered meth.

As you well know from her recent life cases, an officer is only allowed to search the immediate vicinity of the vehicle occupant incident to arrest. Under Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) [ed. note -  this is the first time I have seen L. Ed. 2d correctly cited in a long time. If you read your bluebook, you would know that Ed. does not fall into the same category as Wn. or 3d, meaning you have to give it a space between the L. and the Ed. Yes, I realize this makes me a bluebook nerd.], “[p]olice May search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offensive arrest.”

The lady friend was in custody at the time of the search, thus she was not within reaching distance. Further, the crime of trespass occurring in a different time and place doesn’t really warrant a search for evidence of the offense.

Posted in Criminal Law, Evidence, Justice Gerry Alexander - Draft Majority, Search and Seizure, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »

WA Supreme Court: Measuring Wheel Needs Authentication on Close Calls; No Burden Shifting to Prove Not in School Zone

August 2, 2010

State v. Bashaw

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(The beard makes him more accurate…SCIENCE!)

Bashaw was convicted of selling drugs, as often happens. The court admitted evidence obtained through the use of one of those little rolly devices. That is the scientific technical term. Don’t check, no need. I know my science.

The court also allowed a jury instruction that required unanimity to show that Bashaw was not in a school zone.

As you can imagine, the court took issue with the burden shifting. It is not up to the defendant to prove anything. Rather, is on the state to prove each essential element of the charge, Including aggravating factors. The court also took issue with the fact that the little wheel thingy was not authenticated as to its reliability. Unfortunately, this only makes a difference as to one of the charges, as the other two were well within the school zone such that any admission of little wheeled thingy evidence would not have made a difference to the jury anyhow.

Posted in Criminal Law, Evidence, Justice Sue Owens - Draft Majority, Sentencing, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Bailbondsperson testimony exclusion improper under ER 615

July 19, 2010

State v. Skuza

Note: This opinion is not the standard Google Scholar link, but to Washington Courts. As such, it will expire after ninety days.

In presenting a defense to bail jumping, Skuza was allowed to have a bailbondsman testify. He had a conversation with the bailbondsperson, where she related what her testimony would be to Skuza. The transcript on this portion is worth the read. However, the conversation didn’t on its face violate ER 615 and the exclusion is reversible error to that count only:

Here, however, the trial court erred because there was no evidence that Spencer violated ER 615. The trial judge stated that he had seen Skuza and Spencer together in a smoking area near the court and heard a portion of a conversation between them.  But the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding the circumstances of the interaction.  Spencer, Skuza, and the trial judge were not questioned about the interaction or their observations of it.  The trial judge made a statement, which was not subject to cross-examination, about what he had witnessed and the results of legal research the trial court extern had conducted.  Counsel discussed the effect of the trial judge’s observation on whether Spencer could be called as a defense witness in the proceeding but did not discuss the fact that the trial judge had inadvertently become a witness in the proceeding.  Skuza had no opportunity to question the trial judge about his observations, call Spencer to testify about the specifics of their contact, or research the law to provide a defense or authority against the sanction of excluding Spencer’s testimony.

Moreover, the trial judge’s description of the conversation did not identify specific exchanges that took place between Spencer and Skuza sufficient to warrant a finding that an ER 615 violation occurred.  The trial judge only described statements that Spencer made to Skuza about her testimony and made no reference to specific statements that Skuza made to Spencer about her intended testimony or his prior testimony.  It is possible that the conversation did not violate ER 615′s intent, which is  ”to discourage or expose inconsistencies, fabrication, or collusion.”  Tegland, § 615.2, at 623.  Skuza had already completed his testimony in the case by the time of the alleged violation, so Spencer telling Skuza about her intended testimony did not give Skuza an opportunity to alter his testimony to match hers.

Without a thorough factual development of the circumstances of the conversation, the record is insufficient to establish that an ER 615 violation occurred.  On this record, the trial court erred when it applied the harshest possible sanction of excluding evidence central to the defendant’s bail jumping defense.

 

 

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Posted in Criminal Law, Division II, Evidence, Judge Chris Quinn-Brintall-Draft Majority, Temporary Link, Unanimous, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – If Witness Did Not Report His Own Sexual Abuse, He Can’t Be Used as a Witness for Other Sex Abuse Victims

July 18, 2010

Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc.

Currently there are several cases in the Spokane County Superior Court involving the Morning Star Boys Ranch (the Ranch). The trial court has separated 19 cases into individual trials. The cases are brought by former residents of the Ranch that allege that they were sexually abused by Father Joe Weitensteiner and/or other members of the staff of the facility. In addition to having Fr. Weitensteiner found individually liable, the plaintiffs seek to hold the Ranch liable for damages on various theories including civil conspiracy and vicarious liability.

Father

The first of the 19 trials resulted in a defense verdict. In the second case, this case involving plaintiff George Minehart, the trial court ruled that it would exclude all testimony from witnesses claiming that they were also sexually molested, but never reported the incident to staff at the Ranch (holding that the testimony’s prejudice outweighed its probative value). But if the witness had reported the incident to staff, then the trial court allowed the testimony to support the claims of conspiracy and vicarious liability. Both parties sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals; plaintiff appealing the exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony and the Ranch appealing the admission of other witnesses’ testimony and the suppression of Fr. Weitensteiner’s passed polygraph test. The trial was stayed pending this appeal.

For you lay people, this is what they call an interlocutory review. Basically the trial court has issued an order and the appealing party feels that the alleged error is reasonably certain and its impact on the trial manifest. The appeal is filed while the trial is still pending, but the appealing party feels that the error will affect the outcome of the trial and thus it can’t wait to appeal the case after a final judgment.

In this case, both parties claimed that the discretionary review by the Court of Appeals was necessary under the rules because (1) The superior court had committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; and (2) The superior court had committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially altered the status quo or substantially limited the freedom of a party to act.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were no obvious or probable errors. This decision goes into each ruling that the trial court made and why each one did not meet the standards for discretionary review. I’m not going to go into each of those here, but if you are interested you can click on the link to the case and read on!

While the plaintiffs in these cases won’t be able to use witnesses that didn’t report their own abuse, they still have the witnesses who did report the abuse.  It will be interesting to see how the rest of these cases play out.

Posted in Appellate Procedure, Discretionary Review, Division III, Evidence, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Laurel H. Siddoway, WA Court of Appeals | 2 Comments »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Dismissal of Charges of Child Molestation Upheld Due to Violation of Attorney-Client Privilege

June 19, 2010

State v. Perrow

This is another instance where the State’s handling of a case let an alleged child molester off the hook. In my previous article, the State let a convicted child molester receive about half the prison sentence he should have received under the law. (See Even Though Sentencing Incorrect, Child Rapist Will Be Released Earlier Than Statute Requires; June 15, 2010). In Perrow, the State bumbled the case at the beginning rather in than in the end, as they did in Hudgens.

In October 2007, Detective Sloan began investigating Perrow for alleged sexual abuse of his daughter, A.P. Sloan assisted A.P. in obtaining a protection order against her father on November 13th. On November 14th Sloan contacted Perrow and informed him of A.P.’s allegations. Sloan then prepared an affidavit for a search warrant.

Perrow received a copy of the protection order on November 17th and contacted attorney Vannier on November 19th. Vannier agreed to represent Perrow in regards to both the protection order and any potential criminal charges. Vannier asked Perrow to gather information about A.P.’s allegations and provide him with a written narrative of the matters.

On Novemeber 29th, Sloan executed a search warrant of Perrow’s home. Sloan seized the written materials that Perrow had prepared for his attorney. Perrow contacted his attorney while the police were searching his home and told him that they had seized the written materials he had prepared for Vannier. Vannier told Perrow to inform Sloan that the materials were protected under the attorney-client privilege. Sloan took the materials anyway. Sloan read and analyzed the materials and compared them to notes he had taken from his conversation with Perrow. He noted inconsistencies between the written materials and what Perrow had told him. Sloan prepared a written analysis of the materials seized and forwarded it, along with the seized documents, to the prosecutor.

On December 17th, the State charged Perrow with two counts of child molestation. Perrow moved to dismiss for based on unjustifiable interference of the right to counsel, violation of the attorney-client privilege, and prejudicial governmental misconduct. The court granted the motion finding that at the time the documents were seized, Vannier represented Perrow and therefore the items seized were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the seizure violated Perrow’s constitutional right to counsel and his right to privileged communication with his attorney. Based on the prosecutor’s knowledge of the contents of the documents seized, the court concluded that suppression was not an adequate remedy and dismissed the charges.

The attorney-client privilege applies to communications and advice between an attorney and client and extends to documents that contain a privileged communication. It applies to any information generated by a request for legal advice. "The attorney-client privilege exists in order to allow the client to communicate freely with an attorney without fear of compulsory discovery." The privilege encourages a client to make a full disclosure to his or her attorney, enabling the attorney to render effective legal assistance. An eight-part test in determining if the privilege exists is (1) the client must have sought legal advice; (2) from an attorney; (3) the communication was made to obtain legal advice; (4) in confidence; (5) by the client; (6) the client must wish to protect his identity; (7) from disclosure; and (8) the protection must not have been waived.

The findings of the trial court established each part of the eight part test and thus the attorney-client privilege did exist and the documents were covered under the privilege. The Court of Appeals held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel argument doesn’t matter, because existing case law holds that a violation of the attorney-client privilege is enough to suppress evidence or grant dismissal even before a Sixth Amendment right attaches.

So we are left with the issue of whether dismissal was the appropriate remedy. Case law holds that the prejudice from a violation of the attorney-client privilege cannot be isolated and thus dismissal is the only appropriate remedy. The dismissal was affirmed.

Both Detective Sloan and the prosecutors in this matter really dropped the ball. Detective Sloan could have simply contacted the prosecutor’s office and asked them if the documents were privileged; well in advance of anybody viewing them and spoiling the case. In addition, the prosecutors, once they learned the privileged information was contained in Sloan’s reports, could have sealed the evidence and returned it to Perrow’s attorney. This action may also have saved the case. Instead, both Detective Sloan and the prosecutors ignored the privilege (even when they were informed it existed when seized) and lost the opportunity to convict an alleged child molester. Shame on you. Get it right next time!

Get Out of Jail Free

A dissent was filed in this case by Judge Korsmo, who felt that a lesser remedy was appropriate and that the violation of the attorney-client privilege was only negligent and not egregious. He based this on the fact that the documents were seized under a valid search warrant. The cases in which the majority relied upon, were cases where the information was seized illegally and after the right to counsel had attached.

This may be taken to the Supreme Court.

Posted in Attorney-Client Privilege, Criminal Law, Division III, Evidence, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Dissent, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Draft Majority, Search and Seizure, Sixth Amendment, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »

Div II- nicknames admitted were hearsay and violated the confrontation clause.

May 4, 2010

 

State v. McDaniel and Marlow (consolidated)

McDaniel appeals convictions of first degree attempted murder, first degree robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm. His accomplice, Marlow, appeals his convictions of first degree robbery and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. They argue that the the court erred in admitting hearsay evidence of their nicknames, violating their sixth amendment right to confrontation, the court erred by refusing to sever the unlawful possession of firearms, and that their counsel was ineffective.

McDaniel: The court analyzed the hearsay testimony of the nicknames admitted under Crawford, asking whether the evidence was testimonial.  Here, the court found that the out of court statements made under police questioning are testimonial.  (The dissent argued that the nicknames were admissible under ER 804 (b)(4)).  The court also found that the court abused its discretion when they admitted evidence of his resisting arrest and flight.  The court held that these errors were not harmless and remanded for a new trial. 

The appeals court affirmed Marlow’s convictions.

The court held that the defendants failed to renew their severance motions during trial and held the issue was waived.

The court held that McDaniel’s and Marlow’s argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel fail.

Posted in Confrontation Clause, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Division II, Evidence, Hearsay, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Judge Chris Quinn-Brintall- Draft Dissent, Judge David H. Armstrong - Concur in Majority, Judge Marywave Van Deren - Draft Majority, Sixth Amendment, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Defendant Denied Fair Trial: improper exclusion of evidence, improper other acts admissions, prosecutor misconduct

April 27, 2010

State v. Venegas

JV lived with Venegas, his grandfather’s wife.  JV alleged that Venegas abused him over several years, beating, kicking, choking, and burning him. She was charged with first degree assault on a child and two counts of second degree assault.  One teacher testified that she suggested JV for the gifted program but that Venegas didn’t want him in it.  Venegas made a motion to exclude the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. CPS testified that prior to Venegas charges they were going to take him out of the home and place him in foster home but that Vengeas wanted to make sure they were not going to have to pay for the care. Vengeas objected to this evidence, but the court allowed it in. Vengeas argued that she never hurt JV and that his injuries were made up and based on books he had read and any physical injuries he had were caused by fights with other children, falling down stairs, and wrestling.  Vengeas’ family physician was going to testify but the State object to any expert testimony regarding causation of injuries arguing that they had only just received notice of his testimony.  The court sustained the objection.  She was convicted and appeals arguing that cumulative error prevented her from receiving a fair trial.

The court of appeals agreed with Vengeas.  The court held that the “other acts” testimony from the teacher and CPS investigator were improper as the court did not balance the prejudicial effect of the evidence with its probative value.  They also held that the prosecutor committed “flagrant misconduct” during closing when he misstated the law. Finally, the court found that the trial court’s denial for allowing the doctor to testify was based on untenable grounds. They noted the testimony was important because it directly impeached JV’s testimony on causation and that the court gave to much weight to the “surprise” it would have caused the State given that the trial lasted three additional weeks.  The court reversed on the doctrine of cumulative error.

Posted in Criminal Law, cumulative error, Division III, Evidence, Expert Opinion, Judge C. C. Bridgewater - Concur in Majority, Judge David H. Armstrong - Concur in Majority, Judge Joel Penoyar- Draft Majority, Prosecutor misconduct, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – No Relief for Pot Grower Who Cries Foul at Trial

April 27, 2010

State v. O’Connor

When the officers came knocking on Mr. O’Connor’s door, he had 131 marijuana plants in various stages of production, 6.5 pounds of drying harvested marijuana, and a triple beam scale inside his home. The officers had a search warrant based on an informant’s tip. O’Connor later threatened that informant and told him he owed O’Connor $50,000 for “lost weed” and attorney’s fees.

So the State charged O’Connor with manufacturing, possession with intent to deliver, and two counts of harassment related to the threats to the informant. Before the trial started, O’Connor brought a motion to “open the court.” O’Connor argued that the routine entry-searches at the courthouse doors restricted his right to a public trial. The trial judge informed O’Connor that the courtrooms were open to the public, but the searches were for the safety reasons. O’Connor asked that either the trial be moved to Gonzaga University or courthouse searches stop. That was denied. What a surprise!

On the fourth day of trial, the Spokane County Prosecutor’s office Victims and Witnesses Unit arranged a display in the courthouse in remembrance of murder victims. The display involved multiple pairs of shoes symbolizing victims of violent crimes. O’Connor requested a mistrial because the display prejudiced the jurors on his case. Murder victims=pot grower? Not seeing that one. The judge questioned the jurors and actually dismissed one who said she was affected by the children’s shoes, but denied the motion for a mistrial.

The jury found O’Connor guilty of the two drug charges, but not on the harassment charges. O’Connor appealed the display mistrial motion, the sufficiency of the evidence, the public trial motion, and “pro-se additional grounds.”

“A trial court should grant a mistrial when a trial irregularity is so prejudicial that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. A trial irregularity is not prejudicial unless with reasonable probability the trial’s outcome would have differed if the error had not occurred. Similarly, to establish prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant bears the burden to establish the conduct complained of was both improper and prejudicial.” (Citations omitted)

 

Since the State of Washington has never dealt with the potential prejudice of courthouse displays, it turned to outside authority. In Missouri, the court of appeals held that even a domestic violence display in the courthouse did not prejudice a murder case defendant, stating, “even if we assume, arguendo, that members of the panel actually saw the display, we cannot say that this alone created an inherently prejudicial environment sufficient to deprive the appellant of a fair trial and require a new trial." Division III agreed and pointed out that O’Connor was not convicted of violent offenses. In fact he was acquitted of the harassment charges. In addition, the trial judge questioned the jury to determine if they had been prejudiced. Affirmed. However, I do agree with the court in Missouri that courthouse lobbies are probably not appropriate venues for these types of displays. Don’t give these defendants a way out.

O’Connor also argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him with intent to deliver. Are you kidding me? 131 plants, 6.5 pounds, and a scale? All for personal use I bet. Affirmed!

Cheech

It’s all for personal use, I swear!

And finally O’Connor argued that he was denied an open trial because of the courthouse entry searches. Here the State never requested a closed courtroom. The courtroom was open to the public subject to search. Apparently O’Connor wanted a gun totting audience to watch his trial. I wonder if he thought more people should be in attendance at his big day in court and concluded the only reason the courtroom was empty was because of the searches. The courthouse is full of criminal trials in front of empty courtrooms. No spotlight for a pot grower. The Court of Appeals thought O’Connor’s argument was “sketchy, confusing, and unpersuasive.” Did I mention that O’Connor brought this appeal on his own without an attorney (pro-se)? Once again, affirmed.

Posted in Criminal Law, Division III, Evidence, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Draft Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

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