Archive for the ‘Family Law’ Category

WA Legal Roundup: WA Supreme Court: Mom loses 4 years olds left at home for work; ANOTHER Blakely case; Can’t Adversely Possess City’s Alley

March 1, 2012

So its actually quite an interesting day.

The first case wasn’t all that surprising. The challenge to the dependency action was based on not providing services blah blah blah. The usual rigamarole in dependency actions. So naturally, in Dependency of M.S.R. the Court found no issue with the services (not always the case) and no issue with failure of providing counsel, since none was requested. Let’s just say its not a good idea to take off for work and leave your twin four year olds to their own devices. In this case, they ended up causing a fire.

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Next case is a Blakely case. Every public defender should know this and the Recuenco series of decisions. Anyhow, the long and the short of it is Recuenco III isn’t retroactive and the Court may look at verdict forms to determine if the sentence is valid on its face. Can you imagine the train hurtling down the tracks if firearms enhancements from time immemorial were invalidated? Further, the court should be able to quickly look and see if the sentence is valid on its face, which would give it the ability to revise and clear the burden of the COA. The true gem of this opinion comes from Chambers’ clerk’s inserted footnote. Those who know Chambers’ clerks know from whence this note sprang:

On June 24, 2004, five black-clad figures seized control of the Criminal Justice Express, crashed through warning barriers, flattened the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, opened the throttle, and sent the train hurtling from the main line down the old rail spur where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the sentencing systems of numerous states lay tied helplessly to the tracks. Whereupon, the 2003 Term of Court being concluded, the justices twirled their collective mustachios, sent their robes off to the cleaners, and went on vacation. Two months on, as this Essay goes to press, the rest of us stand staring slack-jawed, some delighted and some aghast, at the disarray and paralysis in the locomotive’s wake and the impending carnage at the end of the line.

I refer, of course, to Blakely v. Washington.

Now, to preserve the (semi) anonymity of the Clerks, I won’t give the name. But I will tell you that this quote originated in a law review article: Frank O. Bowman, III, Essay, Train Wreck  Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved  A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 217, 218 (2004). Oh yeah, the opinion is PRP of Scott.

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Its important to note that, while there have been a LOT of post-Blakely cases. I don’t think the sky has fallen down. The courts seem to have dealt with it rather effectively. Probably a little less turmoil than the whole felon-murder thing and the seminal case I can’t remember right now.

Finally, you can’t really take a city’s alleyway. Its there for public use, so you’re not really adverse possessing until the state actually says that part of it isn’t yours. This only applies to statutory dedications as opposed to common law dedications, which CAN be adversely possessed (comes down to the difference between a grant of fee simple in a statutory dedication of land, and an easement in common law). Sadly, I do not have anything funny to say about an Alley. So instead, I’ll post something involving Kirstie Alley. Oh yeah, so you want to know the case on this one too? You needy bastards! Fine! Kiely v. Graves.

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WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Scribbled Crappy CR 2(a) Dissolution Agreement Enforced Because Both Parties Want It to Be

July 19, 2010

Grimsley-Lavergne v. Lavergne

This is the first time I’ve heard of a record referred to as “abysmal”. But there’s no other way to describe this. It’s essentially a dissolution CR2(a) stipulation written on a bar room napkin:

On September 21, 2004, Mark, Teresa, and their attorneys attended a mediation with former King County Superior Court Commissioner Harry Slusher. The 11-hour mediation resulted in a partially typed but mostly scribbled document identified as a “CR 2A stipulation and agreement” signed by each party, the attorneys, and Slusher. The CR 2A agreement addressed many marriage dissolution issues including: (1) a parenting plan; (2) child support; (3) spousal maintenance; (4) extensive agreements on the distribution of personal property, real property, business property, and personal and business liabilities; and (5) ownership and management of the septic and plumbing business.

The CR 2A agreement is confusing; portions are interlineated, sections are crossed out, and some crossed-out sections have adjacent notes stating, “Back in.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 489-90, 493. The CR 2A agreement does clearly state, however, that “W will prepare final paperwork, incl. [the property settlement agreement]. W will do final presentation.”

Anyhow, they end up having sex that night and staying together three years. Then she wants to enforce the agreement and he doesn’t. Then he does. The court, understandably, is ticked that they didn’t follow form in a dissolution:

Moreover, the record reflects that, although they did so at different times, Mark and Teresa each asked the trial court to enforce the CR 2A agreement. Accordingly, neither party has standing to argue that he or she is aggrieved by the trial court’s enforcement of the CR 2A agreement and the entry of the final dissolution decree.

As we noted earlier, the trial court should have required the parties to comply with former RCW 26.09.070. The legislature expressly designed this statute to address the enforceability of parties’ predissolution agreements. See generally former RCW 26.09.070. Moreover, former RCW 26.09.070 mandates that a predissolution separation contract be in writing and any terms of a parties’ predissolution separation contract (except for parenting plans and child support) be incorporated into a decree of dissolution unless (1) the parties mutually intended to revoke the agreement or (2) the trial court finds the agreement was “unfair at the time of its execution.” Former RCW 26.09.070(1), (4), (5), (8). Neither the trial court nor the parties addressed the statute.

Affirmed.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Notify All Interested Tribes Under ICWA

July 19, 2010

In re Welfare of L.N.B.-L., A.D.B.-L.

Ready for your daily bar prep? Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, when initiating termination proceedings, you must give notice to the tribes if they wish to intervene. This means all the tribes which have an interest. Here, the state failed to notify three interested tribes. The termination, as terminations do, will likely stand. The court, to fix the procedural error, took a rare step in affirming with a remand. The remand is to give proper notice to the three tribes not notified. If any wish to intervene, then there will be a do-over.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Notify All Interested Tribes Under ICWA

July 19, 2010

In re Welfare of L.N.B.-L., A.D.B.-L.

Ready for your daily bar prep? Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, when initiating termination proceedings, you must give notice to the tribes if they wish to intervene. This means all the tribes which have an interest. Here, the state failed to notify three interested tribes. The termination, as terminations do, will likely stand. The court, to fix the procedural error, took a rare step in affirming with a remand. The remand is to give proper notice to the three tribes not notified. If any wish to intervene, then there will be a do-over.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Finds No Contempt, Just Parents’ Inability to Communicate

June 12, 2010

Williams v. Williams

Mr. and Ms. Williams (no relation to this writer…I think) had two children together. They didn’t play nice and thus the court was used as a playground monitor to make sure they followed the rules. The rules in this case were contained in the parties’ parenting plan. It has been my experience in family law that people either take one of two roads when it comes to parenting plans: either they file the parenting plan away after the divorce is over and never refer to it again or they have it memorized and use it as a sword to constantly chastise their ex-spouse. The key difference here being the ability to communicate and work things out without needing a document to tell the parents how to raise their children TOGETHER. Divorce does not end the relationship if you have children. It just makes it different.

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In this case, Mr. Williams cried foul to the court and alleged 11 counts of contempt on his ex-wife for failing to follow the parenting plan. Ms. Williams told the court that her actions were justified based on Mr. Williams’ abusive nature and drinking. (I swear they’re not related). “The commissioner found both parents’ bad behavior stemmed from mutually bad communication. The commissioner further found noncompliance by the mother may have been justified given Mr. Williams’ behavior that invited Ms. Williams’ responses.” The motion for contempt was denied.

Mr. Williams appealed claiming that the trial court erred in combining the 11 contempt allegations based on separate incidents. The Court of Appeals quoted In re Marriage of Eklund, 143 Wn.App. 207, 213, 177 P.3d 189 (2008): “It is well within the trial court’s discretion to hold that, when an initial petition alleges separate violations of a single court order, the incidents constitute a pattern of conduct that merges into a single finding of contempt when these acts are simultaneously declared to violate the order.” Therefore allegations of separate violations can merge into a single finding of no contempt. Mr. Williams also claimed that the commissioner’s findings were incorrect, but the Court of Appeals did not agree.

The bad part of this whole thing is that once these kids are over the age of 18 (which one of them now is), they will have to be the referees in this ugly dance for the rest of their lives. Graduations, weddings, holidays, even funerals will become the battle field for these two individuals to display their inability to just get along for the sake of their children.

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Court of Appeals: Div. III – Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Can Be Considered in Modification of Parenting Plan

April 25, 2010

In re the Marriage of Zigler and Sidwell

This case is a good example of how our state law on modification of parenting plans works. While Washington’s laws in the area of parenting plans are not perfect, we have caught the eye of the rest of the nation with some of our ground breaking cases, such as In re Parentage of L.B. that set forth de facto parentage rights for non-biological parents. Although the details of de facto parentage are still being ironed out in our Supreme Court (oral arguments for In re Marriage of Corbin were heard in early April in regards to the rights of a step-parent), these types of decisions make me proud to be a Washington resident.

The current case, In re the Marriage of Zigler and Sidwell is yet one more of those cases where it would just seem logical that the lower court’s decision was correct. But following the statutory guidelines in family law matters does not mean that a logical result will always be reached.

Kirk Sidwell and Lisa Zigler were marred in 1999, they had a son, Blake, in 2000, and were divorced in 2002. The parenting plan entered with the court made Lisa’s home Blake’s primary residence. The parties agreed to modify the parenting plan in April 2004 and then in December 2004, Kirk filed a motion to modify the agreed parenting plan. The reasons Kirk gave for the modification were:

  • Incidents of domestic violence between Ms. Zigler and her ex-husband, Tim Briggs, that occurred before 2002;
  • Incidents of domestic violence between Ms. Zigler and Mr. Sidwell that apparently occurred between 2002 and 2004;
  • An assault by Ms. Zigler on her daughter, Darci Briggs, in September 2004;
  • Substance abuse by Ms. Zigler’s son, Cory Briggs, in 2004; and
  • Possession of a gun at school by Cory Briggs in 2003.

Kirk’s motion to modify was denied as adequate cause had not been established. Again in March 2006, Kirk and Lisa agreed to modify the parenting plan with some minor adjustments. And then the real fun began! In April 2006, a real brawl took place in Lisa’s home. The altercation involved Lisa, her current husband and two of Lisa’s children. There were punches and biting and an arrest for assault. Kirk again motioned the court to modify the parenting allowing for Blake to reside with him. This time Kirk was successful and the court granted him the modification. Lisa then appealed claiming that the trial judge wrongly considered evidence of family problems from previous to the last entry of a parenting plan: March 2006.

After a determination of adequate cause, a court may modify the parenting plan if it finds: (1) a substantial change occurred in circumstances as they were previously known to the court, (2) the present arrangement is detrimental to the child’s health, (3) modification is in the child’s best interest, and (4) the change will be more helpful than harmful to the child. RCW 26.09.260(1), (2)(c). The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly based its decision on "facts that have arisen since the prior . . . plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior . . . plan." RCW 26.09.260(1).

The trial court had transferred Blake’s primary residence to Kirk’s home because of a history of domestic violence at Lisa’s home. This includes ALL of the history, not just the Smack Down that occurred in April 2006. Lisa argued that the statute only allowed the court to consider evidence that had arisen since the last parenting plan had been entered or that the court had not known at the time of entry of that parenting plan. Since Kirk had filed a motion in 2004 alerting the court to the history of domestic violence at that time, Lisa argued that the court did have knowledge of the problems at the entry of the parenting plan in 2006.

However, the Court of Appeals did not agree with Lisa’s view. The statute allows the court to consider "facts that have arisen since the prior [parenting] plan" and "that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior [parenting] plan." So the reasoning is that Kirk’s motion to modify in 2004 is not a “parenting plan”; it is a motion. So the court could consider as “facts that have arisen” all the facts clear back to 2002, when the original plan was entered. Even though there were two agreed orders entered in between there, the court reasoned that the facts involved in those agreed orders were not known to the trial judge.

Lisa also tried to argue that the record did not show a history of domestic violence. Right. She also argued that there was no evidence to support a finding that her home was detrimental to Blake’s health. The court didn’t buy this one either. And finally she argued that the law required that there must be direct evidence of an effect on the minor child from the detriment. The Court of Appeals did not find any statutory requirement for this and stated that even if there was a requirement there was more than enough evidence to infer that the “this nine-year-old boy was likely affected by the extreme dysfunction, including violence…”

This one feels right to me.

WA Supreme Court: No De Facto Status for Ex-Step Parent

April 21, 2010

In re Parentage of M.F.

In re Parentage of L.B. created a de facto parent right in the case of same-sex partners who agree to have a child together and raise the child together. The question is whether the de facto rights established in In re Parentage of L.B. extend to the following case:

A and B marry, and have a child, C. A and B divorce. B begins dating D. A shares parenting rights with B and D.

Held: D does not get de facto parent status as to C.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Islamic Prenuptial Agreement Held As Not Enforceable

March 2, 2010

 

Obaidi v. Qayoum

This is an interesting case in that the court was asked to interpret an Islamic prenuptial agreement, which is called a “mahr.”  A mahr provides an immediate and long-term dowry to the wife.  So basically the husband pays the wife to marry him and again to divorce him.  Interestingly in this case, the mahr provided that the amount at marriage was only $100 whereas at divorce it was $20,000.  In my opinion, anything that costs $100 to get in and $20,000 to get out, should be avoided.

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Obaidi (the bride) and Qayoum (the groom) were both children of Afghan immigrants.  However, Qayoum is a U.S. citizen and Obaidi was from Canada.  Qayoum had lived in the U.S. since he was three years old and was not accustomed to the Afghan culture.  He considered himself “American first.” 

At the engagement party, or the Nikkah ceremony, Obaidi, Qayoum, and a small group of friends and family all went into a room away from the rest of the party.  Verses from the Koran were read and the parties signed the mahr.  This ceremony was conducted in Farsi.  Qayoum did not speak, write, or read Farsi.  Qayoum also testified that he had not even heard the word “mahr” before the day of the ceremony.  Obaidi and Qayoum both signed the mahr.  As an aside:  It’s never a good idea to sign a document in a language you don’t understand. 

In the Afghan culture, the couple is considered married after the Nikkah ceremony, however the couple solemnized their marriage civilly in Whitman County.  I wonder how often they have Nikkah ceremonies in Whitman County?  13 months later, the honeymoon is over, Obaidi files for divorce and requests the court to grant her the $20,000 pursuant to the mahr.  The trial court concluded that Obaidi was entitled to the $20,000 and also awarded her over $8,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.  Qayoum now appeals claiming that the mahr was not an enforceable contract or prenuptial agreement.

Believe it or not there is no case law in Washington interpreting a mahr!  The Court turned to a New Jersey case that had determined first that deciding such an issue was not precluded under the doctrine of separation of church and state as the issue could be decided on neutral principles of law and not upon religious beliefs or policies.  And second the New Jersey court determined that the mahr was a simple contract and all the elements of a contract were present and was therefore enforceable.

However, the trial court in Whitman County applied the Islamic law stating that the party initiating separation without good cause was at fault and thus must pay the mahr fee.  This was error as Washington is a no fault divorce state.  It doesn’t matter who is at fault.  Next the Court of Appeals applied Washington’s contract laws and determined that there was no meeting of the minds as the mahr’s language was too vague.  In addition, Qayoum was not provided an opportunity to consult with counsel before signing the mahr and he could not even read the document he was signing.  Thus the mahr was not enforceable.

As to the attorney’s fees issue, I usually don’t get into the discussion of attorney’s fees which is at the end of a lot cases, but I had to quote the trial court in considering who would pay the attorney’s fees:

She has the ability to pay some, she makes about $15,000 a year; he makes about a hundred grand a year. It doesn’t take rocket scientists to figure out where I’m coming from on the proration there.

I bet this judge never thought these words would end up in a published opinion.  No abuse of discretion on the attorney’s fee issue.  NEXT!

WA Supreme Court: Must show unfitness of parents in third party custody actions

February 25, 2010

In re Custody of E.A.T.W.

A and B married. They have two children, C & D. B gets breast cancer, her parents move in. A moves to a different state, but maintains contact with the children. B dies. A and the grandparents come to agreements to avoid disruption of the children’s lives, while providing visitation. However, as these things do, the relationship between the adults turn sour.

The grandparents petition for parentage, which the superior court granted. However, Division I reversed, a decision which the supreme court agreed with:

The statute first requires a petitioner seeking a nonparental custody order to submit an affidavit declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of his or her parents or, in the alternative, that neither parent is a suitable custodian. RCW 26.10.032(1). The statute then requires the nonparent to set forth facts supporting the requested order. Id. As indicated by the statute, the “requested order” is a permanent custody order. Id. Therefore, in addition to alleging that a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or that the parent is not a suitable custodian, the nonparent must also set forth facts supporting the custody order. The superior court may ultimately issue a custody order granting the nonparent custody only if the court finds that the parent is unfit or placement with the parent would result in actual detriment to the child’s growth and development. Shields, 157 Wn.2d at 142-43. This standard is necessary in order to adhere to the constitutional mandate that deference be accorded parents in child custody disputes with nonparents. Id. The fact that a parent does not have physical custody of the child, standing alone, does not show that the parent is unfit or that actual detriment would result from placing the child with the parent. Accordingly, merely setting forth facts that the child is not in the custody of a parent is not sufficient to provide adequate cause for a hearing. Something more is required: the nonparent must set forth facts showing the custody order should be granted in accordance with the standard articulated in Shields. The superior court is mandated to deny the nonparent’s motion if it does not find adequate cause for hearing the motion based on the affidavits. See RCW 26.10.032(2).

Washington Supreme Court: State has to offer services before terminating

January 22, 2010

Dependency of C.S.

C.S.’s mother had drug problems. She fixed them. The state still terminated the parental relationship on the basis that, while she had recovered, she was unable to care for his ADHD needs. Unfortunately, the state did not offer services to help her with that, a pre-termination requirement under RCW 13.34.190.


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