Archive for the ‘Judge Chris Quinn-Brintnall – Concur in Majority’ Category

Court of Appeals: Div. II – Defendant Did Have a Clue As To His Guilty Plea, Despite Claim of Incompetency

September 25, 2010

State v. DeClue

Thomas DeClue pled guilty to second degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. DeClue later moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he claimed he was on medication and thus was unable to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. I guess you could say he didn’t have DeClue as to what he was doing! Sorry, I couldn’t resist.

Get a clue

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and several people testified as to DeClue’s competency at the time he plead guilty. A nurse from the jail testified that DeClue had taken several medications at different times including Vicodin, BuSpar, Skelaxin, and Seroquel. I guess incarceration wasn’t too painful.

DeClue testified that the medications made him feel like a zombie and he wasn’t able to process information. Others, including inmates at the jail, also testified that DeClue was drowsy and couldn’t concentrate. However, DeClue’s attorney when he entered the plea testified that DeClue was sharp, astute, paid attention, and had no problems communicating. The judge also reviewed a videotape of the plea. The judge held that entry of the plea did not violate DeClue’s constitutional rights. DeClue appealed.

DeClue contended that since he claimed he was not competent to enter the plea, the statute required that a competency hearing was required not an evidentiary hearing. “If a defendant supports his motion to withdraw a guilty plea with substantial evidence of incompetency, the trial court must either grant the motion or hold a formal competency hearing under RCW 10.77. 060.” The important part of this rule is that the claim must be supported by “substantial evidence of incompetency.” If substantial evidence is lacking, then the motion is denied and no competency hearing is required.

DeClue’s claim that the judge made an error by having an evidentiary hearing rather than a competency hearing failed. The evidentiary hearing was held for the purpose of exploring DeClue’s claim that he was not competent. That exploration ended in a finding that there was no substantial evidence of incompetency and thus no competency hearing was necessary.

DeClue also challenged the trial court’s finding that he was competent. However, given the nurse’s testimony that DeClue didn’t appear intoxicated, DeClue’s attorney’s testimony, and the judge’s own recollection (with assistance from video) of the plea, the Court of Appeals could not find that the judge abused her discretion. Affirmed! Get a clue.

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

January 12, 2010

Flight Options LLC v. State of WA Dept of Revenue

DOR assessed Flight Options with a tax, which Flight Options objected to.  DOR made a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  Flight Options appealed arguing that they were wrongly assessed the tax because they do not own the assessed property (aircrafts). 

Flight Options sells fractional interests in aircrafts while maintaining ownership, management, and operation in the jets.  The fractional owners cannot sell or transfer their share without Flight Options approval and Flight Options staffs the aircrafts.  

The appeals court used RCW 84.12 in their analysis, which governs assessment of taxes of public utilities including airplane companies. The court found that the RCW expressly states that taxation is assessed for any person that owns, controls, or operates an aircraft for compensation.  Moreover, the court held that because Flight Options maintains some ownership over the airplanes as well as full control, “the aircraft(s) are clearly Flight Options’ ‘operating’ property” under the statute. 

Affirmed

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

January 6, 2010

In Re The Settlement/Guardianship of AGM and LMM

This is a case where the attorney missed the SGAL hearing, lied to the court (claiming she was stuck in snow when there was no snow), erroneously told the court that she requested and prepared documents for the SGAL, and sent a three page demand on a policy limit case (undetermined whether it included all the medical records to substantiate). 

Minor sisters were injured in an automobile accident.  AGM’s medical specials totaled over $68,000.00 while LMM’s medical specials were $3,500.00.  The family was represented by Rubinstein Law Firm who submitted a demand on behalf of the family that consisted of three pages and 7 lines dedicated to AGM’s claim.  State Farm offered policy limits ($100,000.00) for AGM and $4,500 for LMM. Rubinstein accepted the offer for AGM (pending approval) and negotiated LMM’s settlement.  An SGAL was appointed to review the settlement and fees (1/3 requested by the attorney per the rep agreement).  The SGAL opined that a lower fee was appropriate for AGM as the attorney spent very little time on the case and there was no need to negotiate.  After missing the first hearing and being requested to file an itemized lien wherein she claimed only 2 hours of attorney work on AGM’s case, the trial court approved $15,000.00 of the requested $33,333.33 fee for AGM.  Rubinstein Law Firm appeals.

On appeal, Rubinstein argues that the trial court lacked a reasonable basis to reduce the fee, based its decision on the itemized lien, and applied an improper method for determining the fee.  The court found that SPR 98.16W authorizes the trial court discretion over the fees and allows the trial court to consider itemized liens, SGAL recommendations, and attorney declarations.  The court also noted that Rubinstein was incorrect in alleging that the burden of proof for determining a reasonable fee should have been the SGAL or State Farm and held that the burden is on the attorney requesting the fees.  

Finally, the court disagrees again with Rubinstein, holding that the trial court did not determine the reduced fee on an unreasonable or arbitrary basis.  The court quotes the RPC 1.5(a) disallowing attorneys from accepting an unreasonable fee.  In pointing out that the attorney spent very little effort on AGM’s case to obtain the policy limit, the court ruled that the trial court acted reasonably in lowering Rubinstein’s fees.

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

January 4, 2010

State v. Smith

Smith sheltered a llama.  The llama became ill and lost weight.  When a neighbor noticed the llama laying down and thought he wad dead, the neighbor called the Sheriff’s Department.  The llama eventually had to be euthanized due to severe malnutrition.  Smith was charged and convicted of first degree animal cruel despite his testimony that he tried to care for the animal and fed him multiple times a day upon noticing his weight loss.  Smith appeals his conviction and argues ineffective assistance of counsel for 1) failing to investigate and discover other possible causes of illnesses for the llama and 2) failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. 

The court held that Smith’s counsel was ineffective for failing to include the lesser offense.  They reason that many pieces of evidence support an inference that he only committed second degree animal cruelty.  The court commented on defense counsel’s tactic of an all or nothing strategy, stating that “it was not a legitimate trial tactic and constituted deficient performance…”

Reversed and remanded.

WA: Legal Roundup Division II

December 15, 2009

Clark County Public Utility District No. 1 v. State of WA Dept of Revenue

The Department appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the public utility districts (Clark County and Grays Harbor) wherein the trial court granted refunds (for three of the five years requested) to the public utility districts for privilege taxes assessed. 

Both Clark County and Grays Harbor received revenue from basic service charges imposed.  The Department assessed the privilege tax (under RCW 54.28.020(1)(a)). 

The Court of Appeals applied chapter 54.28 of the RCWs and looked only to the statute’s plain words as the parties agreed the statute is unambiguous.  The RCW in question declares “gross revenue” as a privilege tax imposed and thus the question surrounding this case is whether the revenue collected from the basic service charges are considered gross revenue. 

The Court held, when looking at the plain language of the statute, that the language does not support a finding that the service charges encompass “gross revenue.”  The Court found that "gross revenue” under RCW 54.28.020 includes revenues “derived … from the sale of electric energy distributed to consumers,” wherein the basic service charges were not from the sale of electric energy. 

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that only 3 of the 5 years were to be reimbursed, stating that, “the trial court had proper subject matter jurisdiction and it did not err when it applied a three-year statute of limitation.” 

WA: Legal Roundup Division II

December 10, 2009

Jolley v. Regence Blueshield

Dr. Jolley sued Regence Blueshield for violating the Consumer Protections Act and for terminating his practitioner agreement, arguing that Regence failed to provide him with a fair review.  The trial court granted summary judgment on both issues in favor of Regence.  Dr. Jolley appeals.

Dr. Jolley and Regence entered into a practitioner agreement whereby the agreement was later amended to satisfy the WACs in regards to the process of dispute resolution.  The agreement discussed termination in three sections including an at will termination clause, a termination upon suspension of the doctor’s ability to practice medicine, and a section stating that a provider may be terminated if they fail to meet the Company’s Credentialing criteria. 

In 2003 the Washington State Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance Commission (MQAC) issued charges against Dr. Jolley for having sexual relations with his patients’ mothers.  His license was suspended but he was granted a stay for the suspension and was placed on probation for 10 years. Regence notified him that his contract automatically terminated when his license was suspended and explained his right to appeal. During the appeal process his contract was later reinstated by an arbitrator, however, Regence again terminated his contract under the at will clause. Jolley appealed. Regence later stated that they had terminated him for conditions on his license.  An arbitrator found for Regence and stated specifically that Regence met their fair review standard and provided Jolley with an opportunity to state his case.

The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of fair review, which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Jolley argued that he did not receive proper notification because he was told his termination was under the at will clause but later found out that it was due to conditions on his license.  The Court disagreed with Jolley holding that Regence had reasons for its at will termination, which did not convert it to a for cause termination.  Second, Jolley argued that he did not have the opportunity to be heard, however, the court disagreed finding that Jolley went through both Regence’s internal appeals process and an arbitration provided to him, which gave amble opportunity to be heard. 

The Court of Appeals held that he lacked standing to bring a CPA claim, but even if his claim were considered it would fail because there is not evidence to support an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

WA: Legal Roundup: Division II

November 19, 2009

State v. Bliss

Bliss was driving her van when a patrol officer pulled her over to verify she was the registered owner.  The patrol car had noticed the van and a light skinned woman with light hair driving.  The police officer ran a check on the car to find that the registered owner (Bliss) had outstanding arrest warrants (felony and misdemeanor) and was a light skinned woman with blond hair.  The officer pulled Bliss over, arrested her, and searched the van- finding meth.  Bliss tried to suppress the meth by arguing that the office made an unreasonable stop and an unreasonable inference she was the driver.

Bliss appeals her conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the meth and in concluding that the officer acted reasonably in stopping Bliss’s vehicle.  Bliss also argues that under Arizona v. Gant, which disallows a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest under some circumstances, the meth should have been suppressed.

The appeals court disagreed with Bliss’s arguments that the police officer’s observations of her prior to pulling her over were not sufficient for the stop and that the stop was unjustified, however, the court held that in light of Gant, there was insufficient evidence for review and remanded back to the trial court for more evidentiary hearings. The court based its decision regarding the justified stop on the analysis that the police officer observed a driver with light skin and light hair, which fit the description of the registered owner with outstanding warrants. 

The appeals court remanded on the limited issue of whether any other exceptions to the warrant requirement might apply to the search of Bliss’s vehicle.  The trial court is to conduct another suppression hearing, enter findings and give those findings to the Division II Court of Appeals.

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

November 10, 2009

State v. Williams

Williams was convicted for obstructing an office when he gave false identifying information and made false statements.  Williams appeals his conviction and argues that the RCW dealing with obstruction applies only to obstructive conduct and not speech.  He also argues that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing the same at trial. 

The court analyzed the statute which states that obstruction occurs when one, “willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement office in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” The court further defines hinder, delay, and obstruct using Webster’s dictionary.  The court held that, by the plain language and ordinary meaning of the statute, the statute does not treat conduct and speech differently and therefore, affirms Williams’ conviction.

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

September 30, 2009

State v. Coleman

Coleman appeals his conviction of first degree burglary with an exceptional sentence based on sexual motivation, invasion of privacy, and presence of the victim during the commission of the crime. 

The Court vacated the sexual motivation aggravating factor.  The verdict form had initially been returned by the jury with a No next to the question on whether the jury found sexual motivations.  The Judge polled the jury and found that they were not unanimous on the issue and sent them back for more deliberations.  Finally, the jury came back and said they unanimously determined “yes” for that answer.  The appeals court found this case to be almost identical to Goldberg and found that the trial court erred when they treated the jury’s no as a deadlock  and requiring more deliberations. 

The court affirmed the aggravating factor of "invasion of privacy,” and found that invasion of privacy does not inhere in first degree burglary as it was charged in Coleman’s case. 

Coleman also argues that the court erred in using the victim’s mother’s presence in the home as an aggravating factor.  As the court could not determine if the jury did consider the victim’s mother the found this error, if any, to be harmless. 

The court remands for resentencing because at least one of the aggravating factors was vacated.  The court confirms the conviction. 

WA Legal Roundup: Division II

September 22, 2009

State v. Sims

Sims appeals his sentence banishing him from Cowlitz County as a violation of his due process rights and equal protection.  Sims was charged with 1st degree child molestation and plead guilty.  He underwent a psychosexual examination for a pre-sentence report.  The report determined that he would present a very low risk for recidivism if allowed to stay in the community.  Based upon the results, the DOC recommended suspending the confinement portion of the sentence under SSOSA (special sex offender sentencing alternative).  The trial court banned him from the county in which the child he molested lived.

The State concedes the error and argues that the case should be remanded back to the trial court for “broader resentencing and reconsideration.”

To survive strict scrutiny the banishment must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The court holds that the banishment of Sims was not narrowly tailored and that there could have been other restrictions imposed to protect the child and her family from Sims.

The court vacates Sims’s sentence and remands back to the trial court for resentencing.  Sims argues that on remand the trial court should not be able to reconsider its SSOSA decision because if allowed to do so it will “chill criminal appeals.”  The court finds the argument compelling, but nevertheless agrees that the trial court should be allowed to reconsider the SSOSA decision. 


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