Archive for the ‘Judge Kevin M. Korsmo – Draft Majority’ Category

« Older Entries

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Six Months Not “Shortly After”…This Time

August 4, 2010

State v. Combs

This one is nice and short. Combs was released from prison on a drug possession charge. Six months later he was charged with attempting to elude a police officer. RCW 9.9A.535(3)(t) allows a court to impose an exceptional sentence if the “defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.” This is referred to as “rapid recidivism.” Say that five times fast!

This case came down to what does “shortly after” mean? Is it a week? A month? Six months? The Court of Appeals held that considering the facts of this case, six months was not “shortly after.” But they weren’t going as far as to draw a line in the sand at six months for every case. The reasoning being that if the defendant had no opportunity to re-offend for six months or immediate access to the means to re-offend (i.e., it takes a while to find contraband), then it could be considered “shortly after.” In addition, some crimes “require a lengthy period of time to plan or come to fruition.” It takes time to knock over a liquor store! Combs exceptional sentence was reversed.

Posted in Criminal Law, Division III, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Sentencing, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – If Witness Did Not Report His Own Sexual Abuse, He Can’t Be Used as a Witness for Other Sex Abuse Victims

July 18, 2010

Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc.

Currently there are several cases in the Spokane County Superior Court involving the Morning Star Boys Ranch (the Ranch). The trial court has separated 19 cases into individual trials. The cases are brought by former residents of the Ranch that allege that they were sexually abused by Father Joe Weitensteiner and/or other members of the staff of the facility. In addition to having Fr. Weitensteiner found individually liable, the plaintiffs seek to hold the Ranch liable for damages on various theories including civil conspiracy and vicarious liability.

Father

The first of the 19 trials resulted in a defense verdict. In the second case, this case involving plaintiff George Minehart, the trial court ruled that it would exclude all testimony from witnesses claiming that they were also sexually molested, but never reported the incident to staff at the Ranch (holding that the testimony’s prejudice outweighed its probative value). But if the witness had reported the incident to staff, then the trial court allowed the testimony to support the claims of conspiracy and vicarious liability. Both parties sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals; plaintiff appealing the exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony and the Ranch appealing the admission of other witnesses’ testimony and the suppression of Fr. Weitensteiner’s passed polygraph test. The trial was stayed pending this appeal.

For you lay people, this is what they call an interlocutory review. Basically the trial court has issued an order and the appealing party feels that the alleged error is reasonably certain and its impact on the trial manifest. The appeal is filed while the trial is still pending, but the appealing party feels that the error will affect the outcome of the trial and thus it can’t wait to appeal the case after a final judgment.

In this case, both parties claimed that the discretionary review by the Court of Appeals was necessary under the rules because (1) The superior court had committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless; and (2) The superior court had committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially altered the status quo or substantially limited the freedom of a party to act.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were no obvious or probable errors. This decision goes into each ruling that the trial court made and why each one did not meet the standards for discretionary review. I’m not going to go into each of those here, but if you are interested you can click on the link to the case and read on!

While the plaintiffs in these cases won’t be able to use witnesses that didn’t report their own abuse, they still have the witnesses who did report the abuse.  It will be interesting to see how the rest of these cases play out.

Posted in Appellate Procedure, Discretionary Review, Division III, Evidence, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Laurel H. Siddoway, WA Court of Appeals | 2 Comments »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Clause Not Ambiguous: Arbitration Not Mandatory

May 12, 2010

Yang vs. AIG Specialty Auto

This opinion was unpublished, but due to popular demand (Justin made me do it) I am submitting it to the blog for review.

I’m willing to bet that even the lay people out there who read this blog (I think that might be limited to my aunt and my cousin) can read the clause in this auto insurance policy and come to the same conclusion as that of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Here it is:

If we and an "insured" do not agree:

1. Whether that "insured" is legally entitled to recover damages; or

2. As to the amount of damages which are recoverable by that "insured";

from the owner or operator of an "underinsured motor vehicle", then the matter may be arbitrated. However, disputes concerning coverage under this endorsement may not be arbitrated.

Both parties must agree to arbitration. If so agreed, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction.

(Emphasis added).

So here’s the $64,000 Question (or in this instance the $25,000 question): Under this clause is arbitration mandatory or discretionary? I’m sure you came to the same conclusion as the Courts.

The_64000_Question_5793_390x191

Yang sued under her parents’ underinsured auto policy and demanded arbitration pursuant to the clause above. She was seeking the policy’s limits of $25,000.  The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and Yang appealed. One of Yang’s arguments was based on the last sentence of the clause above (“If they cannot agree…”). Yang contended that this last sentence is ambiguous and provides for mandatory arbitration.  I guess if you were to take that sentence and place it somewhere besides where it is currently located, you could say that if there was a dispute about arbitration then the court could compel arbitration? Oh who am I kidding! I can’t even buy that! The Court of Appeals pointed out the clear discretionary language (underlined above) and affirmed the lower court.

Posted in Division III, Insurance, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Concu in Majority, Mandatory Arbitration, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Holds That A Judgment “Lien” Can Expire, But Not the Judgment

April 29, 2010

Krueger v. Tippett

This was a very fact intensive case. In summary, the Kruegers borrowed money from the Tippetts several times beginning in 1976. The loans were secured by real estate and an assignment of the proceeds of a $50,000 life insurance policy on Hal Krueger. The Kruegers filed for bankruptcy in 1981 and subsequently the bankruptcy trustee agreed with the Tippetts to abandon any claims the bankruptcy estate had in the life insurance policy and some other Krueger assets. The Tippetts were allowed to proceed against the policy and the other assets. They obtained a judgment in 1986 in the amount of $43,186.54 and began to foreclose on the Krueger home. However, the Tippetts agreed to release the lien and stop foreclosure procedure for Hal Kruegers’ reaffirmation of the assignment of the life insurance policy. The Tippetts released the lien and filed a partial satisfaction of judgment acknowledging payment of $30,000. So the Tippetts still had a judgment.

Well eventually ole’ Hal kicked the bucket in 2007and the Tippetts came calling for their money from the life insurance proceeds. However, Hal’s wife also claimed the proceeds as the named beneficiary and stated that the Tippetts had let their 1986 judgment expire. The trial court ruled that since the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the insurance policy, it was completely assigned to the Tippetts. Ms. Krueger disagreed and she appealed the decision.

So what was the status of the life insurance policy once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned it? Krueger argues that once abandoned, the property reverts back to the debtor (Krueger). Tippett argues that the abandonment was a transfer from the trustee to them.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Krueger. A bankruptcy trustee cannot abandon property of the estate to a creditor. The property reverts back to the debtor. However, the Tippetts were free to pursue their interest in the policy once it was released.

Krueger also argued that since the Tippetts had taken no action on their judgment it had expired. She pointed out that the judgment was obtained in 1986 and thus it expired in 1996. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The reasoning is that the reassignment of the policy was executed after the judgment. The policy was just a method of how the judgment would be paid. Krueger argued that since the judgment had expired, payment was not enforceable. However, the Court pointed out that the judgment lien had expired, not the judgment itself. Huh?

“Washington’s statutory framework for enforcing judgments focuses on the judgment lien. Entry of judgment creates a lien. When that lien expires, there is no longer any statutory method of enforcing the judgment, and nothing can be done to revive the lien. The statutes, however, address the judgment lien rather than the underlying judgment itself. The parties have not provided, and we have not found, any authority that the judgment itself ceases to exist when it becomes unenforceable…The 1986 judgment, while unenforceable, was still valid and served to establish the value of the assignment of the insurance proceeds. The judgment awarding the entire proceeds to the Tippetts is affirmed.”

So the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but just not for the same reasons.

Okay, that just made my head hurt.

Headache

Posted in Bankruptcy, Division III, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Judgment, Lien, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Dealership’s Taking Advantage of Vulnerable Customers Not A Violation of Consumer Protection Act

April 26, 2010

Walker v. Wenatchee Valley Truck

This case involved two separate parties that both felt like they had been taken advantage of by a car dealer. The facts are certainly disturbing. The two parties were Kathleen Walker and Florence Pedraza. Both parties visited an auto sale that was advertised in both the newspaper and on the radio by Wenatchee Kia. The sale took place in Ellensburg for one week.

Walker Case: Ms. Walker had suffered brain damage from having a brain tumor removed. She was unable to read or write and relied heavily upon her 16-year-old daughter Ashley. The Walkers went to the sale specifically looking for an advertised Kia Sportage. At the lot, Ashley did not see the advertised vehicle and was driving off the lot when Brad the salesman jumped in front of their vehicle. Brad convinced the Walkers to look at a different Sportage and they decided to buy it. Here come the real heart-warming facts: Brad convinced the Walkers (16-year-old Ashley and her brain damaged mother) to buy a Sportage with a manual transmission even though Ashley didn’t know how to drive a manual transmission. “Brad assured her she could easily learn.” Brad went with the Walkers to their home to help search for the title to their trade-in although the record said he slept on the couch while the Walkers searched.

After finding the title and returning to the lot to consummate the sale, Ashley had to sign the sales agreement on behalf of her mother. Then they called a friend to drive the vehicle home because it had a manual transmission.

Pedraza Case: Ms. Pedraza was an 86-year-old woman who supplemented her income by working at the local Taco Bell with Ashley Walker. She also wanted a to buy the Sportage advertised for $13,000. She ended up buying a different one for roughly $24,000 (tax & license). With the cost of financing she paid about $29,000.

Joe Isuzu

Wenatchee’s No. 1 Salesman

Both Walker and Pedraza brought claims against Wenatchee Kia for violations under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After a confusing litigation history wrought with failures to file required documents, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the claims based on the dealership’s claim that there was a one year statute of limitations under the Auto Dealers Practices Act (ADPA) and that there was no causal connection between the dealership’s practices and the parties’ decisions to buy the vehicles. Plaintiffs appealed.

The dealership claimed that the one year statute of limitations set forth in the ADPA (enacted in 1967) supersedes the four year statute of limitations set forth in the CPA (enacted in 1961). The Court of Appeals did not agree. Early provisions of the ADPA (RCW 46.70) stated that the chapter “shall be cumulative to existing laws.” In addition, RCW 46.70.310 specifically states “Any violation of this chapter is deemed to affect the public interest and constitutes a violation of chapter 19.86 RCW” (the CPA statute). I think I would have started with this last argument, but hey that’s just me.

The dealership also argued that the CPA did not apply here because the CPA specifically says that it does not apply to “transactions permitted by any other regulatory body.” Thus, they argued, since dealership advertisements are regulated by the Department of Licensing, the CPA does not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed that Wenatchee Kia’s advertisements did not violate the Washington Administrative Codes requirements, but the cause of action was not based on whether the advertising complied with the Code or not.

“The complaint alleged that the dealer’s sales practices did not conform to its advertising, thus amounting to deceptive behavior in violation of the CPA. In other words, the activity regulated by the code involves advertising, not sales practices. The fact that the dealership advertised its sale does not immunize its allegedly deceptive sales tactics from the reach of the CPA.”

So the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on a violation of the statute of limitations. However, not such a happy ending! Remember the trial court also dismissed because it found no causal connection between the dealership’s practices and the parties’ decisions to buy the vehicles. After reviewing the facts, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court of Appeals agreed that there was no connection.

“The record suggests that the dealership took advantage of vulnerable customers. It does not establish that CPA violations occurred.” So all we can do is get the word out there about a dealership that takes advantage of the elderly and the disabled.  Good sell Brad!

Posted in Consumer Protection, Division III, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Statute of Limitations, Statutory Interpretation, WA Court of Appeals | 2 Comments »

Court of Appeals: Div. III – First High Court Analysis of Venue Statute for Personal Injury Cases

February 13, 2010

 

Moore v. Flateau

This case is purely a venue question: where is the action proper; King County or Yakima County? There is a good analysis of RCW 4.12.020 in this case, which statute was changed in 2001. Previously this statute allowed plaintiffs in “motor vehicle accidents” to bring suit in the county where the accident happened or in the county where the defendant resided. The Legislature changed the statute to expand it to all types of injuries and not just those that arise out of motor vehicle accidents. Flateau v. Moore:

In 2004, Flateau contracted to sell his motorcycle modification business to Moore. Two documents outlined the agreement. The first sold the business while the second provided that Flateau would work for Moore. Neither document provided a venue provision, although the sales contract provided that disputes be resolved in Seattle via arbitration. All notices in the contracts provided they be sent to Moore in Yakima and Flateau in Redmond.

In February 2008, Moore sent notice to Flateau at a Bothell address that he was terminating the contracts. Flateau responded demanding that Moore stop breaching the contract. Two days later Moore filed suit in Yakima County for breach of contract and a “tort of promissory estoppel,” however the complaint was not immediately served on Flateau. Flateau then filed suit in King County against Moore for breach of the two contracts. Moore then notified Flateau that he had already filed suit in Yakima County and he moved to dismiss the King County action. The King County Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction because the Yakima County action had been filed first. However, on reconsideration, King County vacated the dismissal upon the parties’ stipulation that either county would be appropriate to resolve the disputes depending on the outcome of a pending motion to change venue in Yakima County.

Yakima County then denied Flateau’s motion to change venue, finding that it was unclear where Mr. Flateau lived. The Yakima court also found that at least a portion of the claim arose in Yakima County because it involved damage to personal property. Discretionary review was granted by the Court of Appeals.

Flateau’s argument was that the alleged damages of the suit were economic in nature and thus he is entitled to be sued in his home county under the general venue statute.

RCW 4.12.030 provides grounds for which a court may change venue. Subsection (1) provides that venue may be changed when the complaint is not brought in the proper county. The succeeding subsections provide for change of venue in other circumstances such as the convenience of the witnesses, the ends of justice, and judicial disqualification. RCW 4.12.030(2), (3), (4).

The Court of Appeals determined that Sections 2 thru 4 of RCW 4.12.030 allowed a court to make a discretionary decision, thus an abuse of discretion review, but that Section 1 was a legal question that is reviewed de novo. RCW 4.12.025 provides that venue is proper where the defendant resides or any one defendant resides and provides for corporation venue as well. RCW 4.12.020 provides that actions involving damages “for injuries to the person or for injury to personal property” shall be brought were the action arose, but gives the plaintiff the option of bringing the action in the county where the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action. The quoted language is new as of 2001 and has not been defined by any court.

Moore contended that since he worked in Yakima County and there was damage to his “personal property” (his business), that Yakima County was the proper venue. So this came down to what is “personal property.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property.” Without any guidance from the Legislature (imagine that), the Court turned to the underlying facts in the case. Since this was a breach of contract claim and thus about economic damages, the court concluded that this case was not about “injury to personal property.” Thus Yakima County was not a proper venue. So all of this work just to determine which court will hear the dispute. Is King County Superior Court that much better than Yakima County Superior Court? No comment. You never know when you might wind up there!

Yakima            King County

Posted in Civil Procedure, Division III, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Property, Statutory Interpretation, Venue, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

February 2, 2010

 

State v. Hardgrove

Hardgrove was pulled over for not wearing his seatbelt on Main Street in Pullman, Washington.  The officer who pulled Hardgrove over was a WSU police officer.  Hardgrove had a suspended driver’s license and was arrested.  Search incident to arrest uncovered methamphetamine on Hardgrove.

At trial Hardgrove moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the police officer was operating outside of his jurisdiction as a WSU police officer.  The trial court denied the motion and Hardgrove appealed.

In 1985 the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act (Chapter 10.93 RCW) was enacted.  This statute allowed law enforcement agencies to contract with each other to provide mutual assistance without regard to normal territorial limitations.

A general authority peace officer can enforce state criminal and traffic laws throughout the state under certain circumstances, which include written consent or a request for assistance from the primary jurisdiction. See RCW 10.93.070. A "general authority Washington peace officer" is a commissioned officer who works for a "general authority Washington law enforcement agency." RCW 10.93.020(3).

As such, WSU was empowered to enter into mutual aid agreements with the City of Pullman and Whitman County, which it did.  Therefore, according to Division III, the WSU did have jurisdiction to pull over Hardgrove outside the WSU campus. 

Posted in Criminal Law, Division III, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Concu in Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Police Jurisdiction, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

December 24, 2009

Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc.

Dissent

Quinn purchased a truck from Cherry Lane.  Cherry Lane had purchased the truck at auction and replaced the speedometer cluster.  Due to miscommunication, the odometer was never reset to the correct mileage (about 60,000 miles more).  However, Cherry Lane discovered the mistake, contacted Quinn and attempted to make things right.  Quinn had not lived up to his part of the bargain (submitting four titled vehicles as trade-in), the bank would  no longer finance, and thus Cherry Lane repossessed the truck.  You know how people feel about their trucks in Eastern Washington.  Quinn filed suit and the trial court dismissed. 

Silverado

Federal law requires parties transferring vehicles to disclose known irregularities in the odometer reading.  A civil action is available only if the purchaser establishes that the transferor acted with intent to defraud.  Even though Cherry Lane had knowledge about the correct odometer reading, this knowledge had not been communicated to the sales staff.  The trial court found no intent on behalf of Cherry Lane.  On appeal, Quinn argued that the knowledge of the correct mileage could be imputed to the sales staff.  The Court of Appeals held that while knowledge can be imputed, intent to defraud is not an issue of law, but an issue of fact.  The trial court weighed the evidence and found that it was insufficient to find intent.  “An appellate court is simply not permitted to reweigh the evidence and come to a contrary finding’ with an issue of insufficient evidence. 

However, Quinn also argued that the State statutes in regard to altering odometers do not require intent and thus we are left with the knowledge argument.  The Court of Appeals held that knowledge is again a factual question left to the trier of fact and the Court of Appeals will not reweigh that evidence.  The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was never a sale because Quinn did not submit his trade-ins and the financing fell through. 

Chief Judge Schultheis filed a dissent.  According to C.J. Schultheis, a reweighing of the evidence didn’t need to take place, because the evidence as it stood (undisputed) still was evidence of violations of the statute.  He viewed this as statutory application versus factual issues (as the majority viewed this case). 

Posted in Chief Judge John A Schultheis - Draft Dissent, Consumer Protection, Division III, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Concu in Majority, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

December 13, 2009

 

American States Insurance Co. ex. rel. Kommavongsa v. Nammathao

Ah, the love/hate relationship between insurance companies and plaintiff attorneys.  Alright, let’s be honest…there is NO LOVE! 

2502978

Nammathao and her 10 year old daughter were passengers in a one-car rollover accident in 1995.  Nammathao was in a persistent vegetative state and her daughter was seriously injured.  The driver only had a $50,000 insurance policy and that was paid.  There was also a $100,000 underinsured policy through American States Insurance Company (ASIC).  Mr. Greenlee took on representation of both injured parties and guardian ad litems were appointed to both.

ASIC filed an interpleader action to tender its entire policy limits ($100,000) on June 28, 2007.  This is 12 years after the accident.  The victims filed a counterclaim against ASIC for bad faith and requested interest on the policy limits from 1997.  This is where the love shines through!  ASIC filed an answer to the claim for interest alleging that the delay was the fault of attorney Greenlee AND filed a third party action against Greenlee for malpractice (even though Greenlee didn’t represent ASIC).  ASIC also moved to disqualify Greenlee based on a conflict of interest (i.e., representing two victims who both had claims for a set amount).

The third party complaint was dismissed and Greenlee obtained waivers on the conflict of interest.  Then ASIC filed a second motion to disqualify Greenlee based on the fact that Greenlee was a witness to the bad faith claim in that it was his actions that caused the delay in tendering the policy limits.  Right back at you!  The victims then moved to have ASIC’s counsel disqualified because he was a witness on their bad faith claim.  The trial court granted ASIC’s motion and disqualified Greenlee.

Greenlee sought discretionary review by the Court of Appeals and it was granted.  An attorney can be removed from litigation when he or she is a necessary witness, but a court must make appropriate findings to justify that action.  ASIC also claimed that Greenlee should be disqualified for not providing competent representation.  CAN YOU FEEL THE LOVE YET?!

ATTORNEY AS WITNESS:  The relevant parts of RPC 3.7:

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: . . . . (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client; or (4) the lawyer has been called by the opposing party and the court rules that the lawyer may continue to act as an advocate.

Division III applied analysis it used in a previous disqualification case:

A motion for disqualification must be supported by a showing that the attorney will give evidence material to the determination of the issues being litigated, that the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and that the testimony is or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney’s client.

Division III determined that this case did not meet these standards based on the current record.  However, if Greenlee attempted to testify on behalf of his clients (at this point in time he had not been named as a witness by the victims), then the motion to disqualify could be renewed.  They also found that the record was not sufficient to support the claim of incompetence.  THEN THEY ALL HAD A PICNIC. 

Posted in Attorney Disqualification, Division III, Insurance, Judge Dennis J. Sweeney - Concur in Majority, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Concu in Majority, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

October 13, 2009

 

State v. Ramos

After reading the facts of this case, I really, really didn’t want to give this convict any more attention than this blog might bring him.  But I will keep my commitment. 

At the age of 14 this monster and his friend brutally (and brutal doesn’t capture the essence of this crime) murdered an entire family of four in their home.  This included the disabled father, the mother while she was showering, the 12-year-old son when he came to the aid of his mother, and finally the six-year-old son who awoke to find these strangers in his bedroom.  As the trial judge commented, these crimes “have no parallel in Yakima County history for violence.”  At 14 years of age.  Where can violence of this nature be born from?

This appeal was about statutory interpretation, and Ramos’ interpretation was incorrect.  This crime took place in 1993 and 13 years later Ramos appealed the convictions.  Division III dismissed the appeal as untimely.  The Supreme Court subsequently ordered that the appeal proceed as timely.

I’ve experienced a lot in my life so far including a lot of loss.  Out of respect to this family of four that was taken from this place in a senseless act of cowardice, I will not say anything more about this case other than Ramos’ convictions were affirmed.  Justice served and may he rot in his jail cell forever.

Four Candles

Posted in Criminal Law, Division III, Judge Kevin M. Korsmo - Draft Majority, Judge Stephen M. Brown - Concu in Majority, Judge Teresa C. Kulik - Concur in Majority, Statutory Interpretation, WA Court of Appeals | Leave a Comment »

« Older Entries
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 476 other followers