Archive for the ‘Judge Ronald Cox – Concur in Majority’ Category

Court of Appeals: Div. I: Rape Convict May Test DNA Evidence Obtained by Police

April 29, 2010

State v. Thompson

Bobby Ray Thompson was convicted of raping J.S. She misidentified him as a five foot seven inch man with light hair. He is in fact a six foot thee inch man with dark hair. He was nonetheless convicted of the rape on the evidence that he was the man that rented the hotel room in which the rape occurred. While DNA evidence from semen was taken, it was never tested and it was initially believed that it had been destroyed.

After the conviction, he requested that the DNA evidence be tested. He discovered that the State Patrol lab still had the DNA evidence. The Court of Appeals determined that the DNA evidence should be tested.

Court of Appeals: Div. I: No Common Fund Created Where Injured Person Recovers as Passenger from Both Tortfeasor’s PIP and Liability Policy

April 29, 2010

Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

Olga Matsyuk was injured while riding as a passenger in a car. As a passenger in the car, she was a third party beneficiary under the driver’s Personal Injury Proptection (PIP) policy. She also recovered from the driver’s liability policy. She sought attorney fees for creating a “common fund.” This was premised on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mahler v. Szucs, Winters v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and Hamm v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. The Court of Appeals held that no “common fund” was created in this case and, therefore, there was no equitable rationale to award attorney fees.

The Court of Appeals claimed to have adhered to its earlier decision in Young v. Teti. That case was decided before Winters and Hamm. Most assumed it was no longer good law after Winters and Hamm. The Court of Appeals noted that it had not been expressly overruled by Winters and Hamm. Look for the Supreme Court to grant review in this case.

Court of Appeals: Div I – Must Show Intentional AND Unreasonable Trespass to Get Treble Damages

February 23, 2010

Clipse v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc.

King County hired Michels Pipeline Construction (who hired Pipe Experts, LLC) to go onto residents’ private property, dig down to the sewer line, fix sewer pipes and replace the excavation.

The Clipses lived in the area where the work was to be performed.  Excavation of their property was planned, though there was some question as to whether they were informed that someone was going to come onto their property and dig it up.  They claimed that excavation began on their property before they had given permission.  Their sewage line backed up and spewed waste water into their home.  They sued Michels Pipeline and Pipe Experts under the wrongful trespass statute (which can entitle a plaintiff to treble damages).  The trial court granted summary judgment to the Clipses, concluding that the Clipses needed only show that the contractors lacked authorization to come onto their property.  The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeals interpreted the trespass statute to require that the plaintiffs show BOTH that an alleged trespasser (1) intentionally and (2) unreasonably trespassed.  The case was remanded for trial.

Court of Appeals: Div I – Landowner Not Responsible Tree that Crushes Person

February 9, 2010

December 12, 2004: Timothy Ruiz is driving along State Route 410.  He drives through forestland.  Earlier on the same day, the Washington State Patrol closes the road because of dangerous trees tend to topple over.  Wind speeds reach 75 miles per hour on that day and trees had previously toppled over under such circumstances.  As Ruiz passes through, a tree falls and crushes his vehicle.  He is injured.  He sues the landowner and the state.

The trial court dismisses his lawsuit against the landowner and the state under the Forest Practices Act of 1974 (FPA).  The FPA purports to give immunity to all landowners and the state for unharvested timber on land used to grow, harvest or process timber. 

Mr. Ruiz argues that the state and the landowner should not be immune because they have allowed a dangerous condition to occur by leaving exposed trees at the edge of a riparian zone.  The Court of Appeals states that “[w]hile this argument has some attraction, particularly on the facts her that underscore a collision between the important policy of public safety and that of environmental protection,” public safety loses (at least insofar as the court doesn’t want to stick its neck out too far).  This choice is left to the legislature.  Poor Mr. Ruiz.

Does this mean that under no circumstances can a landowner be held responsible for dangerous trees that hover over places where people pass?  What if they’ve cut it half way down and know that it will inevitably fall and kill someone?  Is that what the legislature meant when it enacted the FPA?

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Court of Appeals: Div. 1 – No New Tort of Negligent Dissemination of Harmful Information

January 26, 2010

Corey v. Pierce County

Barbara Corey was a prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office for 20 years.  As a deputy, she helped organize a guild to negotiate employment conditions under a collective bargaining agreement.  She was later appointed to be the third highest ranking official in the office, but was then not part of the guild, which had a “just cause” termination agreement.  Her boss promised her that she would still enjoy the “just cause” termination benefits if she accepted the position.  She accepted the position.

Later, Ms. Corey suggested that a fellow prosecutor, John Neeb, be transferred out of the felony division.  Ms. Corey’s boss, Gerry Horne, initially approved the transfer, but later rescinded it when he discovered what the reasons where that Ms. Corey had recommended the transfer.  (The opinion does not disclose what these were.)  Mr. Horne then terminated Ms. Corey.

Prior to being terminated, Ms. Corey had been collecting donations to purchase a gift for the child of a colleague, who was ill.  Mr. Horne found the money in Ms. Corey’s desk drawer after he terminated her and suspected that she had taken some of the donations.  Mr. Horne’s own investigator, however, found no evidence that Ms. Corey had taken anything.

Ms. Corey claimed that someone in Mr. Horne’s office leaked to the Tacoma New Tribune that she was being subjected to a criminal investigation.  Other stories also appeared in the paper that had disparaging things to say about Ms. Corey and which Ms. Corey claimed were untrue.  Ms. Corey was devastated and humiliated.  She sued Pierce County for invasion of privacy, defamation, defamation by implication, false light, outrage, negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated harmful information and breach of a contract formed by promissory estoppel.

The trial court allowed the jury to consider each of these bases for relief, including the previously unannounced tort of negligent dissemination of harmful (unsubstantiated)  information.’

A jury found for Ms. Corey and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict on the basis of the torts of defamation, false light, outrage and breach of the employment contract by estoppel.  (The trial court determined that there was enough evidence that Mr. Horne had promised Ms. Corey that she would only be terminated for just cause.)

The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Washington does not recognize the tort of negligent dissemination of unsubstantiated information.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that such information may not be subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), but that because the PRA does not create a private cause of action, none exists.

The Court of Appeals also recognized that expert testimony with regard to prosecutorial ethics was appropriate and not an invasion of the jury’s role.

The Court of Appeals also held that it was appropriate to exclude evidence from Ms. Corey’s personal life from trial and that her request for attorneys fees was barred as untimely.

Note to appellate courts: Don’t just say that the case law doesn’t support a new tort.  You make the case law.  If public policy including legislative enactments indicate that certain behavior has been deemed offensive in our society, please recognize that nearly the entire body of tort law was created through the common law, which has and will continue to evolve over time.  Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.  Justice Marshall knew that when he stated:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

January 4, 2010

State v. Gresham

Michael Tyronne Gresham was convicted of multiple counts of child molestation in the first degree.  He challenged the constitutionality of RCW 10.58.090 under the separation of powers doctrine and he alleged that as applied to him, the statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

RCW 10.58.090 allowed prosecutors to offer evidence of past sex offenses at Mr. Gresham’s trial.  The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because both the courts and the legislature are authorized to amend the rules of evidence, which is what this statute did.

The Court of Appeals also determined that the statute as applied to Mr. Gresham was not an ex post facto law because it did not change the fact that the state still had the burden of proving that he had committed the prior sex offenses.  The opinion was issued on the same day as a case from the same court involving the same issues.  See State v. Scherner.

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

November 24, 2009

State v. Thompson

James and Judith Thompson exploited a vulnerable older woman named Shirley Crawford by stealing all of her money to the tune of about $500,000.  They also made a videotape of Ms. Crawford reading a declaration they had written for her in which Ms. Crawford claimed that she was aware that they had taken her money and they approved it.  This was done on the eve of a hearing to appoint a guardian for Ms. Crawford.

The Thompsons were convicted of theft and witness tampering because they coerced an elderly woman with dementia to agree to testify that it was her desire to turn over all of her assets (less the $17 left in her estate) to them.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Ms. Crawford suffered from dementia and lacked the capacity to sign the two powers of attorney she executed or “testify” on the videotape regarding her intentions and that the Thompsons knew it.

The Court of Appeals also determined on the state’s cross appeal, that the Thompsons were required to pay a $100 DNA collection fee under a 2008 statute making payment of the fee mandatory “regardless of hardship.” 

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

November 17, 2009

Treiger v. Bank of America

Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens got divorced.  In the divorce degree, Mr. Treiger was given a lien for one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the marital property.  Ms. Owens got into financial difficulty and Bank of America claimed also to have a lien on the property.  Because the dissolution decree is a judgment and a judgment creates a lien when entered and Mr. Trieger’s judgment was entered prior to Bank of America’s, Mr. Trieger’s lien had priority over the bank’s.  Sorry B of A.

Judge Ronald Cox wrote separately to express, in part, his view that the court need not have addressed whether the documents related to the actual sale of the property in question were flawed.

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

October 29, 2009

State v. Brewster

A convicted criminal , regardless of whether they are able to pay, is required to pay for DNA sample extraction obtained following a conviction.

A convicted criminal is not required to undergo an alcohol assessment and treatment for alcohol abuse if there is no evidence that the person’s crime was related to the use of alcohol.

If jurors commit misconduct and you had reason to know that they might but failed to kick them off the jury during jury selection, you can’t complain later.


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