Archive for the ‘Judge Susan R. Agid – Draft Majority’ Category

Court of Appeals: Div I – Police May Not Search Any Vehicle After They’ve Arrested the Driver, Except for Eugene Riley’s

February 10, 2010

State v. Riley

Eugene Riley was pulled over for running a stop light.  After determining that there was an outstanding warrant, police arrested Mr. Riley.  After he had been arrested and was in handcuffs, police searched his car, finding methamphetamine.  At his trial, Mr. Riley claimed that the vehicle belonged to someone else and that he had no knowledge of the drugs being in the car.  He was convicted of possession of methamphetamine.

During the prosecution, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Arizona v. Gant.  In that case, the Supreme Court had held that police may not search a vehicle after an arrest unless they are searching for evidence related to the offense for which the arrest was made.

The Court of Appeals held in this case (2-1), that because the police were operating under a good faith belief that their conduct was constitutional, the evidence they found (methamphetamine) was admissible at trial.  The majority didn’t seem to care that the search was actually unconstitutional, only that the police thought it was at the time.  The majority also declined to state that the search was unconstitutional under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.

The dissent disagreed.  The dissent stated that under controlling Washington Supreme Court precedent, the search was unconstitutional under art. I, sec. 7 of the Washington constitution and should have been suppressed.

Note to Supreme Court: The dissent appears to be interpreting the state constitution according to your recent precedent. 

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

September 22, 2009

State v. Lucero

David Lucero was convicted of 2nd degree assault with a deadly weapon.  He alleged at his trial that he had been defending his friend.  On appeal, everyone (prosecution, defense and  court) agreed that the instruction on defense of another had been improper.  The court determined, however, that since it was the defense that asked for the instruction, it could not complain of error on appeal. 

Mr. Lucero also argued that a previous conviction in California should not have counted toward his offender score because it wasn’t comparable to a Washington crime.  The Court of Appeals determined that since Mr. Lucero’s lawyer acknowledged a prior California conviction existed, the trial court did not need to do a comparability analysis.

Note to criminal defense lawyers: If there is an out of state conviction that might be includable in calculating an offender score, make sure you do the comparability analysis.  See, e.g., In re Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249 (2005).

WA Legal Roundup – Division I

May 11, 2009

Curtis v. Lein

Curtis walked onto the Lein’s dock and her leg went through. The trial court applied res ipsa (the dock was destroyed without an opportunity to inspect). But it refused to summarily hold that the Leins should have known of the defect, only that the defect existed:

Expanding Penson to include the facts in this case would create the potential for premises liability every time a structure fails regardless of whether a defect was discoverable.

Here’s my problem with that logic: The dock may have provided evidence that they should have known. If the whole thing was creaky and rotten, logic would dictate they should have known. Then again, that is a pretty strong sanction for the spoliation in this case, especially where the defect is given to the Plaintiff.

Thoughts? I would love to hear from both bars here.


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