Archive for the ‘Juror Misconduct’ Category

Court of Appeals: Div. I: Misconduct by Civil Defense Counsel and Jurors Warrants New Trial in Sex Abuse by Doctor Case

May 5, 2010

Kuhn v. Schnall

Bill Schnall, MD, was a pediatrician who treated boys as babies and children. He apparently abused them sexually. He gave up his license after being charged with misconduct by the Washington Medical Quality Assurance Commission.

He was sued by four of his former patients. After a six week jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 3 of the 4 plaintiffs. The jury was re-empanelled to consider damages. During this phase, the defendant’s attorney in his closing repeatedly misstated the law and showed a blow up of the language that he was misstating. It was also later revealed that several of the jurors were reading and discussing newspaper articles and television coverage about the trial. One juror revealed that she had been the subject of sexual abuse as a child, which she failed to disclose during jury selection. The trial court granted the plaintiffs a new trial, finding that these things constituted misconduct.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the conduct accused of did, in fact, give the trial court a sufficient basis to find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial.

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

January 4, 2010

State v. Scherner

Roger Scherner was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation.  Mr. Scherner is a California resident, who molested several family members who were under age.  Evidence of prior molestations of women who were under age when they were molested by him was admitted at his trial over his objections under ER 404(b).  He claimed that a statute, RCW 10.58.090, which made such evidence was admissible, was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, holding that the prior molestations were part of a common plan or scheme and that RCW 10.58.090 was not an ex post facto law because it did not change the fact that the State still had to prove that he had committed the prior molestations in order to offer the evidence that he had committed them.  The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments based on the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause and the separation of powers doctrine.

The Court of Appeals also rejected an argument that Bellevue Police Detective Jennifer Robertson had violated RCW 9.07.030 by intercepting telephone conversations where not all parties had consented to the recording. 

The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that the spousal privilege should have prohibited admissions made to Mr. Scherner’s spouse or that admission of that evidence was harmless.

Washington Legal Roundup – Division I

January 4, 2010

State v. Scherner

Roger Scherner was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation.  Mr. Scherner is a California resident, who molested several family members who were under age.  Evidence of prior molestations of women who were under age when they were molested by him was admitted at his trial over his objections under ER 404(b).  He claimed that a statute, RCW 10.58.090, which made such evidence was admissible, was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, holding that the prior molestations were part of a common plan or scheme and that RCW 10.58.090 was not an ex post facto law because it did not change the fact that the State still had to prove that he had committed the prior molestations in order to offer the evidence that he had committed them.  The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments based on the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause and the separation of powers doctrine.

The Court of Appeals also rejected an argument that Bellevue Police Detective Jennifer Robertson had violated RCW 9.07.030 by intercepting telephone conversations where not all parties had consented to the recording. 

The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that the spousal privilege should have prohibited admissions made to Mr. Scherner’s spouse or that admission of that evidence was harmless.

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

December 18, 2009

 

Turner v. Stime

Another jury misconduct case!  What’s the deal with these Eastern Washington jurors?  Just follow the instructions!

The Turners were suing Dr. Stime and his clinic for medical malpractice.  Mrs. Turner was diagnosed with terminal cancer when in fact she had pneumonia.  The untreated pneumonia progressed to sepsis, which resulted in Mrs. Turner being in a coma and amputation of her left forefoot.  Dr. Stime’s own witness testified that Dr. Stime violated the standard of care in several ways during two appointments.  Despite this testimony, the jury returned a verdict favorable to Dr. Stime.  How could that happen?

The Turners were represented at trial by Mark Kamitomo, who is of Japanese ancestry.  Mr, Kamitomo was the only non-Caucasian involved in the trial.  Race was a factor in this trial unfortunately. 

Apparently some of the jurors were using racially inappropriate names when referring to Mr. Kamitomo.  In addition, one juror also made a comment about the verdict being appropriate given that the date was December 7, the same date that Pearl Harbor was bombed.  Based on a finding of derogatory comments and racial bias that affected the jurors’ objective analysis and thus the outcome of the verdict, the trial court granted the motion for a new trial.  Dr. Stime appealed. 

The right to a jury trial includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury.  On a claim of jury misconduct, a trial court has significant discretion in investigating.  However, Dr. Stime claimed that the applicable standard of review was de novo because the trial court’s decision was based on affidavits and not live testimony.  Division III did not agree and held that the standard of review was abuse of discretion because the trial court’s findings were based on its presence during trial. 

Under an abuse of discretion review, it must be determined whether the trial court abused its discretion by deciding that there was "sufficient misconduct to establish a ‘reasonable doubt’ that plaintiff was denied a fair trial.”  There was no dispute about the names used for Mr. Kamitomo and the Pearl Harbor comment.  The test then is if the conduct inheres in the verdict, the conduct cannot be considered which is explained as follows:

"In considering the affidavits filed, we entirely discard those portions which may tend to impeach the verdict of the jurors, and consider only those facts stated in relation to misconduct of the juror, and which in no way inhere in the verdict itself. It is not for the juror to say what effect the remarks may have had upon his verdict, but he may state facts, and from them the court will determine what was the probable effect upon the verdict. It is for the court to say whether the remarks made by the juror in this case probably had a prejudicial effect upon the minds of the other jurors."

Division III affirmed the granting of a new trial, holding that the jurors’ bias and prejudice did not allow for an objective view of the evidence.  The Turners were denied a fair trial and thus a new trial was granted. 

WA Legal Roundup: Division III

November 30, 2009

 

State v. Fry

Mr. Fry punched his wife in the face and was charged with Second Degree Assault.  The trial court instructed the jury on Second Degree Assault and the lesser-included offense of Third Degree Assault.  The court listed the elements of Third Degree Assault as follows: 

1) Mr. Fry caused Ms. Fry bodily harm; (2) "the bodily harm was accompanied by substantial pain that extended for a period of time sufficient to cause considerable suffering"; and (3) Mr. Fry acted with criminal negligence.

The jury convicted Fry of Third Degree Assault.  When the prosecutor and the defense lawyer went to talk to the jury members after the trial, the prosecutor noticed that one of the jurors had a dictionary.  The bailiff told the prosecutor that the juror said the jury used the dictionary to look up the word "substantial."  Fry moved for new trial based on juror misconduct.

The trial court held a hearing and the juror testified that she looked up the word “substantial” at home and brought the dictionary to deliberations, but did not share the definition or the dictionary with the rest of the jury until after the verdict.  The juror also stated that her looking up the word had little to do with her verdict.  The court concluded that the juror’s conduct did not influence the verdict and denied Mr. Fry’s motion for a new trial.  Fry appealed.

A defendant is entitled to a new trial if a juror’s use of extraneous evidence could influence the verdict and prejudice the defendant. Boling, 131 Wn. App. at 332. But a trial court properly denies a motion for a new trial if "it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict." Id. at 333.

It is presumed that juror misconduct is prejudicial, but the presumption may be overcome by an adequate showing that the misconduct did not affect the deliberations.  The question of prejudice turns on whether the conduct had an effect on the outcome.  Ah!  Was there an affect on the effect?  Where’s that dictionary?!

Division III found there was no showing of prejudice, but noted that if this juror went so far as to bring a dictionary to the jury room, she should be watched closely while playing Scrabble.

 

Scrabble Dictionary Fry also appealed the verdict stating that the evidence did not support a finding that Mrs. Fry’s pain lasted past the day of the punch.  Division III was unwilling to conclude as a matter of law that “pain extended for a period of time sufficient to cause considerable suffering” means that the pain must last for more than one day.  That’s probably not in the dictionary.  The word “affirm” is in there!

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