Archive for the ‘Justice Richard Sanders – Draft Dissent’ Category

WA Supreme Court: Prosecutors Can Flaunt Truthiness Clause in Testimony Contract

October 20, 2010

State v. Ish

This is a very bad morning comedically for me. I went on a run at 5:30. I came back. I went to work. I’d rather just take a nap. But here I am…handed a softball like “Ish”, and I’m too tired to make a poop joke. I’m too tired to make a running gag where I just substitute “ish” for is. My brain has just given up.

Anyhow, I suppose we should talk about the case. Well, its a 4-4-1, so the only law made is where the 4 converge with the other 4. Let’s see what they say. Turns out this is a murder case where the prosecutor entered into an agreement with a witness, which required he testify truthfully. During the testimony, the prosecutor whips out the contract and uses it to talk about how the witness will be truthful. Vouching, right? THe court agreed….or at least the lead opinion agreed. The concurrence says this really isn’t misconduct, because an adept defense attorney sees that as a gold mine for impeachment of the witness.

I tend to agree with both. I think an objection can be made, but wouldn’t you rather do the following:

A: Mr. Jones, you came here today to testify against my client?

W: Yes, I did.

A: And you were recommended leniency in exchange for your testimony?

W: Yes.

A: In fact, they made you sign a contract.

W: Yes.

A: They made you sign a contract that you would testify here.

W: Yes.

A: They made you sign a contract that you would testify here and that you would be truthful.

W: Yes.

A: And they wouldn’t give you leniency unless you signed this contract

W: No, they wouldn’t give it to me unless I signed.

A: They wouldn’t give you leniency unless you signed a contract to be truthful.

W. No.

A: So they didn’t trust you to testify truthfully unless they got it in writing?

The dissent by Sanders would have reversed. The law made here today is it was error, but the court of appeals is affirmed anyhow.

 

WA Supreme Court: No Conviction Needed for Probation Violation

October 14, 2010

City of Aberdeen v. Regan

Regan was on probation and had a restriction that he not engage in conduct which constituted “criminal violations of the law.” He of course did so, but wasn’t convicted. The standard for revoking probation is that the conduct be proven to reasonable satisfaction. Requiring a conviction would be changing that standard to “reasonable doubt”. Anyhow, because the City proved to a reasonable satisfaction that the violation occurred, YOINK…bye bye goes the probation.

WA Supreme Court: Fluoride in Water Okay

September 25, 2010

City of Port Angeles v. Our Water-Our Choice

Water, being fluid, is kind of managed by a few people. A local initiative sought to keep fluoride out of the water after the installation of a nice system for fluoridation. Fluoride is staying per the opinion. But if you’re a local initiative nerd, then you probably already have read this one. I’m also late for dinner. So I will give you the link to the opinion. :)

WA Supreme Court: RVs in Mobile Home Parks Outside Ambit of MHLTA, Local Ordinances May Apply

April 21, 2010

Lawson v. City of Pasco

Pasco banned RVs from Mobile Home Parks. Lawson, of course, owned an RV, or else he wouldn’t be here. He argued it was protected by the Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act. Unfortunately, the MHLTA actually contemplates local regulation, thus the field is not preempted. There is no conflict, because the MHLTA deals with mobile homes, manufactured homes, and park models (“a recreational vehicle intended for permanent or semi permanent installation and . . . used as a primary residence.” Since the statute doesn’t address the allowance or disallowance of straight RVs, there is no conflict preemption.

The local ordinance stands.

WA Supreme Court: Sentence, Not Plea Documents, Must Be Facially Invalid to Avoid 1 Year PRP Deadline

April 21, 2010

PRP of Clark

Clark plead to two counts of second degree robbery in 1998. The agreement stated he would serve one year of community placement, something which actually wasn’t statutorily authorized for his crimes. Though this was a bit beyond the one year limit on PRPs, he argues that the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face, allowing avoidance of the one year limit.

So is it invalid on its face? No:

The question is not, however, whether the plea documents are facially invalid, but rather whether the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face.” Hemenway, 147 Wn.2d at 533.

Here, Clark’s judgment and sentence is not invalid on its face. Clark asserts that the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face because it contains a term ofcommunity custody that is not authorized by statute. However, the judgment and sentence, as originally written, did not include a term of community placement.3

WA Supreme Court: Mandamus improper for budget decisions

April 21, 2010

SEIU Healthcare v. Gregoire

SEIU sought pay increases for Home Health providers awarded in a prior arbitration. Gregoire didn’t include it in her budget. The latest budge adopted in the 2009-11 biennial budget. Its already been presented to the legislature and passed into law. Thus, its too late to go back and have the governor amend her proposed budget.

Additionally, the act of budgeting is something that you can’t issue a writ of mandamus to do, as it is a discretionary function of the governor, and not ministerial.

WA Supreme Court: Making no new law on whether the substance need be identified in jury instructions and specifically found by the jury

February 25, 2010

State v. Sibert

Sibert was convicted of a couple meth charges, as meth dealers tend to be. He argued the State had to provide an instruction specifically stating the substance. However, the instructions incorporated the information by reference, which did state the substance. Thus, when the state says it must prove each element of the crime as charged, the to convict instruction referencing the information is enough. In addition, the State actually did prove the identity of the substance.

The court also held that prior convictions used in sentencing need not be proven to the jury under Blakely, the court simply stated it was meritless.

More importantly though, the fifth vote on the majority was result only. Which means that no new law was made here, given three votes for Justice Alexander’s dissent, and one for Justice Sanders’.

WA Supreme Court: State can amend restitution order post conviction

February 18, 2010

State v. Bustamante Gonzalez

BG was convicted of first degree assault and first degree robbery. He did some significant damage to a guys face, causing significant vision loss in an eye. The Court ordered 21K in restitution. Six months later, the restitution was amended and dropped by about $500. After the order, treatment accrued and the crime victims fund ended up paying over $46 grand, and the State (907 days after sentencing) amended the restitution to reflect that.

The statute governing restitution states that the hearing can’t be continued more than 180 days without good cause. The statute also includes this little provisio:

The portion of the sentence concerning restitution may be modified as to amount, terms, and conditions during any period of time the offender remains under the court’s jurisdiction, regardless of the expiration of the offender’s term of community supervision and regardless of the statutory maximum sentence for the crime.

Gonzales argued “amount” was ambiguous as to whether it meant amount of payment or amount of restitution. Given that the statute already has a payment modification clause…argument fail!

Sorry Busta (you knew there was a reason I was including the first name).

WA Supreme Court: Skirting Dep’t of Revenue Rules Leads to Disbarment

February 18, 2010

Discipline of Cramer

Cramer hadn’t paid his excise taxes. He was up for revocation of his business license. Instead he informed the Dep’t of Revenue that he was calling it quits. Instead, he reformed. The mastermind thought the DOR wouldn’t notice that he didn’t pay taxes as Stephen D. Cramer, PLLC and instead got a certificate for Law Office of Stephen D. Cramer, Inc., PS and continued operating. He of course didn’t register the new PS with the DOR and took down their notice of the revocation, that was posted on his door. In continuing to operate (same staff, same equipment, same everything…except for the liabilities, which were not transferred to the new entity), the court took just a bit of issue:

This case involves an attorney who, when faced with revocation of his business license by the Department of Revenue (DOR), notified DOR he was ceasing his business but instead re-formed his practice from a “PLLC” to a “Inc., PS,” and continued to operate.  The attorney failed to notify DOR of his new status and removed the revocation order posted at his office.  The hearing officer and the Washington State Bar Association’s (WSBA) Disciplinary Board (Board) concluded that this conduct was dishonest, illegal, deceitful, and a misrepresentation of his intention to circumvent his tax liabilities and recommended we disbar Stephen D. Cramer.  We adopt the Board’s recommendation.

According to AVVO, this is not Cramer’s first brush with the Board:

Disbarment
02/11/2010

Suspension
06/29/2009

Suspension
12/11/2008

Censure
06/30/1994

Reprimand
02/27/1991

WA Supreme Court: Mandatory Joinder exception applies to Andress cases

January 28, 2010

State v. Gamble

Under the mandatory joinder rule, two or more criminal offenses must be joined if related. Under Andress felony murder charges were invalidated, and many were retried on lesser offenses for the murders. The Defendants (consolidated cases) claimed this violated the mandatory joinder rule. The State contends that this fits into the exception to the MJ rule — that is, to meet the ends of justice.

The court applied the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ requirement of CR 60(b) analogously and determined that Andress was definitely extraordinary.

However, one of the requirements of application is that the extraordinary circumstance be “extraneous to the action of the court.” Here, the court skims over and says it was in fact extraneous.

I beg to differ. Just because it wasn’t the trial court, doesn’t mean that it wasn’t the court. After all, it was the Washington Supreme Court that took on Andress.

That said, I still agree with the result.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 476 other followers