Archive for the ‘Justice Tom Chambers – Concur in Majority’ Category
January 28, 2010
State v. Mandanas
Mandanas was charged with felony assault and felony harassment in an incident. The court doesn’t get too much into facts, but I’ll take their word for it. Because the charges involved a firearm, he picked up two enhancements. The enhancement statute is worded such that seems to clearly anticipate the possibility of multiple enhancements in the case of multiple offenses.” State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wn.2d 402, 423, 68 P.3d 1065 (2003) (Madsen, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). Mandana argued that the sentencing statute precluded multiple enhancements. However, the sentencing statute deals only with calculating previous offense scores.
While armed with a firearm, Mandanas committed two offenses. Each offense was eligible for a firearm enhancement. For the reasons stated above, both of Mandanas’s enhancements are mandatory and they must be served consecutively. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Signed Concurrence, Criminal Law, Firearms Enhancements, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Draft Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Draft Concurrence, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Sentencing, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
January 28, 2010
State v. Gamble
Under the mandatory joinder rule, two or more criminal offenses must be joined if related. Under Andress felony murder charges were invalidated, and many were retried on lesser offenses for the murders. The Defendants (consolidated cases) claimed this violated the mandatory joinder rule. The State contends that this fits into the exception to the MJ rule — that is, to meet the ends of justice.
The court applied the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ requirement of CR 60(b) analogously and determined that Andress was definitely extraordinary.
However, one of the requirements of application is that the extraordinary circumstance be “extraneous to the action of the court.” Here, the court skims over and says it was in fact extraneous.
I beg to differ. Just because it wasn’t the trial court, doesn’t mean that it wasn’t the court. After all, it was the Washington Supreme Court that took on Andress.
That said, I still agree with the result.
Posted in Andress, Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Draft Majority, Criminal Law, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Draft Dissent, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
January 22, 2010
State v. Kelley
Under double jeopardy, you can’t be convicted of the same conduct twice. However, under the same conviction, you may have multiple punishments. Therefore, a firearms enhancement is only a second punishment on the single conviction, not a second conviction. Thus, a firearm enhancement may be added to a 2d degree possession of a firearm.
Posted in Blakely, Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Draft Majority, Criminal Law, Firearms Enhancements, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Concur in Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
January 22, 2010
Dependency of C.S.
C.S.’s mother had drug problems. She fixed them. The state still terminated the parental relationship on the basis that, while she had recovered, she was unable to care for his ADHD needs. Unfortunately, the state did not offer services to help her with that, a pre-termination requirement under RCW 13.34.190.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Dependancy Gaurdianship Proceedings, Family Law, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Did Not Participate, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Draft Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Pro-Tem Justice - Concur in Majority, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
January 22, 2010
Clayton v. Wilson
Mr. Wilson abused Clayton for a long time — that is, until he was caught. When out on bail before trial, he transferred 90% of his assets to his wife. The trial court voided the transfer and the Wilson’s were found jointly and severally liable. The joint and several liability is imposed as long as the abuse occurs during the conduct of community business. Here, that was Clayton cutting the lawn.
As to the fraudulent transfer:
Based on RCW 19.40.041(b)’s 11 factors, the facts of the present matter strongly suggest fraud in the Wilsons’ property transfer: The Wilsons were married, Mr. Wilson continued to live on one of the properties rent free after the transfer, the transfer occurred at breakneck speed between Mr. Wilson’s release from jail and eventual incarceration, Ms. Wilson received over 90 percent of the assets, the spouses knew and discussed their exposure to tort liability, Mr. Wilson gave no equivalent consideration for transferring the property, and the transfer left Mr. Wilson insolvent. Under the UFTA these factors overwhelmingly suggest fraudulence in the transfer.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Draft Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Tort, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
January 14, 2010
Endicott v. icicle foods, inc.
Endicott was injured aboard an icicle foods vessel (the lowercase is evidently intentional). He brought the case in state court. Under the Jones Act:
A seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to . . . a railway employee apply to an action under this section.
Endicott argued that this was his choice. icicle contended either party could demand a jury. The question comes down to whether the law of the venue or the law of the action (in admiralty) governs. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals follows the law in admiralty, which leaves the right with the plaintiff (along with California). The 5th and 7th circuits follow the law of the venue (along with Louisiana and Illinois).
The court adopted the jurisdictional reasoning. Of particular note is their interpretation of a 9th circuit opinion talking about the Jones Act being cause of action oriented even thought that circuit has said the right flows to the plaintiff.
Substantively, I have to comment that its a way to erode the protections given to Maritime Workers under the Jones Act. In the age of tort reform, where the burden is stacked against a defendant legally, providing a jury trial for the defendant does nothing but break down the stacked deck that was put in place by the legislatute.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Draft Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Concur in Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Maritime Law, Tort, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
December 31, 2009
Lallas v. Skagit County
A Skagit deputy was summoned to the court and told, “[h]e needs to go to jail,” by the judge. The deputy was escorting him to jail when the man broke free, and was injured when laid out by court security. At issue was whether judicial immunity shielded the deputy and the security officer from tort liability. Immunity is generally applicable in the administration of a judicial function. The supreme court phrased the issue as whether judges normally escort people to jail, which they do not.
However, the issue, as it seems to me, is whether judges normally direct prisoners be taken into custody, which it seems they do. And actually taking them into custody is administration of that judicial function.
I am not one known for being conservative, by any stretch of the imagination. This time I think the court got it plain wrong.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Judicial Immunity, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Draft Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Concur in Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Tort, WA Supreme Court | 4 Comments »
December 31, 2009
State v. Buelna Valdez
In October of this year, The Prof posted a holding by the court that there had to be a nexus between the driver and the vehicle to perform a search incident to arrest. In State v. Patton, the court held:
Though we agree Patton was under arrest while he stood next to his car, the search incident to arrest exception requires a nexus between the arrestee, the vehicle, and the crime of arrest, implicating safety concerns or concern for the destruction of evidence of the crime of arrest. Because no such nexus existed here, we reverse the Court of Appeals. We hold that an automobile search incident to arrest is not justified unless the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or destroyed.
Fast forward to now, and we have Buelna Valdez arrested and put in the back of a patrol car on an outstanding warrant secondary to a taillight. The officer noticed floorboards loose and called a drug dog for the search. One guess what they found. However, because of the failure to wait for a warrant, the evidence is out.
Its a shame too, the car wasn’t going anywhere.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Criminal Law, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Draft Concurrence, Justice Jim Johnson - Draft Concurrence, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Draft Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
December 21, 2009
Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise
Despite the name, this case has nothing to do with resorts, gold, or stars. Rather, this case represents another chapter in a longstanding challenge to Whatcom County’s comprehensive plan. Counties planning under the Growth Management Act (GMA) must revisit and update their comprehensive plans every seven years. When the time for update comes, the revised plan must confirm not only to the original GMA, but any and all amendments made thereto in the intervening years.
Whatcom County failed to properly conform its comprehensive plan revisions to a specific GMA amendment dealing with rural development, and so that portion of its comprehensive plan was struck down by the Court. The GMA allows for something called a “LAMIRD,” which stands for a limited area of more intense rural development. LAMIRDS are pre-existing areas of development, such as a rural crossroad, or an industrial cluster, or an existing rural neighborhood. The LAMIRD provisions accept the reality that these developments dot the landscape, but instructs counties to plan for their containment within existing “logical boundaries.” Where Whatcom County went astray was in its failure to
consider the statutory LAMIRD criteria when defining its designations for more intensely developed rural areas and . . . attempt to analyze the logical outer boundaries of the areas under RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d).
So, Whatcom County must revise it’s comprehensive plan to conform to the LAMIRD provisions in the GMA.
Moreover, the Court applied it’s recent holding in Thurston County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board, 164 Wn.2d 329, 190 P.3d 38 (2008) barring “bright-line” density rules to reverse the court of appeals and remand back to board for further consideration. In brief, a Growth Management Hearings Board is no longer allowed to judge a county’s comprehensive plans rural development component by a bright-line density computation. Here, the Board applied a bright-line of one dwelling unit per five acres to invalidate Whatcom County’s rural plan portion. The standard now is whether the densities placed in the plan were clearly erroneous under the GMA. Because no determination was made under that standard, the case must be remanded to the board.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Draft Majority, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Concur in Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Concur in Majority, Justice Richard Sanders - Concur in Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Concur in Majority, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, Land Use, res judicata, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
December 3, 2009
State v. Winterstein
Winterstein was living at a place, but had registered his address as another place. His parole officer came around, suspicious that he was actually living in the place he was found, searched and found…surprise…meth-making.
Winterstein argued that the warrantless search wasn’t warranted, because his address was listed as elsewhere. The State argued that reasonable suspicion that the place was Winterstein’s actual residence.
Held: 2 fairly major things.
- The probation officer can search only if he has probable cause that the place is the residence of the parolee;
- The inevitable discovery rule is 86′d in Washington.
Obviously, you will want to know the reasoning as to the second. The first is just one of those policy choices, and in this case, the court decided to follow the ninth circuit. Terry applies only after you have PC that the place is in fact the residence. As to the second:
The independent source doctrine recognizes that probable cause may exist based on legally obtained evidence; the tainted evidence, however, is suppressed. This is consistent with the mandate of White and Boland and does not suggest any balancing of interests as a precondition to the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. As in Bonds, the balancing of interests under the independent source doctrine becomes relevant only after the tainted evidence is disregarded. See Coates, 107 Wn.2d at 889; Gaines, 154 Wn.2d at 720.
In contrast, the inevitable discovery doctrine is necessarily speculative and does not disregard illegally obtained evidence. The State seeks to admit evidence that it claims the police would have discovered notwithstanding the violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. For example, the federal doctrine allows admission of illegally obtained evidence if the State can “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984). There is no requirement of good faith on the part of the police. Id. at 445.
In essence, the greater privacy afforded by the Washington Constitution (explicit versus the implicit in the United States Constitution) means that we should not ever accept illegally obtained evidence.
Posted in Chief Justice Barbara Madsen - Concur in Majority, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Justice Charles Johnson - Concur in Majority, Justice Debra Stephens - Draft Majority, Justice Gerry Alexander - Concur in Majority, Justice Jim Johnson - Draft Concurrence, Justice Mary Fairhurst - Signed Concurrence, Justice Richard Sanders - Concur in Majority, Justice Sue Owens - Signed Concurrence, Justice Tom Chambers - Concur in Majority, WA Supreme Court | Leave a Comment »
