Archive for the ‘Justice Tom Chambers – Draft Concurrence’ Category

WA Supreme Court: Court Invalidates Terry Stop Outside of Drug House; Could Have Reversed On Vehicle Search Grounds But Chose Terry Stop

September 25, 2010

State v. Doughty

Doughty stopped by a drug house for a couple minutes and drove away. An officer stopped him, and ran a records check and found he had a suspended. They searched incident to arrest and found meth.

Those familiar with the recent slew of search and seizure cases that have been coming down know that they can search the vehicle for something instrumental to the crime and in the immediate vicinity, but no longer have a full blanket ability to search the entire vehicle. Thus, the meth they found incident to arrest in the vehicle search is out:

Oooops. Helps if I read the whole opinion. The terry stop itself is out!

In contrast, here Bishop relied only on his own incomplete observations. There was no informant’s tip (which was the element we found most persuasive in Kennedyid. at 6-8) and no furtive movement. Bishop merely saw Doughty approach and leave a suspected drug house at 3:20 a.m. Bishop had no idea what, if anything, Doughty did at the house. The totality of these circumstances does not warrant intrusion into Doughty’s private affairs.

. . .

A more apt analogy rests with State v. Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13, 851 P.2d 731 (1993). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Gleason court held it improper to seize a person merely for exiting an apartment complex that had a history of drug sales.  Id. at 18.  The court reasoned that “this was the first time the defendant had been seen in the area, the officers did not know what occurred inside the apartment and neither officer saw him involved in the purchase of drugs. Further, there was no evidence Mr. Gleason was acting suspiciously, he was not carrying any unusual objects.”  Id. (citation omitted).  That statement describes the events in Doughty’s chronology almost exactly.

Officer Bishop lacked sufficient specific and articulable facts to seize Doughty.  No legal basis existed for the Terry stop.  If a Terry stop is unlawful, the fruits obtained as a result must be suppressed.  See Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254.  ”‘The exclusionary rule mandates the suppression of evidence gathered through unconstitutional means.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002)); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). Accordingly, suppression of the evidence obtained after the unlawful seizure in this case is proper.

Now, here’s what I’m seeing. The court really wanted to take a look at this Terry stop issue. They could have gotten rid of the conviction on the grounds I talked about earlier. They didn’t? Is this a commentary on our State

Washington Supreme Court: Pot conviction upheld, but should have been able to present medical exception.

January 22, 2010

State v. Fry

The man took Fry’s weed! But see, he tried to tell them it was medical, man. But they weren’t diggin it, and got a warrant anyway. Fry’s doc said he suffered from, “severe anxiety, rage, & depression related to childhood.”

Fry tried to argue that the warrant doesn’t hold up because his note negated probable cause. Unfortunately for Fry, the compassionate use defense is just that, an affirmative defense. It doesn’t affect PC one bit. The statute says terminal or debilitating illness. Even as amended, his rage didn’t qualify.

Harshed his mellow, brah.

But, because this was a 4-4-1 split, we must look to the concurrence and see where the Venn diagram creates new law. Essentially, none is created as to the disqualification of the defense. In fact, there is a 5-4 majority that the defense should have been allowed. However, the concurrence also agrees with the result.

So we have 8-1 for the result of Fry being convicted. But we have 5-4 that Fry should have been allowed to present his defense.

Sanders in his dissent makes a very valid point. The lead opinion would have upheld the warrant on the basis that there were still valid reasons to search, such as determining that the amount of marijuana possessed was over two pounds. However, they only had PC that there was marijuana, not that it was over and above the possessible amount.

Excited Utterance Still Exciting: No Violation of Confrontation Clause

December 31, 2009

State v. Pugh

Pugh beat up Mrs. Pugh. She immediately called 911 while he was within eyesight. Her statements that Pugh was beating her up were an excited utterance and the jury hearing the statements was no violation of the confrontation clause.

To determine if a statement is in fact an excited utterance, the courts look to four factors:

(1) whether the speaker is speaking of events as they are actually occurring or instead describing past events; (2) whether a reasonable listener would recognize that the speaker is facing an ongoing emergency; (3) whether the questions and answers show that the statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency or instead to learn what had happened in the past; and (4) the level of formality of the interrogation.

The court went on to explain that the statement to the 911 operator was an excited utterance:

     Here, read out of context, some of Bridgette Pugh’s statements appear to describe past events. For example, she said that “[m]y husband was beating me up really bad.” She also said that he was walking toward the street and that she could not see him, indicating that she was no longer threatened by him. On the other hand, many of her statements during the call show that her overriding purpose in calling 911 was to obtain police assistance to ensure her safety and medical assistance for her injuries. Although she could not see Mr. Pugh, she expressed concerns about being beaten again if she went outside. She obviously thought he was still close by and remained a danger, and in fact he was arrested outside the apartment in the parking lot just as Officer Meissner was leaving the building.

      A number of the 911 operator’s questions and Mrs. Pugh’s responses also indicate that responses were sought to resolve a present emergency, including questions about whether Pugh was armed, whether he had been drinking, and questions about his identity. The Court in Davis indicated that statements might be nontestimonial if police interrogation, objectively viewed, was an effort to establish an assailant’s identity so that dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. That appears to be the case here.

The court then continues into an interesting discussion on the development of the excited utterance hearsay exception, its applicability given the confrontation clause, and the development of the hearsay rule as arising from res gestae (and its pre-constitutional development). Its an interesting read if you’re a legal history buff.

Conviction affirmed.

WA Legal Roundup – Washington State Supreme Court

October 15, 2009

State v. King

If police departments don’t have an interlocal agreement, the only way an officer has jurisdiction to arrest outside of his jurisdiction is under the emergency exception found at RCW 10.93.070(2), which allows an arrest, “[i]n response to an emergency involving an immediate threat to human life or property.”

In this case, a motorcyclist was traveling 70 while standing on foot pegs, and then sped away at a high rate of speed after a speedy lane change. The district court looked at the definition of reckless driving, of which Defendant was charged, which is a, “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”

The court held that that alone does not necessarily create an emergency exception. I disagree. Accelerating to 100 MPH creates a massive danger to life and property. The speed limits are there because they are an expression of what constitutes a safe speed, and to go beyond them, especially to such a degree, constitutes an immediate danger. The definition of “reckless” above says it all. You can’t say its a disregard for the safety of persons or property on the one hand, and on the other say that its not an immediate threat to those same things.

King’s conviction is reversed. I’m going to sluff off to my room to pout. Maybe I’ll run away. Then they’ll see I was right!

WA Legal Roundup – Washington State Supreme Court

October 1, 2009

State v. Kenyon

Unavailability of a judge is not an unavoidable circumstance permitting you to circumvent speed trial rules. That is all.


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