Archive for the ‘Sex Offender’ Category

WA Court of Appeals – Div. I: Sex Offenders Can Be Ordered to Stay Away from Kids

September 25, 2010

State v. Williams

I’m linking to the unpublished version of this on Google Scholar, but rest assured its now published. Unfortunately, Google Scholar is behind and doesn’t have the published version of this up.

This opinion shouldn’t come as a surprise. He was convicted of rape of a child in the third degree, then was homeless and failed to register. A small problem when you’re trying to make sure someone doesn’t reoffend. After picked up for failing to register, the trial court placed a no-contact with children unsupervised into his sentence. Oddly enough, Division I found that no contact with children is related to the crime of failing to register as a sex offender for an underlying offense of raping a child. Weird, I know. They really had to stretch the bounds of legal interpretation to get to that one. Darned activist judges.

Because this is quite possibly the shortest opinion outside of denial of review, The Prof is going to get crazy and post the whole thing after the jump. Watch out! You never know what may happen next!

 

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Court of Appeals: Div. III – Assault Was Part of Rape and Thus Cannot Convict for Both Crimes

July 29, 2010

State v. Williams

This is a lovely story about a swell guy (note sarcasm). Floyd Williams was convicted on two counts of rape and one count of second degree assault with sexual motivation, which involved two victims. The cases had been consolidated and tried together. The trial court admitted testimony from the victim of Floyd’s prior rape conviction. Floyd was sentenced to life imprisonment as a persistent offender based on these convictions and the prior rape conviction.

Floyd appealed the admittance of the prior victim’s testimony. In addition, Floyd claimed that the assault charge should have merged with the rape charge.

Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes to show that the defendant acted in conformity with that character-had a propensity to commit this crime. But evidence of prior crimes may be admitted for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Since the facts of the earlier rape were very similar to the facts of both the recent rapes, the trial court held that it showed a common scheme and the prejudice of the testimony was minimal. The Court of Appeals agreed.

Next Floyd argued that he could not be convicted of both assault and rape as the assault was part of the rape and the assault had no independent purpose. Since the assault on the victim before and during the rape is what raised it to the level of First Degree Rape, Floyd couldn’t be convicted of both charges. There was merger of the two crimes and thus the conviction for assault was vacated. Boy, I bet ole Floyd was glad to get that assault off his record. I mean what would his employer think?

Three strikes and you’re out Floyd. Out for life! Floyd also made some Pro-se arguments including that the forensic lab who conducted the tests on the victims had a history of making mistakes. But at trial he argued that the sex was consensual. Nice try Floyd.

WA Supreme Court: Residential Status Not an Element of Failing to Register as a Sex Offender

May 6, 2010

State v. Peterson

Peterson moved on September 12 and didn’t register until December 6, when he registered as homeless. He needed to register within 72 hours. The statute provides that you register within 72 hours of leaving your current residence. There’s no requirement that he actually be residing somewhere else, thus the state need not prove his residential status.

He also argued that this was an alternative means crime, or a crime that can be committed in a variety of ways (i.e. – failing to register after becoming homeless, failing to register when switching residences, etc). Again, the statute is pretty clear that the rule is registering when you leave, not when you take up in another place. So it is not an alternative means crime.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Cannot Add Requirements to Statute for Sex Offender’s Petition

February 17, 2010

 

State v. Hooper

This case is a consolidated appeal wherein two petitioners’ cases appealing the same issue were decided together by the Court of Appeals.

Hooper and Felice were both convicted of sex crimes when they were 13 and 12 years old respectively.  Both were required to register as sex offenders.  In 2008, they both petitioned the court to relieve them of their duties to register as sex offenders.  The trial court denied both petitions because Spokane County Juvenile Court requires that a petitioner who was under 15 when he committed the sex offense produce updated polygraph test results and an updated psychological evaluation before the court will consider relieving a petitioner of his duty to register.  Neither petitioner did this. 

RCW 9A.44.140(4) sets out the requirements for a sex offender to petition for relief to register:

An offender having a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a sex offense . . . committed when the offender was a juvenile may petition the superior court to be relieved of that duty. The court shall consider the nature of the registerable offense committed, and the criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior of the petitioner both before and after adjudication, and may consider other factors.

The lower court believed that “may consider other factors” granted it authority to require additional conditions before considering a petition.  Division III held that “may consider other factors” to mean the court can think about other things, but it cannot require the petitioner to produce other things. 

The Court went on to say that indeed the requirement of an updated polygraph test and an updated psychological evaluation is a great idea, but unfortunately that is not what the statute requires.  The lower court’s order denying the petitions for failure to provide the test and evaluation was reversed.  However, this does not mean that Hooper’s and Felice’s petitions are granted.  The lower court will still have discretion to deny the petition after giving the statutory considerations.  I bet I can guess what the result of the next hearing will be:

Denied


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