Archive for the ‘Unanimous’ Category

WA Supreme Court: Still Need Probable Cause for Body Searches Under CrR 4.7

October 20, 2010

State v. Garcia-Salgado

Garcia-Salgado (GS from here on out, as that’s a lot to type) decided it was kosher to pull down an 11 year old’s pants and move up and down on her. Her parent’s disagreed on this point. A police officer sided with the parents. The court, after his arrest, ordered GS’s DNA be taken under Criminal Rule 4.7(b)(2)(vi).

Unfortunately, CrR 4.7 is subject to constitutional requirements. This means you have to have a warrant, and you have to have the additional prerequisites for an invasion to the person. Here, the State didn’t even meet the PC requirement:

Other than the deputy prosecutor’s assertions, it is unclear what information was brought to the attention of the trial court. The State urges us to consider the certification of probable cause in support of Garcia-Salgado’s arrest, but the record does not establish that the trial judge ever read the certification. Ideally, the CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) order itself would reference the evidence relied upon for the probable cause determination, but the order is silent, and nothing in the  transcript of the record reveals what information was before the trial court when it entered the CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) order. Because we do not know what the trial court considered, we cannot say that probable cause supported the order. Accordingly, we cannot find that the warrant requirement has been satisfied. It is the State’s burden to establish that an exception to the warrant requirement has been met. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 250.  The State has not established an exception in this case. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand.

WA Supreme Court: A Boy Named Laura Will Wash That Conviction Right Out of His Hair

October 20, 2010

State v. Moeurn

Moeurn, who’s first name happens to be Laura, got involved in a little altercation involving a little 2X4. The little 2X4 happened to itself get into an altercation with someone’s head. The head was displeased about getting hit with a 2X4 and evidently called the police, who decided that Laura, and not the 2X4, should be charged.

Laura was eventually convicted and the court included an old juvenile adjudication in calculating the offender score. The conviction had washed out though:

In sum, a conviction that has washed out is not relevant to the calculation of an offender score. The Court of Appeals wrongly reversed the order by “scoring” a prior conviction before determining if it had washed out.

 

WA Supreme Court: Court of Appeals has to Defer to ALJ on WAC Interpretation re: Need for Surgery Center

September 25, 2010

Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health

Swedish wanted to add a surgery center in East King County. The department of health agreed. Under the administrative code, to find a certificate of need for the surgery center, the department has to look at three factors: (a) the existing capacity of operating rooms in the planning area, (b) the anticipated number of surgeries in the area three years into the future, and (c) whether existing operating room capacity is sufficient to accommodate the projected number of future surgeries.

Well Swedish applied for a certificate of need. Overlake, being big-dog in the area opposed it, as did Evergreen Health. The health law judge said that the exempt facilities can’t be counted for existing capacity, but can be used for the determination of future need. This seem off to you too? How about we include the capacity of every surgery facility read plainly under the WACs?

Overlake and Evergreen requested an adjudicative proceeding before a health law judge to determine whether the Department erred by issuing the CN to Swedish. They contended that the Department failed to properly apply WAC 246-310-270(9) and that, as a result of the alleged error, the need for an additional ASF in East King County was overstated.  In  upholding the Department’s decision, the health law judge acknowledged that, in calculating existing capacity and future need, the applicable language in sections (a) and (b) of WAC 246-310-270(9) “appears to be all inclusive” of ASFs and exempt facilities. CP at 29. The health law judge went on to say, however,  that the language of the WAC “cannot be read in isolation” and that its “plain meaning may be ascertained by an examination of the statute in which the provision is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found.”  Id. (citing City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wn.2d 289, 295, 126 P.3d 802 (2006)). Following that approach, the health law judge  determined that exempt facilities should be excluded from the calculation of existing capacity under WAC 246-310-270(9)(a), but included in the calculation of future need under subsection (b) of that regulation. In holding that Swedish established need for an additional five operating  room ASF in Bellevue, the health law judge took particular note of the legislature’s emphasis on assuring “that all citizens have accessible health services” and indicated that “[i]f the more inclusive approach were followed, the calculation of available operating rooms would include [exempt facilities] that would not be available to many of the individuals within the health planning area.” CP at 29 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ got it wrong in interpreting the WACs. Unfortunately, that’s not the standard:

The standard of review in CN cases is that the agency decision is presumed correct and that the challengers have the burden of overcoming that presumption. Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health, 164 Wn.2d 95, 102, 187 P.3d 243 (2008). Insofar as questions of law are concerned, we may substitute our interpretation of the law for that of the agency. We do, however, accord  substantial  deference to the agency’s interpretation of law in matters involving the agency’s special knowledge and expertise. An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision is the result of willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances.

Overlake contends that not counting exempted facilities led to an overestimate of need. However, the supreme court said, while not clear, that the ALJ’s interpretation could be a valid one. They have to provide some deference on interpretation of the WACs to those within the agency. Here, the ALJ gave some good reasons as to why he was calculating like that, under a need for availability of centers for the general public. It may not be the best reason, but its definitely one within the agency’s special knowledge. Swedish gets its CN.

That was the Chevron case, right? It’s been a while since i graduated. But I definitely remember something about Chevron.

 

WA Supreme Court: Online Poker Ban Passes Dormant Commerce Clause Muster

September 25, 2010

Rousso v. State

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Let me tell you how this case will go. Washington bans gambling. We uphold gambling ban. Appeal to the Supreme Court of the U.S. which holds the ban unconstitutional because of their super-free market damn the consequences stance. You just wait. I would show you my crystal ball, but I’ve been told that it’s actually made of plastic. My reconstructive surgeon also informed me that showing it to people could get me arrested.

Yes…this may be a first for The Prof. Genital humor. (Go back and reread it if you don’t get the joke).

Anyhow, the legislature banned online gambling. They can’t really second guess the legislature and can only decide if the enactment was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Suffice it to say the ban reads in place. If you want a great breakdown of application of the Dormant Commerce Clause because you are still a law student, or because you want to torture yourself. Go right ahead.

 

WA Supreme Court: Presumption of Competency for Child Witnesses; Burden on Person Opposing to Prove Otherwise

September 25, 2010

State v. S.J.W.

S.J.W. raped a developmentally disabled boy, 14 years old. At trial, S.J.W.’s attorneys challenged the competency of the victim as a witness. The trial court held that the burden was on S.J.W. to show that the witness was not competent. The court of appeals held that the burden was on the party offering the witness to show the witness was competent, not the other way around, but that the error was harmless.

Let me just pause right there to state why the court of appeals holding would be unruly. Every witness in a criminal trial offered by the State would have to go through a litany of questions as to their competency when the same wouldn’t really be in question. It makes sense that the burden is on the person challenging competency to prove incompetency. Anything else would be just plain silly.

The supreme court agreed with me of course. Its because I’m wise and incredibly handsome:

We may better frame this issue as whether a trial court should presume a child is competent or incompetent to testify. If a trial court should presume a child witness is competent, then the party challenging the child’s competency has a burden to rebut that presumption by establishing that the child is not competent to testify. Conversely, if a trial court should presume a child witness is incompetent, then the party offering the child witness has a burden to rebut that presumption by establishing that the child is competent to testify. As noted, the trial court here started with the presumption that 14-year-old children are competent to testify. The Court of Appeals would have trial courts presume that all children are incompetent to testify.

. . .

Because RCW 5.60.050 no longer makes any reference to age, the default rule for all witnesses should apply, i.e., that every person is presumed competent to testify. See RCW 5.60.020 (“Every person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding”); ER 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or by court rule.”); see also State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803, 650 P.2d 201 (1982) (“Where there has been no such [adjudication of insanity], the burden is on the party opposing the witness to prove incompetence.”). Requiring a trial court to presume a witness is incompetent based solely on his age would be inconsistent with the current statutory scheme that gives no weight to the witness’s age. A six-year-old child (as in Allen) may be more competent to testify than an adult in a given case; no court should presume a child is incompetent to testify based upon age alone. Rather, we hold that courts should presume all witnesses are competent to testify regardless of their age.

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(The Prof: Incredibly Handsome and Wise)

WA Supreme Court: When Nolte Wants Cocaine, Nolte Gets Cocaine!

August 2, 2010

State v. Harvill

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(Nolte wants coke!)

Nolte (not the one pictured) was a bad, bad man. He’d smashed a bottle on a guy’s head, giving him brain damage. He pulled a gun from another man, and then stepped in. So when Nolte called up Harvill, wanting cocaine, Harvill was understandably a little afraid. When he said, “You better get me some cocaine,” Harvill was understandably a little afraid.

Now, while the jury may not have determined that this amounted to dress, it was error for the trial court to not give such an instruction.

The trial court denied Harvill’s request for a duress instruction on the ground that there was no actual “threat.” See RCW 9A.16.060(1)(a) (allowing a duress defense only if the defendant “participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force, created an apprehension . . . .” (emphasis added)). In this context, “threat” means “to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent . . . [t]o cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person.” RCW 9A.04.110(27)(a).

. . .

The question comes down to whether the duress statute requires an explicit threat or whether an implicit threat that arises from the circumstances will suffice. At trial and again on appeal, the State emphasized that Nolte never told Harvill to get him drugs “or else,” arguing that the absence of this phrase or similar words confirms that no express or implied threat occurred. VRP (Jan. 4, 2007) at 38; Br. of Resp’t at 8-9. But, the lack of an “or else” proves only that there was no direct threat. The statutory definition of threat sweeps more broadly. See RCW 9A.04.110(27) (defining “threat” as “to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent . . . [t]o cause bodily injury” (emphasis added)). Determining what counts as an indirect communication of intent to cause physical harm depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Implicit threats count, and are viewed from the reasonable perceptions of the defendant.

WA Supreme Court: Reference to DV elsewhere in information sufficient

August 2, 2010

State v. Nonog

Nonog  was charged with interfering with the reporting of domestic violence under RCW 9A.36.150. The count for interfering did not specify the crime of domestic violence committed, but did specify the day on which it occurred. The other count in the information specifically detailed that crime. Held: the information, then liberally construed, was sufficient. The defendant knew what crimes are being alleged, because they were elsewhere in the information.

WA Supreme Court: Have To Plead Knowing In Your Escape Information

August 2, 2010

State v. Brown

Brown requested, and received, a 72 hour furlough for drug treatment. He came back several months later.

I’m going to stop right there, because this reminds me of one of my favorite skits from The State, an old sketch comedy show from MTV. In the skit, the warden of the prison has only one rule: the big open gate is off-limits. The inmate leaves through the open gate, much to the disdain of his fellow convicts, who can’t believe that you would betray the Warden’s trust. He returned several years later to a stern chastising from the warden, and orange cones put up as a warning to others that he really meant it. While I can’t find anything from that skit, here’s an example of their awesomeness: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoCxYhnqH6g (if you’re offended by phallic content, safe for work, but crass nonetheless, you may wish to abstain) (if you love Shakespeare and improv, you will probably like this).

Anyhow, back to the case.  Knowing is an essential element of escape. You have to to plead it in the information. Rather than plead the element, the state pleaded, “he escaped from custody ‘contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided.’”

 

WA Supreme Court: Bookends for Tolling Criminal SOL – Two week job training does not toll; Relocation does

August 2, 2010

State v. Willingham

Willingham took some liberties indecently. During the time the statue was running, he left the state for two weeks for job training. Under Ansell, mere absence is enough to toll the statute  of limitations. Or not.

The court held, per curiam, that two weeks for a work trip did not toll the running of the statute of limitations.

Now we have a set of bookends. If I ever teach criminal law, I am soooooooooooooooooooo using this. Socratic method here I come!

WA Supreme Court: Bench Warrant on Probation Violation Only Requires Well-Founded Suspicion

August 2, 2010

State v. Erickson

Erikson was on probation, and failed to show for probation hearing. Naturally, the court issued a bench warrant. He was found, arrested, and the search revealed little bit of snow. Seeing as he was arrested in August, I’m guessing this wasn’t acquired at a recent trip to Whistler.

Anyhow, the court never did make a formal finding of probable cause on the probation violation alleged. This argument didn’t go over so well:

Erickson essentially argues that under Parks, a judge does not have authority to issue an arrest warrant unless a formal finding of probable cause has previously been made on the underlying reasons for the hearing, in this case the probation violation allegations. But as the Court of Appeals noted below, unlike Parks, Erickson had not simply been accused of a crime but had previously been convicted of fourth degree assault. Erickson, 143 Wn. App. at 666-67. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because probable cause had earlier been found on that charge, the bench warrant was valid. Id. at 662. It noted, “punishment imposed for a probation violation relates to the original conviction for which probation was granted.” Id. (citing State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 154 P.3d 909 (2007)). It therefore held that Erickson could be arrested for failing to appear at the scheduled hearing regardless of whether the court had cause to believe he had violated his probation. Erickson, 143 Wn. App. at 667.

. . .

Erickson argues that under Fisher, the court here could only issue a bench warrant if it had at minimum a “well-founded suspicion” that a violation of the terms of release had occurred. Id. at 232. While we agree with Erickson regarding the required standard, we conclude that in this case the issuing court did have a “well founded suspicion” that Erickson had violated the conditions of his release. Had the bench warrant here been issued immediately after the court received notice of the probation violation allegations, we might be more persuaded by Erickson’s argument. But one of the conditions of Erickson’s release was that he notify the court of any address change. The returned summons stated that Erickson had moved and had left no forwarding address. This alone provided the court with a well-founded suspicion that Erickson had violated the terms of release. The bench warrant was therefore valid and provided adequate authority of law to arrest Erickson.


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