Archive for the ‘WA Court of Appeals’ Category

WA Court of Appeals – Div. I: Sex Offenders Can Be Ordered to Stay Away from Kids

September 25, 2010

State v. Williams

I’m linking to the unpublished version of this on Google Scholar, but rest assured its now published. Unfortunately, Google Scholar is behind and doesn’t have the published version of this up.

This opinion shouldn’t come as a surprise. He was convicted of rape of a child in the third degree, then was homeless and failed to register. A small problem when you’re trying to make sure someone doesn’t reoffend. After picked up for failing to register, the trial court placed a no-contact with children unsupervised into his sentence. Oddly enough, Division I found that no contact with children is related to the crime of failing to register as a sex offender for an underlying offense of raping a child. Weird, I know. They really had to stretch the bounds of legal interpretation to get to that one. Darned activist judges.

Because this is quite possibly the shortest opinion outside of denial of review, The Prof is going to get crazy and post the whole thing after the jump. Watch out! You never know what may happen next!

 

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WA Court of Appeals – Div. I: Confrontation Clause Requires the Witness, Not a Piece of Paper for DOL Testimony

September 25, 2010

State v. Jasper

I apologize for the link to the Washington Courts site. Google Scholar is slacking with its polling, even though this opinion was entered almost a week ago.

Anyhow. Jasper was driving. He didn’t have a license. Because the Prof is cheap and lazy and doesn’t know how to add youtube to this properly, I will instead just give you a link to the kid from the Charlie Bit Me Video….his name is Jasper and he’s pushing Charlie around in a car. Its the first thing that came up, and its super cute!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbe1ZqMJ210

Anyhow, you can imagine what Jasper was charged with…not the cute Jasper in the video, the abstract one in the opinion.

So the State, to prove that there was no license came up with an affidavit from the DOL saying they did a search and found no valid license. Unfortunately, it’s hard to cross-examine an affidavit. This tends to violate the confrontation clause, which requires an opportunity to cross-examine. The supreme court analyzed our law in relation to the recent United States Supreme Court Case of Melendez-Diaz:

The affidavit is not merely a certification that the agency records attached to the affidavit were true and correct copies of records possessed by the DOL. Without question, such a statement would be of the type approved by Melendez-Diaz. 129 S. Ct. at 2539; see, e.g., United States v. Mallory, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 1286038, *3 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[T]he FedEx custodian’s certification in this case does not comment on the content or meaning of the record. . . . [and] does not attempt to describe or decipher the content of the business record” but merely certified that the attached documents were true copies of records kept in the regular course of business).

Instead, the affidavit herein contains ex parte statements made for the purpose of establishing the fact that Jasper was driving with a suspended license on the day of the collision. The affidavit first asserts that the affiant performed a diligent search, implying that the person searching the records knew what records to search for, knew how to find them in the database, and conducted the search correctly. The affidavit next states that Jasper’s license was suspended on a particular day. This statement explains what the results of the records search revealed and what the witness concluded from the records searched. These statements are testimonial because they constitute factual assertions, intended to prove an element of a crime charged. They are not mere statements of the authenticity of the attached records themselves. The affidavit also contains an indirect assertion regarding the non-existence of a record, impliedly asserting that no agency records exist indicating either that Jasper avoided suspension of his license by properly attending to the prior citations referenced in the two letters or that his license was ever reinstated following such a suspension. A statement asserting that a particular record does not exist, when offered to establish that fact, is testimonial.

Let’s hope Jasper remembers to get his license…and hopefully some insurance…before his next crash.

 

 

Court of Appeals: Div. II – Defendant Did Have a Clue As To His Guilty Plea, Despite Claim of Incompetency

September 25, 2010

State v. DeClue

Thomas DeClue pled guilty to second degree manslaughter and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. DeClue later moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he claimed he was on medication and thus was unable to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. I guess you could say he didn’t have DeClue as to what he was doing! Sorry, I couldn’t resist.

Get a clue

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and several people testified as to DeClue’s competency at the time he plead guilty. A nurse from the jail testified that DeClue had taken several medications at different times including Vicodin, BuSpar, Skelaxin, and Seroquel. I guess incarceration wasn’t too painful.

DeClue testified that the medications made him feel like a zombie and he wasn’t able to process information. Others, including inmates at the jail, also testified that DeClue was drowsy and couldn’t concentrate. However, DeClue’s attorney when he entered the plea testified that DeClue was sharp, astute, paid attention, and had no problems communicating. The judge also reviewed a videotape of the plea. The judge held that entry of the plea did not violate DeClue’s constitutional rights. DeClue appealed.

DeClue contended that since he claimed he was not competent to enter the plea, the statute required that a competency hearing was required not an evidentiary hearing. “If a defendant supports his motion to withdraw a guilty plea with substantial evidence of incompetency, the trial court must either grant the motion or hold a formal competency hearing under RCW 10.77. 060.” The important part of this rule is that the claim must be supported by “substantial evidence of incompetency.” If substantial evidence is lacking, then the motion is denied and no competency hearing is required.

DeClue’s claim that the judge made an error by having an evidentiary hearing rather than a competency hearing failed. The evidentiary hearing was held for the purpose of exploring DeClue’s claim that he was not competent. That exploration ended in a finding that there was no substantial evidence of incompetency and thus no competency hearing was necessary.

DeClue also challenged the trial court’s finding that he was competent. However, given the nurse’s testimony that DeClue didn’t appear intoxicated, DeClue’s attorney’s testimony, and the judge’s own recollection (with assistance from video) of the plea, the Court of Appeals could not find that the judge abused her discretion. Affirmed! Get a clue.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Teacher’s Use of School Computer for Lobbying Is Grounds for Dismissal

August 22, 2010

Knudsen v. Washington State Executive Ethics Board

Knudsen is apparently a take charge kind of person. She even represented herself in the appeal of this case. But sometimes this type of approach can get you into trouble. Knudsen was a teacher at Spokane Community College (SCC). She sent an email from an SCC computer urging recipients to pursue approval of two pending bills that would provide tenure-like protections to part time college teachers. Knudsen was a part time college teacher. Was.

The email violated school policy, state statutes, and administrative code for using state resources for lobbying. Although Knudson did not agree that her email was lobbying, she was unable to present evidence that the email was within the scope of her duties as an English teacher. The Washington State Executive Ethics Board entered a finding that Knudsen had violated school policy, state statutes, and the administrative code. Knudson did try to argue that the email was sent on behalf of her union, but then contradicted herself when she testified that the union had made no efforts to lobby on behalf of this legislation. Knudsen appealed to the Superior Court and then to the Court of Appeals.

The Washington Administrative Code allows for de minimis personal use of state resources, EXCEPT if the use is “for the purpose of participating in or assisting in an effort to lobby the state legislature, or a state agency head.” WAC 292-110-010.

Knudsen argued that the school’s email policy violated her free speech rights. However, her argument was procedurally incorrect, as the Board did not consider the email policy when it made its determination; it only considered the statute and the WAC. Thus the Court of Appeals could not consider the constitutionality of the school’s email policy. The Court agreed, but analyzed her argument anyway:

 

The constitution allows the regulation of protected speech in certain circumstances. For example, speech in public forums is subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. In contrast, speech in nonpublic forums may be restricted if the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral

 

Since the email system was a nonpublic forum and application of the statute and WAC was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, there was no constitutional violation

So in an attempt to protect her teaching position, Knudsen lost hers.  Class dismissed!  Or should I say “Claim dismissed!”

0511-0709-0401-3307_English_Teacher_clipart_image

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Gang Affiliation and Witness Intimidation Not Prejudicial for This Walmart Shopper

August 15, 2010

State v. Saenz

Mr. Saenz was a member of a gang called the Bell Garden Locos in Sunnyside, Washington. Saenz got into a verbal altercation at Walmart with two 15 year old members of a rival gang, the Lower Valley Locos. Walmart makes me crazy too. I become a member of the Low Price Locos and our motto is “I don’t care how cheap it is, get me the hell out of here!”  And their logo is a smiley face…I don’t think so.

Walmart guy

The parties left the store and Saenz had a friend, Guillen, pick him up to pursue the two rivals. They found the rivals driving through the parking lot. Saenz started shooting and the two rivals exited their vehicle and ran. Saenz shot one of them in the back. The other fell while trying to escape and put his head through the glass door at Ace Hardware.

Saenz and Guillen escaped, but were later turned in by a relative. Guillen agreed to testify against Saenz for a plea deal. Saenz was charged with two counts of first degree assault and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. At trial, the State sought admission of Saenz’s gang affiliation. “The court found that three detectives had specific knowledge of language, formation, affiliation, and overall gang structure. The trial court allowed the detectives to testify regarding gangs and gang activity to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.”

The State also sought to introduce evidence of witness intimidation. Saenz had been sending messages to Guillen while they were both in jail. Saenz wanted Guillen to take responsibility for the crimes because he wouldn’t get as much time. Guillen was warned that if he didn’t take the rap, then he and his family would be harmed. Guillen was assaulted in the jail by a group of inmates who were “sending a message.” The court allowed the evidence regarding witness intimidation to show guilty knowledge of the crimes and participation.

Saenz was convicted on all charges and the State sought to have Saenz sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole because he was a persistent offender. The judge disagreed that Saenz was a persistent offender because Saenz had plead guilty to second degree assault and custodial assault when he was 15 years old. When Saenz plead guilty to these charges he signed a stipulation declining juvenile jurisdiction and specifically waived the requirement of a declination hearing. Saenz was represented by counsel when he plead guilty. However, the judge who took the plea failed to make any findings regarding the declination of juvenile court jurisdiction or Saenz’s waiver. So the trial court in the present case concluded that these convictions did not qualify for purposes of persistent offender status because there was no express waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Saenz had one other serious offender conviction, but the statute requires two convictions for persistent offender status.

Saenz appealed the admission of gang affiliation evidence and witness intimidation. The State appealed the court’s failure to sentence as a persistent offender.

Since the trial court had weighed the probative value of the evidence of gang affiliation against its prejudicial impact and held that the evidence was being introduced to establish motive, intent, opportunity, and res gestae for the crimes charged, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the ruling. Similarly, the witness intimidation evidence was also properly weighed by the trial court and admitted.

Saenz also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. However, given the testimony of the victim AND Saenz’s own homie that he was the shooter, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient.

In addition, the Court of Appeals found that when Saenz entered his plea as a 15 year old, he knowingly and intelligently waived juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus he was a persistent offender under the statute and the trial court was reversed. Saenz will be getting LIFE! Maybe he can start a new gang called the Life Time Locos!

Life

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Court Holds City Must Haul Their Juveniles 158 Miles for Holding

August 11, 2010

City of East Wenatchee v. Douglas County

East Wenatchee must be a hotbed of juvenile crime. Douglas County had previously allowed East Wenatchee to hold juveniles in their holding facility at Chelan County (Douglas County had a contract with Chelan County). However, the juveniles could only be held at Chelan County until their preliminary hearing. After that, the juveniles were required to be held at a juvenile facility in Medical Lake, which is about 158 miles from East Wenatchee.

But these are hard economic times and counties are slashing costs everywhere. Douglas County was paying $110 per day for each of the East Wenatchee juveniles held at Chelan County. In addition, 70% of the Douglas County juveniles held at Chelan County were East Wenatchee cases. So Douglas County pulled the plug on their agreement with East Wenatchee. After December 5, 2005, East Wenatchee was required to haul the juveniles 158 miles to Medical Lake for holding. They should have made the juveniles ride bikes there…in shackles…in the hot sun…or cold snow; maybe it would deter them from committing crimes!

Snowing Bike 

Transportation to Medical Lake

East Wenatchee broke down and struck their own contract with Chelan County to hold the juveniles until transported to Medical Lake. What a weird name for a lake. Want to go swimming in Medical Lake? I don’t think so.

East Wenatchee filed suit against Douglas County seeking an order requiring Douglas County to pay for holding juveniles at Chelan and for transporting them to Medical Lake. On cross motions for summary judgment the trial court ruled in favor of Douglas County holding that their juvenile holding facility was Medical Lake and East Wenatchee was responsible for transporting their juveniles there.

RCW 13.16.030 requires that counties provide juvenile detention facilities. Douglas County has a juvenile detention facility. The statute does not require that the county place it in a convenient location. East Wenatchee made several arguments citing Attorney General opinions on detaining arrestees, however all of these opinions dealt with cities booking arrestees into jails of the county for which the cites are located. Here, East Wenatchee wanted to book the juveniles into Chelan County; East Wenatchee is in Douglas County. Even though the Chelan County facility is conveniently located 3 miles from East Wenatchee, there is no authority for allowing them to hold their juveniles there. Judgment affirmed.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Six Months Not “Shortly After”…This Time

August 4, 2010

State v. Combs

This one is nice and short. Combs was released from prison on a drug possession charge. Six months later he was charged with attempting to elude a police officer. RCW 9.9A.535(3)(t) allows a court to impose an exceptional sentence if the “defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.” This is referred to as “rapid recidivism.” Say that five times fast!

This case came down to what does “shortly after” mean? Is it a week? A month? Six months? The Court of Appeals held that considering the facts of this case, six months was not “shortly after.” But they weren’t going as far as to draw a line in the sand at six months for every case. The reasoning being that if the defendant had no opportunity to re-offend for six months or immediate access to the means to re-offend (i.e., it takes a while to find contraband), then it could be considered “shortly after.” In addition, some crimes “require a lengthy period of time to plan or come to fruition.” It takes time to knock over a liquor store! Combs exceptional sentence was reversed.

Court of Appeals: Div. III – Assault Was Part of Rape and Thus Cannot Convict for Both Crimes

July 29, 2010

State v. Williams

This is a lovely story about a swell guy (note sarcasm). Floyd Williams was convicted on two counts of rape and one count of second degree assault with sexual motivation, which involved two victims. The cases had been consolidated and tried together. The trial court admitted testimony from the victim of Floyd’s prior rape conviction. Floyd was sentenced to life imprisonment as a persistent offender based on these convictions and the prior rape conviction.

Floyd appealed the admittance of the prior victim’s testimony. In addition, Floyd claimed that the assault charge should have merged with the rape charge.

Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes to show that the defendant acted in conformity with that character-had a propensity to commit this crime. But evidence of prior crimes may be admitted for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Since the facts of the earlier rape were very similar to the facts of both the recent rapes, the trial court held that it showed a common scheme and the prejudice of the testimony was minimal. The Court of Appeals agreed.

Next Floyd argued that he could not be convicted of both assault and rape as the assault was part of the rape and the assault had no independent purpose. Since the assault on the victim before and during the rape is what raised it to the level of First Degree Rape, Floyd couldn’t be convicted of both charges. There was merger of the two crimes and thus the conviction for assault was vacated. Boy, I bet ole Floyd was glad to get that assault off his record. I mean what would his employer think?

Three strikes and you’re out Floyd. Out for life! Floyd also made some Pro-se arguments including that the forensic lab who conducted the tests on the victims had a history of making mistakes. But at trial he argued that the sex was consensual. Nice try Floyd.

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Bailbondsperson testimony exclusion improper under ER 615

July 19, 2010

State v. Skuza

Note: This opinion is not the standard Google Scholar link, but to Washington Courts. As such, it will expire after ninety days.

In presenting a defense to bail jumping, Skuza was allowed to have a bailbondsman testify. He had a conversation with the bailbondsperson, where she related what her testimony would be to Skuza. The transcript on this portion is worth the read. However, the conversation didn’t on its face violate ER 615 and the exclusion is reversible error to that count only:

Here, however, the trial court erred because there was no evidence that Spencer violated ER 615. The trial judge stated that he had seen Skuza and Spencer together in a smoking area near the court and heard a portion of a conversation between them.  But the trial court failed to conduct a hearing regarding the circumstances of the interaction.  Spencer, Skuza, and the trial judge were not questioned about the interaction or their observations of it.  The trial judge made a statement, which was not subject to cross-examination, about what he had witnessed and the results of legal research the trial court extern had conducted.  Counsel discussed the effect of the trial judge’s observation on whether Spencer could be called as a defense witness in the proceeding but did not discuss the fact that the trial judge had inadvertently become a witness in the proceeding.  Skuza had no opportunity to question the trial judge about his observations, call Spencer to testify about the specifics of their contact, or research the law to provide a defense or authority against the sanction of excluding Spencer’s testimony.

Moreover, the trial judge’s description of the conversation did not identify specific exchanges that took place between Spencer and Skuza sufficient to warrant a finding that an ER 615 violation occurred.  The trial judge only described statements that Spencer made to Skuza about her testimony and made no reference to specific statements that Skuza made to Spencer about her intended testimony or his prior testimony.  It is possible that the conversation did not violate ER 615′s intent, which is  ”to discourage or expose inconsistencies, fabrication, or collusion.”  Tegland, § 615.2, at 623.  Skuza had already completed his testimony in the case by the time of the alleged violation, so Spencer telling Skuza about her intended testimony did not give Skuza an opportunity to alter his testimony to match hers.

Without a thorough factual development of the circumstances of the conversation, the record is insufficient to establish that an ER 615 violation occurred.  On this record, the trial court erred when it applied the harshest possible sanction of excluding evidence central to the defendant’s bail jumping defense.

 

 

WA Court of Appeals at Div. II: Have to be under house arrest to get credit for it

July 19, 2010

State v. Dockens

NewImage.jpgNewImage.jpg

(One Dokken is never enough…or maybe it is)

There’s just something really satisfying about homophones. But enough about metal. Dockens contended that it was a violation of the equal protection clause to not give him credit for house arrest on his sentence. Seeing as he was never under house arrest, but on bail with a curfew, he doesn’t get credit for house arrest. Second, he is not a member of a protected class.


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