A.M. was 11 when he allegedly “placed his wiener in RD’s butt.” AM was 11, RD was about 7. RD told the officers it touched the outside but didn’t go inside.
The term “sexual intercourse,” for purposes of RCW chapter 9A.44 (sex offenses), “has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight.” RCW 9A.44.010(1)(a).
That’s the crucial definition here, the difference between Rape of a Child in the First Degree and a lesser charge. The court refused to remand for attempt because the juvenile court didn’t make findings pre-appeal. Same goes with the lesser charge of child molestations.
Two things here, I think the court is narrowly interpreting sexual contact, which meets the definition of intercourse. RD told officers it touched the anus, but didn’t penetrate, which meets the definitions in the RCW.
Second, really? This kid is 11. Obviously he’s had something happen where he because hypersexualized. How about some counseling or something to help him out rather than labeling him as a sex offender. This one goes towards prosecutorial discretion in my book.
Getting an art award overturned is tough, there has to be an error of law on the face of the award. Basically Budget tank was giving estimates of 20-40 grand and invoicing for 360-640 grand. A little bit of a difference. The arbitrations were consolidated, and the people who were screwed allegedly given vastly differing estimates by Budget got really good awards.
Budget moved to vacate based on the consolidation, but appealed the final order, including the alleged error. The court agreed that this fell under a final judgment appeal.
(1) An appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) An order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) A final judgment entered under this chapter.
RCW 7.04A.280. However, a decision on consolidation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The parties were able to explain how their cases met the consolidation criteria in RCW 7.04.100(1), and the court was satisfied that the arbitrator considered those and thus consolidation was proper.
As to errors on the face of the award, the court gave a little bench slap, then gave a BUNCH of reasoning as to why. I won’t put it here, you can go look it up:
Budget contends that the trial court improperly limited its review to the last two pages of the award and failed to consider whether the first 40 pages demonstrated recognizable error. It appears, however, that the court simply concluded that the issues raised by Budget were not reviewable. Having considered all 42 pages, we reach the same conclusion.
Side note: Don’t think I’ll be doing business with Budget (you know, if I ever needed tanks removed). I mean, off by a couple grand I can dig. Off by 2900%? That’s a little bit of a problem.
So Bin had some issues with housing, something about not providing enough information. She went to a hearing that was rescheduled to a date where her attorney couldn’t appear. She speaks limited English. The hearing officer, when asked to reschedule, went and talked to the scheduling coordinator outside the presence of counsel and Bin (there by her lonesome). She had asked for it to be continued to a date where her attorney could be there. The hearing officer said he didn’t have the authority.
Four major issues with this one:
They didn’t provide her with a translator or translate important documents. Since they were forcing her to proceed pro se, they needed to.
Second, the hearing examiner always has authority to reschedule. He’s not bound by the scheduling officer telling him he shouldn’t reschedule. Like He-Man, he has the power.
Third, error for the H.E. to go and talk with the scheduling officer to make his decision. No opportunity to respond=no due process.
Finally, there was some confusion about when jurisdiction vests with the Superior Court in an unlawful detainer with this kind of administrative remedy. The Court held that the Superior Court always has subject matter jurisdiction.
Now if you’re anything like me, you generally want people, especially people in cars, to not be drunk at work. If they are, you generally want someone to be aware of it. In a 5-4 opinion (thank you Tom, Deb, Richard, and Chuck for the dissent), the court held that the current schema of WISHA and the criminal DUI statutes are good enough, and that firing someone for reporting drinking and driving at work is not contrary to public policy.
In April 2004, ALSCO hired Cudney as the service manager of its Spokane branch. During his tenure at ALSCO, Cudney made numerous complaints to his supervisor about the alcohol use of John Bartich, the Spokane branch’s general manager. On June 10, 2008, Cudney observed that Bartich appeared to be intoxicated at work. He noted that Bartich was weaving back and forth, had slurred speech and glazed eyes, and smelled of alcohol. Cudney then observed Bartich drive away in a company vehicle. Cudney reported his observations to the assistant general manager and to the human resources manager. On August 5, 2008, Cudney was terminated from his job.
This guy sounds like the guy on MadMen who wet himself. Not exactly Don Draper material (compare and contrast the classiness:
Anyhow, the Court seems to think that this is okay, because, you know, WISHA and the criminal laws will take him down eventually, hopefully not after he’s killed someone:
This court has long used the adequacy standard, finding, under the jeopardy element of our four-part Gardner analysis, that a tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy can proceed only when other remedies are inadequate. Accordingly, we answer the federal court’s certified questions by holding that Washington’s public policies of (1) promoting workplace safety and protecting workers who report safety violations and (2) protecting the public from drunk drivers are adequately promoted by WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws, respectively.
So let me get this straight, a 30-day administrative exhaustion remedy is okay because DUI laws and WISHA offer enough protection to the public from people drunk at work driving cars around?! I’m sorry, administrative exhaustion just needs to go away. Especially when it comes to whistleblower litigation. All this does is allow terminations in violation of public policy at a rate that exceeds what will likely be brought administratively. It means its still worth it to fire a whistleblower 95% of the time, because Joe Schmoe hasn’t killed anyone yet, and you really like the guy even though he may hit the sauce a bit at work.
In this pair of opinions, the State lays out the duties of the Attorney General. He has discretion to pursue things, yes. But he does not have the discretion to let state agencies hang in the wind. Thus, he has to represent the Department of Natural Resources in pursing the head of that agencies agenda, and cannot simply say he doesn’t want to. However, he can also pursue taking down Obamacare.
Here’s where it gets iffy in my opinion. The governor expressly supports Obamacare. It seems to me then that he is in dereliction of representation of the Office of the Governor. Does this mean that the Gregoire can use the state AG’s office to draft an amicus against itself? Doesn’t this create a conflict within the AG’s office? Shouldn’t discretionary authority be limited by the head of the agency to which you are beholden?
Well, our attorney general really has no inherent powers other than advisory to state agencies. Other powers “may be prescribed by law” under our constitution. A statute (RCW 43.10.030) allows McKenna to engage in litigation in which the State has interest, and interpretation of law gives him discretion on that interest. So basically, its now up to the legislature.
One route may be for the governor to declare the state has no interest in this litigation via formal proclamation, then institute litigation against McKenna herself.
I dunno, McKenna is pushing forward his partisan agenda here in a gubernatorial bid. No sir, I don’t like it!
So for a while I have been mixing and matching my Washington legal news and the reporting on Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect Issues. I’m happy to say that late last night, I have launched a new blog. With the help of the fine folks over at Lexblog, I have launched The Nursing Home Neglect Report. The focus of the blog will be strictly elder care issues, including answer questions, updating the latest legislation in that area, and generally tracking stories and enhancing prevention of elder abuse and neglect.
Also, for those of you that don’t know, I am fairly active on Twitter, tweeting both legal news and elder issues. If you’re a trial attorney working in Elder Abuse, you get the best of both worlds Find me on twitter here.
Now that the launch is done, I hope to resume posting here with a bit more regularity. Enjoy!
These cases are so fact specific that there’s really not a rule of law, simply a case where it did or did not apply. Basically some vouching for credibility happened and there was no objection to it blahdeblahblah. Read it if you want the full scoop.
Flight Options tried to say DOR couldn’t tax them because their planes were all homed in Ohio, and their headquarters was in Ohio. Nice try except they flew into WA airports over 2000 times in two years (while that may not seem like a lot compared to, say, United, this is a charter service).
Find me on twitter 
