Posts Tagged ‘nursing home abuse’

WA Legal Roundup – WA Supreme Court: Dismissed convictions don’t count; Post conviction DNA test goes forward due to non-admitted statement

February 23, 2012

So there’s really not much going on at the Court. We have Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc., which is really just about an indemnity clause (*yawn*).

We have State v. Johnson, which makes me chuckle because of the euphamism for male genitalia (my sense of humor never progressed much beyond a sixth grade level). Anyhow, that case simply stated the obvious. Chris Hansen can get people to pose as little girls, and when you try to have sex with them thinking they’re little girls, you can be found guilty of a crime. Substitute a police sergeant for Chris Hansen, and substitute undercover detectives for the actors on To Catch a Predator, and you see where this is going.

NewImage

There were, however, two interesting cases, both criminal.

State v. Thompson involved post-conviction DNA testing. Under the standard, you really have to show that you stand a more probable than not chance of a different result. Here, the guy is alleged to have beat and raped a girl, and there is a statement that said he had consensual sex with her. So DNA wouldn’t make a difference, right? Well, unfortunately, the prosecutor let slide the statement under a stipulation saying it would only be used if he testified. Had there been a hearing on the admissibility of the statement, could have used it in analyzing the post-conviction DNA request. So he gets his test, but my guess here is that it probably won’t make a lick of difference.

In re: Personal Restraint of Carrier

This is an interesting analysis of post-conviction dismissal under the sentencing reform act. I won’t bore you with the details, but if you have a 3 strikes case with a post-conviction dismissal under the SRA, you should definitely get to know this case. Maybe take it out for dinner. A couple nice glasses of wine. Definitely be sure to call this case the next day, but don’t wait the full three days, you don’t want to look like you’re playing games.

WA Legal Roundup – Div. III: No Fifth Amendment Right for Corporation

November 22, 2011

Diaz v. Wash. State Migrant Council

So in this case, the Migrant Council had some board members who were suspected illegal immigrants. Not the best spot to be in when trying to secure funding. Diaz, the executive director, brought this up to the board, who promptly fired him. During the litigation over the retaliation, sought info on the immigration status of the board. He didn’t seek this from the board members, but from the Migrant Council corporate entity. The Council refused to respond, citing a fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination.

Well, no such luck. While the board makes decisions, it is not the corporate entity. Corporate entities have no fifth amendment right against self-incrimination:

The Fifth Amendment is no impediment to the corporation asking a director for information needed for discovery and relying on him or her to respond. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975) (officer and director’s inculpatory statements provided in an internal investigation were not privileged under the Fifth Amendment; no state compulsion was involved); United States v. Shvarts, 90 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (questions put to defendant in carrying out a private corporation’s own legitimate investigatory purposes do not activate the privilege against self-incrimination), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001); D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir.) (while internal investigation may entail exposure to criminal liability, that in itself is not enough to establish a governmental nexus implicating the Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002). The fact that a corporation’s agent has invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to individual questioning does not excuse the corporation from its duty to respond to discovery.  See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 417, 419-20 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Moreover, a corporation’s failure to respond to discovery because its officers and directors in possession of relevant information have invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege may be considered willful and deliberate since it results from a deliberate choice on the part of the officers and/or directors. Id.; see also
Worthington Pump Corp. (U.S.A.) v. Hoffert Marine, Inc., 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 855, 1982 WL 308871 at *3 (D.N.J. 1982).

A director may be reluctant to provide the information to the corporation out of the same self-interest that prompts him or her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when deposed. But the Fifth Amendment protects only against state-compelled self-incrimination, it ”does not protect against hard choices.”  Solomon, 509 F.2d at 872.

Where an interrogatory is directed at a corporation, “the phrase ‘such information as is available to the party’ has been construed to mean all information available to the corporation’s officers, directors, employees and attorneys.”  Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int’l B.V., 116 F.R.D. 550, 558 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1210 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). Knowledge of officers and employees of a corporation relative to the subject matter of litigation is imputed to the corporation.  Gen. Dynamics, 481 F.2d at 1210 (citing Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. Am. Alloys Corp., 422 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1970)). A corporation’s failure to obtain and provide all such information is incomplete and therefore must be treated as a failure to respond. Chapman & Cole, 116 F.R.D. at 558 (citing Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978)).

The Migrant Council’s core argument is that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the Migrant Council’s due process rights “when it ordered the Council to do the impossible: to produce documents and information about the actual immigration status of its current or former volunteer Board members.” Br. of Appellant at 15. The directors presumably have responsive information. But the Migrant Council inexplicably excludes its directors from “the Council” whose duty it is to respond. When asked at oral argument which human actors the Migrant Council has in mind as “the Council” that cannot respond, its lawyers identified themselves and the several corporate contacts who assisted them in drafting responses. Whether a corporation has reasonably responded to discovery is not measured solely by whether the lawyers and corporate administrators tasked with drafting responses have included all of the information they have collected. It is substantially measured by whether corporate directors, officers, employees, and other agents who possess responsive information have provided it to be included in the corporation’s response.

The fact that a corporation’s lawyers and their contacts have been unable to secure cooperation may be an explanation for a corporation’s insufficient response, but it does not excuse it. This is so even where cooperation is lacking because corporate principals are concerned about criminal culpability. If corporate principals’ refusal to cooperate out of concern for self-incrimination excused a corporation from providing relevant information in discovery, then there would be an inverse relation between corporate management’s violation of law and an adverse party’s ability to prove it: the more criminally culpable a corporation’s management, the less its obligation to provide discovery. We may assume that in many cases where corporate principals refuse to cooperate in responding to discovery it is for substantial self-serving reasons. The fact remains that the corporation — whose employees, officers, and directors could provide the needed information — has not provided it.

(emphasis added).

The court goes on to talk about how the Council can’t really balk about the sanction of an adverse inference, because it proposed the darned sanction as a lesser sanction in lieu of default. Further, just because you claim the Fifth (or your board has), that doesn’t mean you’re protected from adverse consequences in a civil proceeding.

WA Legal Roundup – WA State Supreme Court: Per curium defining substantial bodily harm; withdrawal of plea ok given misunderstanding of offender score

October 6, 2011

Two new opinions out of the court. One was a per curiam decision. What does that mean? The law in the thing is so basic, that the court doesn’t really feel the need to have a “majority” author, because the court is speaking with one united voice. Here, in State v. McKague, the court used the opportunity to correct the court of appeals definition of substantially bodily harm:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a split decision. Judge Armstrong dissented on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm.” He specifically disagreed with the lead opinion’s citation to a dictionarydefinition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” State v. McKague, 159 Wn. App. 489, 520-21, 246 P.3d 558 (2011) (Armstrong, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Armstrong opined that under this definition, any cognizable injury would necessarily be “substantial.” He would have held that the term “substantial” requires the harm to be considerable and that the State’s evidence was insufficient to meet that standard.

We agree with Judge Armstrong that the majority applied an erroneous definition of “substantial,” but we nonetheless affirm McKague’s conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show that Chang’s injuries were “substantial” under a proper definition.

The court takes no side on whether it was appropriate to define substantial in a jury instruction, only that the definition by the court of appeals was wrong. So what is the proper definition?

We hold instead that the term “substantial,” as used in RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), signifies a degree of harm that is considerable and necessarily requires a showing greater than an injury merely having some existence. While we do not limit the meaning of “substantial” to any particular dictionary definition, we approve of the definition cited by the dissent below: “considerable in amount, value, or worth.” Webster’s, supra, at 2280.

The next case on the block is State v. Robinson. Robinson was given a plea deal after being explained the implications. He thought his juvenile offenses had washed out. Not true. So basically he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary waiver, and the trial court allowed him to withdraw the plea. The Supremes agreed, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to do so.

 

WA Legal Roundup – WA State Supreme Court: No appeal of hearing for school district. Must read for teachers!

October 5, 2011

Federal Way Sch. Dist. v. Vinson

When a teacher loses a dispute in this state at the level of administrative hearing, they have the ability to appeal to the court. A lot of this is rooted in the fact that the license carries with it the ability to work. Any law student who has taken constitutional law can tell you that (due process, people). In Washington, its also governed by statute.

The statute doesn’t provide a right of appeal to the school districts if the hearing officer finds for the teacher, a fact which has been just affirmed by our supreme court:

We hold that the statutory writ, an extraordinary remedy, is not available to the school district. In contrast, the constitutional writ is always available to a party seeking relief from arbitrary, capricious, or illegal acts. The hearing officer acted within the limits of his statutory authority, and his final decision was not arbitrary or capricious. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the attorney fees awarded by the superior court.

The court of appeals reasoning below basically held that a teacher could be fired for doing anything not work related during the school day, even if at lunch:

The Court of Appeals first deviated from our stated rule in Clarke in Sauter v. Mount Vernon School District No. 320, 58 Wn. App. 121, 791 P.2d 549 (1990). Relying on Pryse and Potter,[17] the Sauter court eliminated the remediability prong of the second Clarke test. Sauter, 58 Wn. App. at 130-31. The Sauter test — sufficient cause for a teacher’s discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher’s deficiency is (1) irremediable and materially and substantially affects the teacher’s performance or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose — eradicated the significant protections previously afforded teachers by the sufficient cause standard.[18] Under the Sauter test, any misconduct will be grounds for discharge because, by definition, misconduct is behavior that “lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose.” Id. at 130.

The ramifications of the modified-Clarke rule are glaringly apparent in Vinson. The Clarke rule as modified by Vinson holds that any time a teacher, in the course of his job, engages in conduct lacking any “professional purpose,” that teacher may be discharged. Vinson, 154 Wn. App. at 230. This creates a per se rule of discharge under which any school-day lapse, no matter how minor and no matter the context, will always constitute sufficient cause for the teacher’s discharge. Essentially, the Vinson court, relying on Sauter, removes the required nexus between alleged teacher misconduct or deficiency and teaching performance. We reject this alteration of our Clarke rule. The nexus requirement finds root in the constitution. See, e.g., Hoagland, 95 Wn.2d at 429 (“[I]t would violate due process to discharge a teacher without showing actual impairment to performance.”).

Sufficient cause may be found as a matter of law, without applying the Clarke test or Hoagland factors, in only the most egregious cases. We hold that where a teacher engages in sexually exploitive conduct or physical abuse of a student, sufficient cause is established as a matter of law; the Clarke test and Hoagland factors (if applicable, see Clarke, 106 Wn.2d at 114) must be applied in all nonflagrant instances of misconduct.

So basically, because the conduct of the teacher on his lunch (shouting match with a former student, who was harassing him because of gender identity) had nothing to do with his ability to teach, he gets to keep his job.

WA Legal Roundup – Div I: Commission Order Lessening Cops Punishment Not Supported By Substantial Evidence; Requests Under the PRA are NOT Continuing (duh); Oath-ify Your De Novo; UW Has Delegated Authority to Suspend Raises; But There’s Not…err…typo…NOW Racism; Review Those Manslaughter Instructions; Can’t Just Toss Out an Other-Person With ONLY Evidence That Another Said They Did It To Cops; Goodwill is an Asset

September 19, 2011

Holy &*(%!!!! Is Division I trying to kill yours truly? I need to get a hold of some truthers up in this biatch! Seriously! Eight opinions?! Ever heard of a little thing called staggering? Or scotch! Scotch would resolve this problem, I bet. If you’re hungover, you won’t pump out this much work in one day.

Werner v. Seattle Police Dep’t

Its rare that you see something kicked back on lack of evidence grounds. Here, Werner (an officer with SPD) was disciplined for lying to investigators about striking a suspect. SPD, of course, wants its officers to be truthful. This is especially true given the recent string of incidents of officer violence.

Anyhow, Werner was being investigated for excessive force and denied striking a suspect. During the interview process for a job in Snohomish, he admitted to striking the suspect.

Gil 86′d the officer, but the commission reduced it to a 30-day suspension based on what it deemed uneven application of the discipline rules around truthfulness.

29.  Even-Handedness of the Rule.  The Commission 
       majority is concerned about the even-handedness in which the 
       Department is applying its rules.  There is evidence that employees
       in past cases involving dishonesty either received no suspension 
       of duties or only temporary suspension of duties.  Examples of 
       more lenient punishment include an officer who fired shots at a 
       stolen car and then misrepresented the facts was not suspended 
       for the incident; an officer who did not notify authorities of the 
       discharge of his service weapon, and only reported the incident 
       when he learned that local police were investigating was not 
       suspended but instead received a disciplinary transfer with no loss 
       of pay; an off-duty officer was involved in an encounter when her 
       handgun was accidentally discharged, she initially denied it before 
       reporting it to her chain of command and was given only 15 days 
       suspension; and an officer, who denied using any force but was 
       contradicted by three witnesses, received a one-day suspension 
       for excessive force in a case where dishonesty was an issue. To 
       date, no other employee has been terminated based on 
       dishonesty.  The Commission majority concludes the evidence 
       does not support that the Department even-handedly applied its 
       rules.

       The superior court reversed finding of fact 29 for lack of evidentiary 

support. The superior court ruled as follows:  

              The Department correctly argues that the finding is not supported 
       by substantial evidence.  To the contrary, none of the cases cited by the 
       Commission include a sustained finding of dishonesty (as opposed to 
       other misconduct).  Moreover, none of the cited cases involve a sustained 
       finding of intentional dishonesty in an investigation regarding use of force.  
       Nor did the Commission find that the misbehavior in the cited cases was 
       either as serious as or more serious than Werner's dishonesty.  In short, 
       there is neither any evidence that other officers who either engaged in the 
       same behavior or who were disciplined for dishonesty were treated 

                                           8 

No. 65632-5-I/9

       differently.

Yes, I’m going to be lazy and not format that. Its a pain in the butt and I have better things to do. Anyhow, the supremes went through the cases of “unevenhandedness” and found that they weren’t comparable to Werner, noting that even Diaz had testified that not all discrepancies are acts of dishonesty (the law does allow for brain farts).

The superior court decision stands and the court refused to reinstate the commission ruling.

Sargent v. Seattle Police Department

There is no standing request under the PRA. Once the disclosure is made, they don’t have to keep looking through new documents. Can you imagine?!

Brackman v. City of Lake Forest Park

A certificate of service filed with a request for trial de novo that is

signed by a legal assistant, but is not made under oath or under penalty of perjury, is

not "proof that a copy has been served" under Mandatory Arbitration Rule (MAR)

7.1(a).  We affirm the trial court's decision to strike the request for trial de novo and the 

order denying reconsideration.

Nye v. Univ. of Wash.

Peter Nye, representing a putative class of University of 

Washington faculty members, appeals a summary judgment order dismissing his 

breach of contract claim against the  university.  Nye contends the university 

breached its contractual obligation under the faculty salary policy to pay two 

percent merit raises to eligible faculty members during the 2009-2011 biennium.  

Because the university acted within its delegated authority in suspending the 

merit raises, we affirm.

State v. Read

Read argued that he didn’t focus his racial epithets at one person as required by the law. The court begged to differ: “We hold that the virulent racial epithets Read used coupled with his aggressive and intimidating conduct establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Read intentionally and maliciously threatened the victim because of her race, color, ancestry, or national origin, and sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Read made a true threat.

Donezo!

State v. Peters

The jury 

found Peters not guilty of felony murder but guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.  

Contrary to State v. Gamble, 154 Wn.2d 457, 114 P.3d 646 (2005) and 11 Washington 

Practice:  Washington Pattern Jury Instructions:  Criminal 10.03 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC),

the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that in order to convict Peters of 

manslaughter in the first degree, the State need only prove that he knew of and 

disregarded "a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur," rather than "a substantial 

risk that death may occur." Because the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless  

No. 64568-4-I/2

beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

State v. Strizheus

This one is interesting. Strizheus pointed to his son, Vladimir. Because of what I’m about to type, I think I should refer to him as “Vlad the Stabby”:

In his trial brief, Strizheus claimed Valentina blamed Strizheus for committing the 

crime because she was more afraid of Vladimir than she was of Strizheus.  Strizheus

asserted that Vladimir "is a suspect in this case" and there was evidence that 

established Vladimir committed the charged crime.  Strizheus argued that the evidence 

of Vladimir's October 2007 statements to the police, the February 2007 malicious 

mischief conviction, the 2008 incident resulting in the assault charge, and evidence that 

police had been called to the residence on several occasions in the months before the 

stabbing, met the requirements to admit evidence that Vladimir committed the crime.  

The defense further sought to introduce evidence that Vladimir was angry at Strizheus

because Strizheus allegedly had sex with Vladimir's girlfriend, and evidence that 

Valentina broke up a physical fight between Strizheus and Vladimir a couple of days 

before the stabbing.  

       The trial court addressed the admissibility of the proffered other suspect

                                               6 

No. 64077-1-I/7

evidence several times during the trial.  Most of the discussion focused on the 

admissibility of the statements Vladimir made in October 2007 as recounted in the 

police reports.  The State and the defense disputed whether these statements 

amounted to a confession to the crime.  Relying on the report of one officer, the 

defense argued that Vladimir said that he "'stabbed his mother and father.'"  The State

countered that the statements the defense relied on were not actually Vladimir's words 

but only the officer's interpretation of what Vladimir said to the other officer.  According 

to the State, the police officer whose report Vladimir cited would testify that Vladimir's 

actual statements were "'[i]t's my fault, arrest me.  I should be in jail.'"

 

Now, I don’t know about you, but those statements seem pretty clear cut evidence of a different person committing the crime. I’m no Sherlock Holmes here, but a guy coming up to me and saying “I stabbed her” is pretty good evidence that its not anyone that didn’t say that.

The court of appeals frames this, talking not about the other evidence, which Strizheus didn’t talk about in the brief, but which he rested on just the statement:

But on appeal, Strizheus challenges only the trial court's 

exclusion of the statement Vladimir allegedly made to police in October 2007.  

Strizheus argues that the prior statement is direct evidence that Vladimir committed the 

crime.  Strizheus claims a statement that Vladimir stabbed his mother and father,

standing alone, satisfies the nexus required to admit evidence showing that Vladimir 

committed the crime.        

I dunno, they say its not enough on its own. I don’t agree with this. This is when we get down to technicalities instead of truth. Hopefully there’s an appeal to the supreme court.

Dixon v. Crawford, McGilliard, Peterson & Yelish

Goodwill is an asset for law firms.


In other news, have you checked out the new blog? The Nursing Home Neglect Report covers issues of elder abuse and neglect and elder care. You can find it at http://www.nursinghomeneglectreport.com.

WA Legal Roundup – WA Supreme Court: No specific findings competency for waiver needed for pro-se; County jails need to provide good-time credit; failure to define aggravators not a manifest constitutional error; Statutory language trumps on lien

September 15, 2011

Pers. Restraint of Rhome

In this original personal restraint petition, Demar Rhome argues 

that the state and federal constitutions require independent findings of fact that a 

defendant is competent to waive counsel and represent himself at trial.  He also 

argues that the colloquy conducted by the trial court here was inadequate to secure a 

valid waiver of counsel.  We disagree and dismiss his personal restraint petition.

Pers. Restraint of Talley

We hold that the statutory issue is properly before us.  We also hold 

that former RCW 9.92.151 requires a county jail to provide opportunities for 

a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit.  We do not reach Talley's 

constitutional issue.  Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicts with 

former RCW 9.92.151, Talley should receive earned early-release credit at 

the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.

State v. Gordon

John Gordon and Charles Bukovsky were each charged 

with second-degree murder in the beating death of Brian Lewis.  The State also 

sought two aggravating sentencing factors: deliberate cruelty and particular 

vulnerability of the victim.  The jury was instructed to determine whether the  

State v. Gordon (John Caldwell); State v. Bukovsky (Charles Andrew), 84240-0

aggravators were present, but the instructions did not define "deliberate cruelty" or 

"particular vulnerability."    The defendants did not object to the instructions on that 

basis.  The jury found the defendants guilty and also found the aggravators applied.  

The trial court imposed exceptional sentences.  We must decide whether the failure 

to provide detailed instructions defining the meaning of "deliberate cruelty" or 

"particular vulnerability" is a manifest error of constitutional magnitude that may be 

addressed for the first time on appeal.  We hold that it is not and therefore reverse 

the Court of Appeals.

Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc.

RCW 60.04.091(2) requires mechanics' liens to be 

"acknowledged pursuant to chapter 64.08 RCW"  --  that is, an authorized person 

must certify in writing that the signor executed the lien freely and voluntarily.  RCW 

64.08.050.  RCW 60.04.091(2) also includes a sample claim of lien that the statute

states "shall be sufficient" but that does not include language satisfying the

acknowledgment requirement.  Contractors Athletic Fields Inc. (AFI) and Hos Bros. 

Construction Inc. each filed claims of lien that used the sample form and did not 

contain certificates of acknowledgment.  In each case, the lower court concluded the 

lien was invalid.  We disagree and hold that a claim of lien in the sample form is 

valid despite the absence of a proper acknowledgment.

 

 

In other news, have you checked out the new blog? The Nursing Home Neglect Report covers issues of elder abuse and neglect and elder care. You can find it at http://www.nursinghomeneglectreport.com




Announcing New Blog! The Nursing Home Neglect Report

August 31, 2011

So for a while I have been mixing and matching my Washington legal news and the reporting on Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect Issues. I’m happy to say that late last night, I have launched a new blog. With the help of the fine folks over at Lexblog, I have launched The Nursing Home Neglect Report. The focus of the blog will be strictly elder care issues, including answer questions, updating the latest legislation in that area, and generally tracking stories and enhancing prevention of elder abuse and neglect.

Also, for those of you that don’t know, I am fairly active on Twitter, tweeting both legal news and elder issues. If you’re a trial attorney working in Elder Abuse, you get the best of both worlds ;) Find me on twitter here.

Now that the launch is done, I hope to resume posting here with a bit more regularity. Enjoy!

-The Prof


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